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Preface 
 
All Greek words in the text are transliterated, even in direct quotations from 
modern authors where the original quoted words in Greek script. The translations of 
Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism quoted in the text are drawn from Benson Mates, 
The Skeptic Way (New York and Oxford, 1995). I have also consulted Annas and 
Barnes, Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge and New York, 2000). 
I use ‘Pyrrhonist’ and ‘sceptic’ interchangeably. When I refer to Sextus’s writings in 
the text, I use PH as an abbreviation for the Outlines of Pyrrhonism and M as an 
abbreviation for Against the Mathematicians, followed by book and section number. 
When I quote from Wittgenstein in the text I use T as an abbreviation for the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus followed by section number and PI as an 
abbreviation for the Philosophical Investigations followed by section number.    
 
The length of this thesis is 80975 words 
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INTORDUCTION 
 
DOING PHILOSPHY IN WORDS 
 
This thesis addresses fundamental issues about the very nature of philosophy 
by exploring the philosophical writings and methods of Plato, Sextus Empiricus and 
Wittgenstein under the framework of a special mode of doing philosophy that does 
not result in theory or doctrine. Philosophy is a self-reflective discipline and 
philosophical writings naturally fall within the scope of its field of study since the 
antique. We should recall the famous statement that ‘there is an old quarrel between 
philosophy and poetry’ in Plato’s Republic (607b5-6) and the various discussions of 
rhetoric and poetry in the Ion, Republic, Gorgias and the Phaedrus. In the modern 
time, the philosophical importance of the dialogue form, orality, authorial 
anonymity and silence, dramatic techniques, irony and humour, the fables, myths 
and stories used in Plato’s writing has gained increasing attention in Platonic 
scholarship.1 Moreover contemporary philosophers also begin to take film seriously 
as a new subject for philosophical investigation (films as philosophy) and also a new 
form of philosophical medium (the philosophy of film).2  These ongoing and 
                                                 
1
 See for instance Arieti 1991, Clay 2000, Farness 1991, Fendt and Rozema 1998, Hart and Tejera 
1997, Klagge and Smith 1992, and also Press 1993 and 2000. The discussion on Plato in this thesis 
should join force with this growing trend. 
2
 See for instance Cavell 1979a and 1995, Falzon 2002, Frampton 2006, Freeland and Wartenberg 
1995, Livingston 2009, Read and Goodenough 2005. 
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spreading interests in philosophical writing, methods, and new media reflect the 
critical and self-examining dimension of philosophy.  
This thesis investigates the philosophical and interpretive challenges posed 
by the distinctive language-uses, as well as the unique styles and methods of Plato, 
Sextus and Wittgenstein. The novelty of this thesis lies in its attempt to apply the 
idea of non-assertoric discourse in a close examination of a wide and disparate 
philosophical writings by three major philosophers from different schools of thought 
and traditions.  
In general, language can be put to different kinds of use and the same 
sentence-type can perform different speech acts. The force of my utterance may not 
be given in the form of my utterance and the relationship between the words being 
used and their illocutionary points is often oblique. All these can have crucial 
implications on how we should approach a philosophical text if we want to achieve a 
more sophisticated and sensitive reading. For instance, because of the subtleties in 
language-use we cannot understand a philosophical statement without understanding 
its status first. In a philosophical writing the form of its statements can be 
misleading and hence the reader has to go beyond the form to discern the force and 
the status of its statements. Secondly we cannot grasp the meaning and status of a 
philosophical statement without understanding the philosopher’s real purposes or his 
illocutionary intentions. For instance, the philosopher may employ language as if he 
is committed to the views advocated in his work but in fact he may just want to 
prompt debate, initiate philosophical reflection, or simply identify questions and 
problems instead of making theoretical assertions. Therefore the reader has to decide 
the philosopher’s real purposes or the illocutionary intentions of the author. The 
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intentions may be arguing or asserting one’s own view as the correct view. But there 
can be other non-assertoric intentions like maieutic, therapy, or elucidation.  
For, as I shall argue in the examples of Sextus and Wittgenstein, the 
philosopher may employ sentences that look like assertions in his work and yet the 
sentences are actually not intended as straightforward assertions of his own 
theoretical beliefs. The philosopher may do it on purpose and this purpose may have 
nothing to do with theoretical assertion or system-building. As I shall argue, in the 
rest of the thesis, Plato takes great care to formally distance himself from the fictive 
assertions of his dramatis personae and it is apt to construe his work as maieutic. 
Plato is more concerned to put ideas on test and help the reader to think through the 
problems rather than to assert his own metaphysical convictions. Therefore to read 
Plato’s writing as if it is a means of ascent to a set of Platonic doctrines is misguided. 
Moreover, other than making theoretical assertion, the purpose can be therapeutic: 
the philosopher may want to bring about a positive change in the reader. In the case 
of Sextus, he wants to put an end to dogmatizing and help people to achieve 
ataraxia by suspension of dogmatic belief. In addition, the purpose can be 
elucidatory. In the case of Wittgenstein, his early work wants to elucidate that any 
attempt to use language to get outside language can only lead to nonsensicality 
whilst his later work wants to show that we are held captive by some problematic 
pictures of language and meaning, like a fly is held captive by a fly-bottle (PI §309). 
Insofar as Wittgenstein’s works are intended to release the reader from the perceived 
malaise his works are also therapeutic. 
Indeed, to stress once more, this thesis addresses fundamental issues about 
the very nature of philosophy itself. Now, it is useful to think of the nature of 
philosophy (the answer to the ‘what is philosophy?’ question) as containing two key 
11 
 
aspects: what it is about and what it does. For instance, it is said that G. E. Moore’s 
response to the question, ‘what is philosophy’, ‘was to gesture towards his 
bookshelves’, saying ‘it is what all those are about.’3 This is an answer of the first 
kind. It mentions what philosophical discourse is about (however uninformative it is 
on what exactly that is). Despite its brevity, the response contains a germ of truth. In 
a sense philosophy is the corpus of philosophical writing. Seen in this light, it can be 
suggested that philosophy is the main subject of (for instance) Plato’s various 
dialogues; Aristotle’s Organon and Nicomachean Ethics; Descartes’s Meditations 
on First Philosophy (1641); Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651); Spinoza’s Ethics (1677); 
Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Nature (1690); Leibniz’s Monadology (1714); 
Berkeley’s Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge; Hume’s An 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748); Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781) and many other classic writings of past and contemporary philosophers. 
The other answer to the question, ‘what is philosophy’, responds by saying 
what it does: philosophy is what philosophers do. Now, one part of the proper 
business of practising philosophers consists in discussing and evaluating the views 
of their predecessors and their contemporaries, and also the arguments that have 
been advanced in support of various views. So, the writings of past and present 
philosophers become a shared intellectual heritage or a common framework for 
every re-investigation of perennial philosophical perplexities. New investigation can 
take off by revisiting and reassessing one or several historical stances and the 
supporting arguments offered. This kind of activity reflects the critical dimension of 
philosophy as a unique discipline which comes to concern itself with itself and falls 
within the scope of its own field of study.  
                                                 
3
 Flew 1980, 3. 
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But clearly this is not all that philosophers do; they also think, speak and write 
about their own views. They do philosophy by generating discourse in words. In 
particular, philosophical writing and spoken discourse play a central role in the 
on-going practice of philosophy and in the communication of the results of 
philosophical enquiry. As mentioned earlier, this aspect of philosophy is the focus of 
the current study. In this thesis I shall take a closer look at the special status of 
philosophical writing in its own right. It must be said that in most cases 
philosophical writing is not the primary object of philosophical enquiry. But by 
adopting this particular focus, I hope to reveal a distinctive mode of writing and 
doing philosophy that does not result in theory or doctrine. In particular, I hope to 
remove the misunderstandings caused by dogmatic reading of Plato, Sextus and 
Wittgenstein. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
DOING PHILOSOPHY:  
THE ASSERTORIC WAY  
AND THE NON-ASSERTORIC WAY 
 
Philosophical writing comes in a wide variety of species and expository forms, 
each of which has its own characteristic structure and serves a different purpose. A 
visionary philosophical perspective may call for a creative mode of exposition. For 
example, Plato’s dialogues represent an innovative type of philosophical rhetoric 
which I discuss in Chapter Two. An original philosophical outlook may introduce a 
new methodological conception that expands the available forms of philosophical 
writing. For example, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the 
Philosophical Investigations are two prime examples of this kind which I discuss in 
Chapter Four. Indeed the influential writings of the great philosophers display 
various forms of exposition. They range in expository form from the 
ground-breaking Meditations of Descartes to the tight geometrical demonstration of 
Spinoza’s Ethics, from the grandiose architectonic structure of Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason to the rigid systemic organization of numbered paragraphs assembled 
in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. In fact, even when the great philosophers engage in the 
same expository form, they can still enrich it with new twists. For instance, a 
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seemingly common expository form, the dialogue form, is adapted for use 
differently by Plato and Wittgenstein.4 
The examples that I shall explore in this thesis are also the results of creative 
philosophical authorship. While the most common mode of writing in philosophy 
involves making assertion, the examples that I shall consider opt for a radically 
different approach: they avoid assertoric presentation of the writer’s own views. For 
example, Sextus’s writing, my second case study in Chapter Two, resembles the 
report of a non-committal chronicler which can never justify assertions about 
anything on the basis of what appears to him to be the case. Clearly in order to judge 
whether a given piece of philosophical writing is assertoric or non-assertoric, we 
need some criteria. Since non-assertoric discourse is defined in relation to assertoric 
discourse, it is best if we first look more closely at the defining characteristics of 
assertoric discourse.  
 
1. ASSERTORIC DISCOURSE: A FAMILIAR MODEL ACROSS 
SEVERAL TRADITIONS 
 
Philosophy, particularly in the analytic tradition, often seems to model itself on 
the scientific or historical paradigm, whose distinctive features include the 
presentation of factual evidence, the discussion of alternative views, the exposition 
of the writer’s views supported by the development and presentation of a set of 
reasoned defences for those views. This might be explained by virtue of the fact that 
                                                 
4
 Here I am referring to the ‘later’ Wittgenstein and his Philosophical Investigations. I discuss the 
dialogical structure of the Philosophical Investigations in Chapter Four.  
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many philosophers, particularly those in the analytic tradition, see themselves as 
doing something akin to scientists or historians: they seek the objective truth about 
the nature of things, they operate with strict methodological criteria, and when in 
possession of results that meet the relevant criteria they themselves assent to the 
findings and assert them in published works as a shared positive contribution to 
human knowledge. 
In order to illustrate this point, I want to look at three examples of assertoric 
discourse, two from twentieth century philosophers (one from the analytic and the 
other from the continental tradition) and one from a Chinese philosopher working in 
a quite different tradition. By taking a brief look at these examples we shall see why 
we might readily assume that philosophers typically engage in the practice of 
making assertions, or developing arguments that are designed to support their own 
views—views that they personally endorse and believe.  
 
1.1. Three Examples of Assertoric Mode of Discourse 
 
Russell’s ‘On Denoting’, a classic work from the analytic tradition published in 
1905, is concerned with the meaning and reference of proper names. Russell begins 
his assertoric presentation by defining his vocabulary of concepts.5 But, he says, the 
form can be misleading and he sets out three very different cases of denoting phrases 
                                                 
5
 Russell 1905, 479: ‘By a “denoting phrase” I mean a phrase such as any one of the following: a 
man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the present King of 
France, the centre of mass of the Solar System at the first instant of the twentieth century, the 
revolution of the earth around the sun, the revolution of the sun around the earth. Thus a phrase is 
denoting solely in virtue of its form.’ 
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to show that the interpretation of denoting phrases ‘is a matter of considerable 
difficulty’ and that ‘ it is very hard to frame any theory not susceptible of formal 
refutation’.6 Then Russell claims that he has a proposal that will resolve the 
problems and he gives a clear layout of the course of his argument for his proposed 
Theory of Descriptions.7  
 
I shall begin by stating the theory I intend to advocate; I shall then discuss the theories of 
Frege and Meinong, showing why neither of them satisfies me; then I shall give the 
grounds in favour of my theory; and finally I shall briefly indicate the philosophical 
consequences of my theory. 
 
Russell launches his assertoric presentation with an initial summary of his Theory 
of Descriptions.8 In his discussion Russell rejects Meinong’s theory on the ground 
that it violates the law of contradiction. Frege’s theory is rejected on a different 
ground; it could not settle the cases in which the denotation appears to be absent. 
After shooting down these alternative theories, Russell then proceeds to argue for 
his own theory, according to which ‘a denoting phrase is essentially part of a 
sentence, and does not, like most single words, have any significance on its own 
account’.9 Finally he draws out what he took to be an interesting result after his 
Theory of Descriptions was grounded.10 
                                                 
6
 Russell 1905, 479. The three problematic cases are as follows. 
(1) A phrase may be denoting, and yet not denote anything; e.g., “the present King of France”. (2) A 
phrase may denote one definite object; e.g., “the present King of England” denotes a certain man. (3) 
A phrase may denote ambiguously; e.g., “a man” denotes not many men, but an ambiguous man. 
7
 Russell 1905, 480: 
8
 Russell 1905, 480: ‘This is the principle of the theory of denoting I wish to advocate: that denoting 
phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in whose verbal expression 
they occur has a meaning.’ 
9
 Russell 1905, 488. 
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The structure of Russell’s sample writing provides a paradigm example of 
assertoric mode of writing in philosophical discourse. The flow is clear; the 
development is logical and the writing is packed with arguments that serve to refute 
alternative theories and support Russell’s own proposal as the correct theory on the 
meaning and reference of proper names. Indeed, the references to ‘my theory’ in his 
discussion and the personal satisfaction that he reveals in the course of his 
arguments mean that there is little doubt that Russell is asserting his own views on 
the topic, his own genuinely held beliefs as the correct theory on the meaning and 
reference of proper names.  
The nature of truth (das Wesen der Wahrheit) is a pervasive issue in Heidegger’s 
work and he presents it under the notion of unconcealment or aletheia (the Greek 
word for truth) in his essay ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. Heidegger believes that 
since the nature of truth is always best understood in terms of unconcealment and 
therefore he needs to probe into unconcealment to discern the nature of truth. 
Heidegger begins his essay by taking on the notion of origin and gradually moves on 
to elaborate on the dynamic between the artist and his artwork.11  
Heidegger considered two initial questions, namely (a) Where and how does art 
exist? and (b) But what and how is a work of art?12 Heidegger contends that his 
enquiry must go in a hermeneutic circle in that ‘What art is we should be able to 
gather from the work, and What the work is we can only find out from the nature of 
                                                                                                                                         
10
 Russell 1905, 492-493.  
11
 Heidegger 2002, 1: ‘Origin means here that from where and through which a thing is what it is and 
how it is. That which something is, as it is, we call its nature [Wesen]. The origin of something is the 
source of its nature. The question of the origin of the artwork asks about the source of its nature. 
According to the usual view, the work arises out of and through the activity of the artist. But through 
and from what is the artist that which he is?’ 
12
 Heidegger 2002, 1-2. 
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art’. Then he moves on to bring the ‘thingliness’ in the artwork into view. He 
discusses what a thing is and dismisses the three predominate interpretations of the 
thingness of the thing in the history of Western thought, that is, ‘Things as bearer of 
characteristics’, ‘The thing as nothing but the unity of a sensory manifold’, and ‘The 
thing as formed matter’. Under Heidegger’s discussion, each of these interpretations 
turns out to be an assault on the thing and together they generate a mode of thinking 
that ‘shackles reflection on the being of particular beings’.13 
Therefore, Heidegger proposes to distinguish ‘the thingness of the thing’, ‘the 
equipmentality of equipment’, and ‘the workly character of the work’. He discusses 
van Gogh’s portrayal of a pair of peasant shoes and finally announces that ‘Van 
Gogh’s painting is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of peasant shoes, in 
truth, is. This being steps forward into the unconcealment of its being. The 
unconcealment of being is what the Greeks called aletheia. We say ‘truth’ and think 
little enough in using the word. In the work, when there is a disclosure of the being 
as what and how it is, there is a happening of truth at work.’14  
Heidegger believes that what is at work in the artwork is ‘the opening up of 
beings in their being, the happening of truth’ (p.18) and this opening up is the 
unconcealment of the truth of beings.  Though Heidegger was working in a 
different tradition and in a different philosophical style, his essay is just as assertive 
as Russell’s sample writing and exhibits once more fundamental characteristics of 
assertoric discourse. It contains fewer arguments, but there is little difference in the 
extent to which the author stands firmly behind his claims and statements. Both 
writers are clearly overtly committed to the views expressed in their writings. 
                                                 
13
 Heidegger 2002 4-12. 
14
 Heidegger 2002, 16. 
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My third example of philosophy is not from the Western tradition, but from 
Chinese philosophy. The Daodejing is a classic writing in Chinese daoist philosophy. 
Laozi is believed to be the author of this concise but profound text. The Daodejing 
has been widely respected across many traditions and Heidegger himself attempted 
to translate portions of the text in 1946. The Daodejing is composed of only around 
five thousand words organized in eighty-one chapters or sections. The shorter 
chapters last not more than thirty words and the longer chapters run for slightly more 
than one hundred words. With its very limited words, the Daodejing is able to 
articulate and provide discerning ideas in broad areas like ethics, politics, ontology 
and cosmogony. The writing is predominately poetic and minimally argumentative. 
And yet, once again, like Russell’s ‘On Denoting’ and Heidegger’s ‘The Origin of 
the Work of Art’, the Daodejing is written in an assertoric tone; once again, the 
whole writing amounts to an assertive pronouncement of the writer’s own views. A 
small sample will help to give an idea of this work. Some prominent examples of the 
assertive pronouncements made in the Daodejing are as follows. 
 
Chapter 8 
Highest good is like water. 
Because water excels in benefiting the myriad creatures without 
Contending with them and settles where none would like to be, 
It comes close to the Way. 
 
In a home it is the site that matters; 
In quality of mind it is depth that matters; 
In an ally it is benevolence that matters; 
In speech it is good faith that matters; 
In government it is order that matters; 
In affairs it is ability that matters; 
In action it is timeliness that matters. 
It is because it does not contend that it is never at fault. (Translated by D. C. Lau) 
20 
 
 
Chapter 12 
Colours blind the eye. 
Music deafens the ear. 
Flavours numb the taste. 
Desires wither the heart. 
Rare goods cause delinquency 
The Sage seeks for no more than subsistence (My translation) 
 
As I have said, the Daodejing is predominately poetic and minimally 
argumentative while its tone is utterly assertoric. The Daodejing presents its 
assertoric aphorisms and makes no direct attempt to give supporting arguments. But 
the aphoristic pronouncement somehow establishes itself by appealing to the 
intuition. 
 
1.2. Conclusion 
 
Now I want to sum up the characteristics of these three examples of assertoric 
mode of discourse so that the contrast with non-assertoric discourse can be made 
explicit later on. The three examples make assertoric presentations of the writer’s 
own views in different ways.  
The structure and procedure of Russell’s sample writing is modelled on the 
scientific or historical paradigm and he makes it very clear that his presentation aims 
to advance his own Theory of Descriptions as conveying objective truth on the 
meaning and reference of proper names.15  Secondly Russell’s sample writing 
                                                 
15
 Russell makes it clear that he wants to advocate his own Theory of Descriptions as the correct 
theory of denotation. See Russell 1905, 480. 
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features an assertoric mode of presentation as he gives the impression that he speaks 
in the direct first-person with an assertoric tone in the presentation. Russell’s 
presence and his commitment are invariably felt throughout his entire presentation as 
he frequently uses the first-person singular pronoun ‘I’ to signal his positions and 
also his commitment to the claims that he made. Moreover, his assertive tone and 
language also make his confidence and commitment more evident at various turns of 
his presentation. For instance, when he introduces his theory:  
 
The difficulties concerning denoting are, I believe, all the result of a wrong analysis of 
propositions whose verbal expressions contain denoting phrases. The proper analysis, if I 
am not mistaken, may be further set forth as follows. (p.480) 
 
At the surface, the expression ‘if I am not mistaken’ seems to convey Russell’s 
lack of confidence with his arguments. But the surface grammar is not the deep 
meaning. The expression is simply a characteristic way of engaging with the reader 
in assertoric discourse. Russell seems to ask the reader to check whether he has 
made a mistake. But the implied message is that he has not made a mistake in his 
arguments. Another instance is when he concludes his classic writing with an urge to 
conviction if the reader fails to come up with another theory of such elegant 
simplicity.16 The overall effect strikes the reader as if she has just experienced 
something close to a lively direct first-person verbal presentation of a definitive 
                                                 
16
 Russell 1905, 493: ‘Of the many other consequences of the views I have been advocating, I will 
say nothing. I will only beg the reader not to make up his mind against the view – as he might be 
tempted to do, on account of its apparently excessive complication – until he has attempted to 
construct a theory of his own on the subject of denotation. This attempt, I believe, will convince him 
that, whatever, the true theory may be, it cannot have such a simplicity as one might have expected 
beforehand.’ 
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account on the meaning and reference of proper names conducted by Russell 
himself.17   
Unlike Russell’s sample writing the sample writings of Heidegger and Laozi 
represent different styles. They do not use the first-person assertoric mode of 
presentation. The structure and procedure of Heidegger’s sample writing are similar 
to Russell’s sample writing. Heidegger begins his writing by elaborating on some 
key notions and the questions that he sets out to investigate. Then he rejects 
alternative interpretations and presents his own view as more desirable. On a closer 
look, Heidegger proceeds to present his view as if it is a joint investigation 
witnessed (or participated) by the reader and led by Heidegger himself. So for 
instance, through Heidegger’s leading, the reader gradually comes to see how the 
three predominant interpretations of the thingness of the thing in the history of 
Western thought are actually assaults on the thing and how they hinder reflection on 
the being of particular beings. But Heidegger does not directly lead in the 
first-person; his presence is not comparable to Russell’s presence in his sample 
writing. Secondly unlike Russell’s use of long and rigorous arguments to support his 
repudiation of alternative views as well as proving his own views, there are few 
arguments in Heidegger’s sample writing. Instead of presenting long and rigorous 
arguments, Heidegger leads by gradually disclosing his own views as more 
desirable.  
Unlike the other two sample writings, the Daodejing is loosely structured as it 
takes a different expository form. Laozi does not use the first-person assertoric mode 
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 For instance, Russell’s presence is rendered even more vivid when he suggests that the Hegelians, 
driven by their love for synthesis, will probably conclude that since the present King of France cannot 
be found among the things that are bald and the things that are not bald, he wears a wig (Russell 1905, 
485). 
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of presentation and his presence can hardly be traced in the Daodejing. Instead 
Laozi uses poetic language and various metaphors and images to convey his ideas 
but his tone is essentially assertoric. So for instance in Chapter Eight, water is 
depicted as close to Dao and like the highest good, and then with virtually no 
transition the author abruptly dictates various practical wisdoms for desirable codes 
of conduct. Chapter Twelve mentions how our different senses can be negatively 
affected and then it suddenly asserts the restrained life style of the Sage. With its 
various assertions the Daodejing presents itself as a source of insightful aphoristic 
pronouncement on the ultimate truth. 
By contrast with these examples, I shall present, in the rest of the thesis, some 
case studies of quite different ways of using language, and ways of employing 
sentences that look superficially like assertions, but are not straightforward 
expressions of the author’s own opinions. If we take the assertoric mode for granted 
or miss the signs that another mode of discourse is being utilised we can easily risk 
misreading philosophical works that engage in a different mode of discourse. For, in 
fact, a philosopher can do philosophy without ever expressing his or her own 
commitment to the views described or offered for consideration. In this respect (as 
we shall see) the philosopher's work might be compared to that of poets, dramatists 
and novelists, rather than scientists and historians.  
 
2. WHAT IS IT TO MAKE AN ASSERTION? 
 
In the three examples of assertoric mode of discourse, making assertions is the 
primary purpose of doing philosophy in writing and consequently their sentences put 
forth the authors’ beliefs as truth claims on how things really are or how things 
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should be. But obviously, there are all sorts of other things we can do with words in 
utterances or written presentations. As I have said, language can be put to different 
kinds of use and the same sentence-type can perform different speech acts. If I ask 
‘What is the time,’ it may be a direct request for information about time, or a hint 
that I want to end a conversation and get back to my work. If I say to my wife ‘The 
shop has a sale on,’ I may be making a statement of fact about the shop, or it may be 
a hint that I want to go shopping after a day’s work. In the latter case, the force of 
my utterance is not given in the form of my utterance; a seemingly assertoric 
utterance is not intended to express a fact about the shop, namely that it has a sale.18 
All these subtleties in language-use can have crucial implications on how we should 
approach a philosophical text. In particular we cannot assume that the philosopher’s 
illocutionary intention must always be making assertions. In the rest of the thesis, I 
will discuss three other illocutionary intentions: maieutic, therapeutic, and 
elucidatory in the works of Plato, Sextus, and Wittgenstein.  
But before we move on to the non-assertoric examples that are the subject of the 
main part of this thesis and look at other ways of doing philosophy that do not build 
on the assertoric model, we should consider what it is to make an assertion in the 
language of speech acts theory. We should also look at the exegetical assumptions 
that philosophical writings are modelled on the assertoric mode of discourse like 
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 As we shall see in Chapter Three, this is one of the crucial distinctions that mark off the 
Pyrrhonian speech from assertoric use of language. 
In a different context, Russell complains in his sample writing that the form of a denoting phrase can 
be misleading. On his view, ‘The author of Waverley was a man’, if fully expressed, should take the 
form as ‘One and only one entity wrote Waverley, and that one was a man’. See Russell 1905, 488: 
‘If I say “Scott was a man,” that is a statement of the form “x was a man,” and it has “Scott” for its 
subject. But if I say “the author of Waverley was a man,” that is not a statement of the form “x was a 
man,” and does not have “the author of Waverley” for its subject.’ 
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science or history, and to engage in the practice of making assertions is the only 
norm for philosophers in producing philosophical discourse. 
When language is used to describe some state of affairs or to state some fact, the 
statement (or the description) is truth functional, that is, it must be either true or 
false. It is true if it corresponds to the real state of affairs that is being mentioned; it 
is false if things turn out to be otherwise. But the philosophers in the case studies 
that I shall be discussing are never constrained by this representational function of 
language. Instead of this assertoric employment of language to state what is the case, 
they exhibit quite different modes of using language in their philosophical discourse 
and the prominent feature is the doing away with the assertoric function of 
language.19 
What is it to make an assertion? Why would some philosophers take great care 
and employ various measures to avoid making assertions? What is the relationship 
between assertion and belief? In John Searle’s taxonomy of speech acts, assertives is 
one of the five basic categories of illocutionary acts. The other categories include 
directives, commissives, expressives and declarations.20 According to Searle: 
 
The point or purpose of the members of the assertive class is to commit the speaker (in 
varying degrees) to something’s being the case, to the truth of the expressed propositions. 
                                                 
19
 For instance, as we shall wee in Chapter Four, Conant 2002 argues that the Tractatus features 
elucidatory and ethical employments of language.  
20
 See Searle 1979, 1-29. Searle’s taxonomy is an alternative to Austin’s taxonomy which includes 
verdictives, exercitives, commissives, expositives, and behabitives. Searle argued that Austin’s 
categories ‘form an excellent basis for discussion’ and yet Austin’s taxonomy ‘needs to be seriously 
revised because it contains several weaknesses’ (Searle 1979, 8). 
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All of the members of the assertive class are assessable on the dimension of assessment 
which includes true and false. 21 
 
So in the language of speech acts theory to make an assertion is to perform a 
speech act in which something is claimed to hold in reality. If I assert that ‘London 
is more populous than Norwich,’ then I claim it is a fact that London is more 
populous than Norwich. What I claim to hold, namely ‘London is more populous 
than Norwich’, is a truth functional proposition. The proposition of my assertion is 
true if in reality London is more populous than Norwich; it is false if in reality 
London is not more populous than Norwich. The concept of assertion is closely tied 
to the notion of truth. If assertion aims at truth then the purposes of the three 
examples of assertoric mode of discourse by Russell, Heidegger and Laozi would be 
that of fact-stating; they all aim at saying what they hold to be true and their writing 
expresses their beliefs. 
To make an assertion is also to perform a propositional act. When I make the 
assertion about London and Norwich, I relate myself to the proposition about 
London and Norwich; I represent myself as believing London is more populous than 
Norwich and I am dedicated to my belief. If the falsity of my belief makes itself 
evident, I will be very surprised or puzzled. This is because I previously believed 
that my belief was true. An assertion is the expression of belief; it is the evidence 
that the speaker has a certain belief. There are other propositional attitudes. I could 
say that I know, or alternatively, doubt the propositional content of my assertion. 
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 Searle 1979, 12: ‘Using Frege’s assertion sign to mark the illocutionary point common to all the 
members of this class, and the symbols introduced above, we may symbolize this class as follows:  
├↓B(p) 
The direction of fit is words to the world; the psychological state expressed is Belief (that p).’ 
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But If I confidently assert that ‘London is more populous than Norwich,’ I should be 
held committed to my assertion. In fact asserting could often be taken as a claim to 
know. If making assertion implies commitment in this way, then Russell, Heidegger 
and Laozi would be rightly held committed to the assertions made in their works. 
A proposition usually takes the form of a declarative sentence. But as I have 
noted, the force of my utterance may not be given in the form of my utterance. 
Therefore if a philosopher who does not intend to make assertoric pronouncement of 
her own views but somehow employs sentences that look like assertions in her work, 
she runs the risk of being grossly misunderstood. The reader may be misled by the 
seemingly assertoric form of her sentences and approach her work as just an 
assertoric presentation of her own views. The reader may wrongly believe that the 
philosopher aims at saying what she holds to be true. The reader may mistakenly 
hold the philosopher committed to the statements and utterances expressed in her 
work. All this can happen easily because the reader may be informed by the 
exegetical assumptions that philosophical writings must be modelled on the 
assertoric mode of discourse like science or history, and that to engage in the 
practice of making assertions is the philosopher’s routine in producing philosophical 
discourse. Things could be even worse if the reader further assumes that 
philosophical discourse is meant to produce conviction in the reader. In this way, a 
creative philosophical work that engages in a different mode of discourse 
unfortunately falls prey to the unprepared soul.  
Surely not all utterances of the declarative form are assertions. 22  For instance, 
poems and novels can give the appearance of assertions and yet they are actually 
                                                 
22
 I discuss Pyrrhonian avowals of appearance as a crucial deviation of the declarative mode of 
speech in Chapter Three section 2.2 and 2.3. 
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descriptive of imaginary scenarios with fictional characters and events.23 These 
genres of non-assertoric writing take in literary description of the fictive or the 
unreal for artistic reasons. But there is much more than this. Metaphor and fiction 
raise important issues in discourse and I shall now look into the case of metaphor 
and fictional discourse in order to enrich my discussion of doing philosophy in 
non-assertoric discourse. In my view, the way metaphor works its wonder is 
comparable in many respects to the non-assertoric discourse.24 
 
2.1. Metaphor and Truth 
 
My discussion of metaphor will consider Donald Davidson’s theory and show 
how it makes metaphorical truth inexplicable if not totally inscrutable. Then my 
discussion will draw on the account of Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen to 
see how metaphorical utterances can be regarded as a practice governed by 
convention and how the context-specific aims of metaphor can be invoked to explain 
truth-telling can be a deliberate communicative intention on the part of the speaker 
in some contexts.  
                                                 
23
 Plato’s writings are fictional dialogues. In Chapter Two I discuss how fictive assertions and 
utterances present the reader with significant philosophical and interpretive challenges in reading off 
Plato’s doctrines from the fictive assertions and utterance in his writings. 
24
 I am not suggesting here that all the case-studies of non-assertoric discourse that I shall discuss in 
the main part of this thesis work their wonders exactly like that of metaphor. As I have already 
mentioned the case-studies are different instances, their methods and purposes are not all the same. 
But in any case, I do see close resemblance between metaphor and the cases-studies of non-assertoric 
discourse which I will discuss soon.  
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For fictional discourse and truth, I shall get support from the works of John 
Searle and Mark, R. Rowe. Fictional discourse resembles non-assertoric discourse in 
that while the authors are not committed to the truth of their utterances, their works 
can somehow state some truths or even enact and symbolize them. Secondly the 
authors of fiction and non-assertoric discourse may appear to be making assertions 
which are defined by the constitutive rule of asserting, and yet it turns out that they 
only pretend to perform the illocutionary acts. Does it mean that the authors and 
non-assertoric discourse are not ‘serious’ or simply ‘insincere’ to the reader? A 
discussion of how the pretending is possible and what kinds of speech acts the 
author of a fiction performs can help make the case for non-assertoric discourse.  
If someone says, ‘Life is a box of chocolates,’ then we are invited to see human 
life in a certain light. But which light? Each one of us may have different ideas as to 
what the speaker really wants to say. It might be one of the following. Perhaps ‘Life 
is a gift,’ (because a box of chocolates is often given as a gift). Perhaps ‘Life is 
sweet,’ (because chocolates are usually sweet). Perhaps ‘Life is bitter,’ (because 
dark chocolates are bitter). Perhaps ‘Life is full of uncertainty or surprise,’ (because 
you never know what you get until you open your gift). Or perhaps, ‘Life is an 
assortment of different favours; some sweet, some bitter.’ However, the speaker may 
actually have none of these in mind because what she really wants to say is 
something else. (Suppose her point might be that ‘Life is a box of chocolate and you 
have to enjoy it because it is yours.’) In this case, we have to work out the exact 
point of the metaphorical utterance when, like most cases of metaphorical utterances, 
the range of possible likenesses or comparisons seems to be indefinite. Therefore 
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Donald Davidson remarks, ‘understanding a metaphor is as much a creative 
endeavour as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules.’25 
As a semantic phenomenon, metaphor raises a lot of important issues. For 
instance, how is a metaphor or figurative utterance related to what it makes us see? 
How can a metaphor manage to produce the effects of understanding when the 
speaker means something different from what the sentence means literally? Does the 
speaker assert what he says in a metaphor? If someone utters a sentence p 
metaphorically, is he asserting p or only ‘making-as-if-to-say’ that p? Is there room 
for truth as a mode of appraisal for metaphorical utterance? Is what we are caused by 
a metaphor to notice propositional in character? These questions are much relevant 
to non-assertoric discourse. A throughout discussion of metaphorical utterance and 
these questions can shed useful light on non-assertoric discourse. 
The semantic interaction theory regards metaphor as a semantic phenomenon and 
therefore proposes a semantic treatment of metaphor. It suggests that there are two 
semantic components in a metaphor and while one component is intended literally, 
the other is intended nonliterally, and that the two components interact with each 
other to provoke the effects of understanding. So instead of saying it straight out, the 
speaker in my earlier example invites a certain view of human life by speaking in 
metaphor and the meaning will be given in the interaction of the two ideas, that is, 
human life and a box of chocolates. The speaker may want to draw our attention to 
certain similarities between the two ideas which we might not otherwise have 
thought of. Therefore, the metaphor is an invitation to explore likenesses and 
comparisons and by attending to the likeness suggested by the metaphor our 
understanding of life is supposed to increase. Metaphor can make us attend to some 
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 Davidson 2001, 435.  
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likeness and thereby yields some insight. In its own special ways metaphor can do 
what ordinary communication cannot do. Metaphor is not only a useful tool of 
communication in literature and daily conversations; it is also employed by the most 
distinguished philosophers. For instance, in the Phaedrus Socrates refers to the 
human soul as a chariot.  
 
First the charioteer of the human soul drives a pair, and secondly one of the horses is 
noble and of noble breed, but the other quite the opposite in breed and character. 
Therefore in our case the driving is necessarily difficult and troublesome. (Phaedrus 
246b)26 
 
John Locke proposes to see the human mind as a tabula rasa (a blank slate); 
there are no innate ideas and sensory experience is the proper source of human 
knowledge. To the list, we can add the examples of ‘language game’, ‘ghost in the 
machine’ and many others.  
Davidson attests to the power and status of metaphor in different discourses and 
he argues that ‘what metaphor adds to the ordinary is an achievement that uses no 
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 Does it follow that Plato is using the chariot to assert metaphorically something about the soul? 
But strictly speaking Plato is, at least, at one remove from this metaphor because it is issued by a 
fictional character in a fictional dialogue. Unlike Russell’s first person assertoric mode of 
presentation, Plato almost never lets himself say anything in the first person in his writings. Plato’s 
usual practice is to let his dramatis personae (Socrates and other interlocutors) to discuss things with 
each other. Consequently the reader must decide for himself the meanings of the memorable 
metaphors and vivid imagery in his writings and also Plato’s purposes in using them. However, 
continuous scholarly disputes on the bearing of Plato’s metaphors and imagery have attested to the 
philosophical and interpretive challenges posed by metaphors and imagery. I discuss the famous Sun, 
Line and Cave (Republic 507a-521b) in Chapter Two.  
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semantic resources beyond the resources on which the ordinary depends.’ 27  
Accordingly ‘metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, 
mean, and nothing more.’ Davidson denies the assumption of semantic interaction 
theory which suggests that the author of metaphor conveys a cognitive content in 
disguise pending the interpreter’s decoding. On Davidson’s view, it is very difficult 
to decide, even in the case of the simplest metaphors, exactly what the content is 
supposed to be. 28 Davidson does not deny that what the metaphor makes us notice 
can be propositional in nature. But he believes that in most cases what the metaphor 
prompts or inspires is not recognition of some truth of fact as what we notice or see 
is not generally propositional in character.29  
So when someone says, ‘Life is a box of chocolates,’ she does not assert that 
human life is a box of chocolates. Taken as a bare assertion the utterance would 
immediately become a plain falsehood; human life cannot be a box of chocolates; 
they are different categories of things for very obvious reasons. Therefore the 
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 Davidson 2001, 436: ‘Metaphor is a legitimate device not only in literature but in science, 
philosophy, and the law: it is effective in praise and abuse, prayer and promotion, description and 
prescription.’ See Davidson 2001, 435. 
28
 Davidson 2001, 444-445: ‘If what the metaphor makes us notice were finite in scope and 
propositional in nature, this would not in itself make trouble; we would simply project the content the 
metaphor brought to mind onto the metaphor. But in fact there is no limit to what a metaphor calls to 
our attention, and much of what we are caused to notice is not propositional in character. When we 
try to say what a metaphor means, we soon realize there is no end to what we want to mention. 
How many facts or propositions are conveyed by a photograph? None, an infinity, or one great 
unstatable fact? Bad question. A picture is not worth a thousand words, or any other number. Words 
are the wrong currency to exchange for a picture.’ 
29
 Davidson 2001, 445. 
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metaphor is better taken as expressing an invitation or suggestion that a certain 
comparison between human life and a box of chocolates be followed up.30  
For Davidson’s theory, truth assessment would miss the point of metaphor. 
Indeed for most cases, it is the falsehood at literal level and even plain absurdity that 
trigger a proper mode of interpretation for metaphorical utterances.31  Finally 
Davidson’s theory of metaphor has some odd implications for metaphorical truth. If 
his theory is correct,  
 
A consequence is that the sentences in which metaphors occur are true or false in a 
normal, literal way, for if the words in them don’t have special meanings, sentences don’t 
have special truth. This is not to deny that there is such a thing as metaphorical truth, only 
to deny it of sentences. Metaphor does lead us to notice what might not otherwise be 
noticed, and there is no reason, I suppose, not to say these visions, thoughts, and feelings 
inspired by the metaphor, are true or false. 32 
 
My major disagreement with Davidson’s theory is that it makes metaphorical 
truth inexplicable because it denies metaphorical truth of the sentences that express 
the metaphor. According to his theory, metaphor can only ‘mean what the words, in 
their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more’. Many metaphors will then 
appear to be plain falsehood or absurdity at the literal level, and the sentence 
containing the metaphor cannot be the truth bearer. Davidson’s theory does not 
reject metaphorical truth altogether but it leaves metaphorical account inexplicable. 
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 In Chapter Two I argue that presumably the Sun, Line and Cave serve the same purpose. They do 
not express Plato’s metaphysical doctrines. Instead they suggest that a certain comparison be 
followed up.   
31
 Davidson 2001, 442. Patent falsity or plain absurdity is the usual case with metaphor, but on 
occasion patent truth will do as well. 
32
 Davidson 2001, 441. 
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For this reason, I propose to turn to Lamarque and Olsen for a more satisfactory 
account of metaphorical truth. 
For Lamarque and Olsen, Davidson’s theory of metaphor is the most ‘austere’ 
because it recognizes no content other than that of literal meaning.33 They criticize 
Davidson’s assumption that the prime mechanism of the metaphorical process is 
causal and the speaker of a metaphor intends to produce just perlocutionary effects. 
34
  Contrary to Davidson’s theory, Lamarque and Olsen believe that the very 
possibility of metaphorical speech is ‘bound by convention’ and hence they suggest 
invoking the idea of ‘a practice’ to explain the conventionality of metaphorical 
speech.35 Lamarque and Olsen’s account of metaphor distinguishes two separate 
communication-intentions. The first is the constitutive aim which initiates the 
metaphorical process and the second is the context-specific aims of metaphor.36 
The constitutive aim is definitive of metaphorical utterance and it initiates the 
metaphorical process by inviting or encouraging a hearer ‘to think of, conceive of, 
reflect on, or imagine one thing (state of affairs, idea, etc.) in terms associated with 
some other thing (state of affairs, etc.) often of a quite different logical type.’ 
Lamarque and Olsen do not assume that the speaker of metaphor must always intend 
to convey some specific propositional content in his metaphorical utterance. For 
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 Lamarque and Olsen 1994,351 
34
 Lamarque and Olsen 1994, 358: ‘By accounting for metaphor as just a stimulus to thought, 
Davidson fails to give due weight either to the purposive and communicative function of speaking 
metaphorically or to the rule-governed nature of the interpretation of metaphor. 
In the language of speech acts, the user of a metaphor intends to produce not just perlocutionary 
effects, as Davidson’s theory implies, but illocutionary effects as well; i.e. the mechanism for 
bringing about the required response is rational and rule-governed, not simply causal.’ 
35
 Lamarque and Olsen 1994, 359 
36
 Lamarque and Olsen 1994, 360 
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their idea of a metaphorical process or task actually ‘moves away from the paradigm 
of understanding associated with grasp of content or truth-conditions.’  
The context-specific aims of metaphor are found in all instances of metaphorical 
utterance. The speaker of metaphor usually issue a metaphor in the context of some 
deliberate communicative purpose and one such aim, in general, is that of conveying 
a particular belief or thought. 37  Lamarque and Olsen suggest that similar 
context-specific aims can occur in philosophical metaphors and they believe that 
understanding philosophical metaphors does not, or not only, amount to the 
identification of a specific intended content; it is the exploration of analogies that 
counts.38  
I think what is true of metaphorical utterance in Lamarque and Olsen’s account is 
also true of non-assertoric discourse. Like metaphorical utterances, non-assertoric 
discourse can yield insights as well as truths. For instance, as I shall argue in 
Chapter Three, since the Pyrrhonian speech is consistently non-assertoric, it is apt to 
construe Sextus’s writing as non-assertoric discourse. His report of Pyrrhonism 
resembles a chronicler’s report as it does not register belief claims on Sextus’s part. 
But that does not mean we cannot gather any trustworthy information about 
Pyrrhonism in this non-assertoric account. In addition, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is 
able to give us some insights into language as we have learnt from the Tractarian 
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 Lamarque and Olsen 1994, 362: ‘Some metaphors are purely decorative or ‘rhetorical’, merely 
embellishing a speech act, not contributing to its purpose or content. Others have a summarizing 
effect, distilling into epigrammatic form something already stated or established. Sometimes a 
speaker will invite the metaphorical process of exploring analogies and similarities for the sake of 
getting a better understanding of the terms, rather than intending to formulate a specific content.’ 
38
 Lamarque and Olsen 1994, 363-364. 
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elucidation that a certain way of thinking and talking about the world and language 
is nonsensical. 
 
2.2. Fictional Discourse and Truth 
 
John Searle suggests that while metaphorical uses of expressions are ‘nonliteral’, 
fictional utterances are ‘nonserious’.39 Of course, Searle does not mean that fiction 
and poetry are not serious. What he has in mind is that ‘if the author of a novel tells 
us that it is raining outside he isn’t seriously committed to the view that it is at the 
time of writing actually raining outside.’ So a fiction is nonserious in that its author 
is not committed to the truth of her fictional utterances. The author has no 
commitment to provide evidence for its truth though there may or may not be 
evidence for the truth of her fictive propositions. The author may appear to be 
making assertions which are defined by the constitutive rules of asserting. And yet 
the utterance of the author is not a commitment to the truth of her fictive 
propositions. So what kind of speech acts does the author of a fiction perform? 
Searle rejects the attempt to explain fictional utterances as belonging to the 
illocutionary act of writing a novel because, according to Searle, there is no such 
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 Searle 1979, 60. For the problem of metaphor, Searle gives a pragmatic treatment of metaphor 
(See Searle 1979, 76-116). Contrary to Davidson’s view that metaphors mean what the words mean 
and nothing more, Searle’s pragmatic approach sees the phenomenon of metaphor as a result of the 
falling apart of the speaker’s utterance meaning and the word or sentence meaning. By proposing 
some principles for the formulation and interpretation of metaphorical utterances, Searle’s theory of 
metaphor explains how it is possible for the speaker to say metaphorically ‘S is P’ and mean ‘S is R’, 
when P plainly does not mean R. Lamarque and Olsen argue that Searle’s theory of metaphor is too 
determinate in bounding the metaphorical process with the grasp of content or truth-conditions. (See 
Lamarque and Olsen 1994, 360-361)  
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illocutionary act of writing a novel. And to suppose we have the illocutionary act of 
writing a novel would lead to the consequence that every sentence in our language 
would have both a fictional and a nonfictional meaning.40  
On Searle’s view, what happens in the work of fiction is that ‘the author of a 
work of fiction pretends to perform a series of illocutionary acts, normally of the 
assertive type’. 41  In her fictional use of words, the author engages in a 
‘nondeceptive pseudoperformance’ and she pretends to recount to the reader a series 
of events. The author may act as if she is making assertions in her work of fiction. 
She may imitate the making of assertions by pretending to perform the illocutionary 
acts like stating, asserting, describing, explaining, etc. But what is the criterion for 
identifying a work of fiction if the author is only pretending to perform the assertive 
kind of illocutionary acts? Searle believes that there is no textual property that can 
help the reader to identify a text as a work of fiction. The identifying criterion lies in 
the illocutionary intentions of the author.42  
According to Searle, what makes fiction possible is ‘a set of extralinguistic, 
nonsemantic conventions’ that breaks the connection between the words and the 
world. 43 These conventions do not alter or change the meanings of the words in a 
fiction. Instead they ‘enable the author to use words with their literal meanings 
without undertaking the commitments that are normally required by those meanings’. 
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 Searle 1979, 64. 
41
 Searle 1979, 65. 
42
 In Chapter Four, I argue for my non-assertoric reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and 
Philosophical Investigations on the ground that unless we can take his declared aim of elucidation 
and his persistent intention of doing away with theories or doctrines more seriously we will be misled 
into reading his seemingly theoretical or doctrinal remarks as theoretical assertions or some stated 
doctrines on the essence of language.  
43
 Searle 1979, 67. 
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In addition, the author can pretend to perform illocutionary acts because the 
illocutionary act is pretended but the utterance act is real. It is a general feature of 
the concept of pretending that one can pretend to perform a higher order or complex 
action by actually performing lower order or less complex actions which are 
constitutive parts of the higher order of complex action.  
Thus, for example, one can pretend to hit someone by actually making the arm 
and fist movements that are characteristic of hitting someone. The hitting is 
pretended, but the movement of the arm and fist is real.44 Therefore, in similar vein, 
the author of non-assertoric discourse can pretend to perform the illocutionary act of 
asserting and she succeeds in doing it not by changing the meaning of the words in 
her writing. As a result, the form of her utterances is not informative of her 
illocutionary intentions. 45   
Most fictions contain nonfictional elements. So for instance, in James Joyce’s 
Ulysses, the story of Leopold Bloom and Molly Bloom is a fictional story about 
fictional characters but the Dublin of Ulysses is the real Dublin. So what role does 
truth play in a work of fiction or literature?  
According to Mark W. Rowe reading a work of fiction does not mean giving up 
an interest in truth altogether as literary interest is focused not on categorical truths 
(what is and was) but on a special kind of modal truths that link with human beings 
or other rational creatures (what human beings might think, feel, and act). 46 
Therefore literature can state, enact and symbolize its truths. Lamarque and Olsen 
contend that the truth conveyed by metaphorical utterances is likely to be low-key 
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 Searle, 1979, 67-68. 
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 Again grammatical form can be misleading. This applies aptly to Pyrrhonian avowals of 
appearance. 
46
 Rowe 2009, 381-382. 
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truth which involves the imparting of fact or information. However Rowe notes two 
cases in which the artistic quality of a work of literature can be compromised by 
factual errors and false generations.47 The first case is concerned with factual errors 
in a fiction. Factual errors can lower our opinion of a work of fiction even if the 
reader is not intended to acquire facts in his reading. The second case is concerned 
with generalization about human nature made in a fiction. The reader would expect 
that such generalization to be true or at least close to the truth.  
Rowe argues that a broad conception of the aesthetic attitude and knowledge can 
show that the two are actually not in tension and in fact, the formal similarities 
between them even encourage us to see both as proper elements of the aesthetic 
attitude. Fictional discourse can communicate non-propositional knowledge about 
human beings and this ability is an important part of a work’s aesthetic quality. On 
the other hand, a work’s aesthetic quality is affected by factual errors and false 
generations. The author of fiction cannot eschew responsibility for the factual errors 
and false generations he made. In addition, the author is sometimes held responsible 
even for the views expressed through his fictional characters.48 
Reading literature can deliver aesthetic pleasure as well as non-propositional 
knowledge about human beings. But in the case of non-assertoric discourse, 
conveying trustworthy information, yielding insights or even imparting knowledge, 
can be an important part of its intrinsic value. But this it is not the only value that it 
possesses. With so much useful results, I shall now turn to the less familiar model, 
that is, the non-assertoric discourse.   
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 Rowe 2009, 382. 
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 For instance, the British Indian novelist Salman Rushdie was held responsible by the Muslims for 
mocking their faith in his novel, The Satanic Verses (1988). I thanked Dr Mark W. Rowe for drawing 
my attention to this.  
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3. DOING PHILOSOPHY IN NON-ASSERTOIRC DISCOURSE: 
A LESS FAMILIAR MODEL 
 
Now we are better equipped to launch into the cases of non-assertoric discourse 
produced by Plato, Sextus and Wittgenstein. In so far as the case studies that I shall 
explore in this thesis avoid making assertoric presentation of the writer’s own views, 
they can be viewed as a group. But their methods are not all the same, any more than 
my three examples of assertoric discourse were the same. My interest here is to 
explore several different ways of writing in non-assertoric mode, across a range of 
different traditions of philosophy. 
Each of my chosen thinkers, and each school of thought, is confronted with 
different philosophical problems; they work in different times and within different 
philosophical traditions. Given these differences, it is striking to see how comparing 
their approaches to writing can enable us to identify one common feature in their 
methods and writing styles, in so far as their philosophical writings count as 
non-assertoric discourse. But this is only one connection. At the same time as we 
observe this major link between the thinkers, we shall also seek to highlight the 
ways in which the different kinds of non-assertoric philosophy differ from each 
other, and to notice how different methods can be employed to distance the writer 
from the claims that appear in the text (or in the utterances, if the material is spoken 
live). 
So in the main chapters I shall choose three case studies for close scrutiny and 
explain how their writings, while showing some common features in methods and 
styles, actually represent different modes of non-assertoric discourse. And I shall 
explore in more detail what is going on when a philosopher writes in a mode of 
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discourse that is not assertoric and what kinds of value are imbedded in a 
non-assertoric discourse.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
PUZZLES IN THE SUN, LINE AND CAVE: A CASE 
STUDY IN READING PLATO’S IMAGERY 
 
In this Chapter I review some major problems and difficulties that scholars have 
encountered in making sense of the famous allegories of the Sun, Line and Cave in 
Plato’s Republic, when they approach the imagery with an expectation that it is 
making assertions about what Plato actually believes.49 There are two models of 
interpretation: (a) taking the imagery as illustrating the doctrines (as a kind of visual 
aid); and (b) taking the imagery as an implicit argument for the positions that Plato 
is trying to recommend. Some scholars, for instance Lesher, take it to be doing both 
kinds of work at once.50 As we shall see, my thesis is that the material should not be 
read in either of these two ways. I shall start with a brief review of the literature so 
as to familiarise us with some of the key interpretations of the dialogues, showing in 
each case that they are taking Plato to be either (a) illustrating or (b) arguing for the 
doctrines he is recommending, without going into detail on what those doctrines are. 
Secondly, again without commenting on the doctrines as such, I shall summarise the 
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 Although my review cannot consider all of the vast amount of scholarly work, it deals with the 
most disputed problems and the most enduring difficulties that scholars have encountered in their 
reading of the imagery as assertions of Plato’s philosophical positions. 
50
 Lesher 2010, 183-184. 
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problems and puzzles that such readings have encountered in trying to make sense 
of the images and the relation between them. 
 
1. TWO ASSERTORIC WAYS OF READING THE MATERIAL 
 
1.1. Scholars who take it to be illustration 
 
Cross and Woozley take the images as illustration, from which—after appropriate 
analysis—they can gather Plato’s philosophical position as represented in his theory 
of Forms; although they also admit that what Plato intends to convey by the images 
is rather unclear and that the images have caused a great deal of difficulty.51 They 
believe the philosophical implications of the Line and Cave have to do with the 
repeated contrast between mathematical thinking and philosophy (or dialectic), a 
contrast that can reveal to us what Plato conceives to be the task of the philosopher 
and how it differs from that of the mathematician. According to this distinction, both 
mathematics and philosophy deal with intelligible objects—that is, the Forms; but 
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 Cross and Woozley 1966. See for instance 202-3, where one finds the following claims that 
illustrate well this sort of reading: ‘The Sun then, Plato says (508b), is the offspring of the Good, 
occupying in the visible world a position analogous to that of the form of the Good in the world of 
Forms. The Sun simile then is an analogy, illustrating, by the role of the Sun in the visible world 
relatively to sight and the objects seen, the role of the Good in the intelligible world relatively to 
knowledge and the objects known (i.e. the Forms).’ 
‘Plato then, using an analogy with the Sun in the visible world, is seeking to illustrate the special 
position which he believes the Form of Good to occupy in the intelligible world relatively to the other 
Forms. Without the Good the other Forms would not be known; and indeed, more than that, their 
very being or existence is in some way derivative form the Good.’  
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philosophy deals with the Forms in a coherent system dependent on the supreme 
Form, the Form of the Good while mathematics deals with the Forms in isolation.52 
In addition, mathematical thinking makes assumptions which it does not explain 
(510c), it proceeds from hypotheses (like the odd and the even, the kinds of angles, 
the Square itself and the Diagonal itself) to the conclusion through a series of 
consistent steps; and it uses the visible figures as aids and talks about them, although 
it is not thinking about these visible figures but rather their originals (510d).53 On 
the other hand, philosophy is concerned entirely with the intelligible world and 
philosophical thinking does not involve anything in the sensible world; it uses only 
Forms, it ‘moves solely through Forms to Forms and finishes with Forms’ (511c). 
Cross and Woozley believe that Plato makes the various branches of mathematics 
the initial training for the philosopher in Book VII of the Republic because 
mathematics can serve as a bridge-study, leading the trainee philosopher kings from 
the changing unstable world of sense experience to a world of stable, unchanging 
objects grasped by the intelligence.54  
Finally Cross and Woozley appear to be sober enough to restrict what they can 
gather from the images to Plato’s general philosophical position regarding the task 
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 Cross and Woozley 1966, 233-238. They reject assigning mathematical intermediates to 
mathematical thinking. Their reason is that other than ‘a passing reference at 74c of the Phaedo to 
“the equals themselves”, which could be understood of mathematical equals, there is no reference in 
the dialogues earlier than the Republic to the doctrine of mathematical intermediates’ (236).They 
believe that if Plato does intend to bring in the doctrine of mathematical intermediates in the Republic, 
he should introduce it as something new, explain it and express it in a clear language, instead of 
smuggling it in through the back door of imagery. 
53
 I shall return to this as one of the six key problems with the Line in section 2.6. 
54
 Cross and Woozley 1966, 238-241. 
45 
 
of the philosopher.55 But actually what they take to be Plato’s general philosophical 
position regarding the task of the philosopher and how it differs from that of the 
mathematician is already heavily loaded with metaphysical assumptions. For 
instance, despite their proviso that it is rash to make too much of the imagery in 
connection with Plato’s metaphysical views concerning the theory of Forms, Cross 
and Woozley believe that Plato uses one single line to represent the sensible world 
and the intelligible world in order to avoid implying a two-world view. Using one 
line to represent the sensible world and the intelligible world suggests a continuity 
between the sensible and the intelligible.56 Moreover, they also believe that the Sun, 
Line and Cave clearly add one new element—namely the Form of the Good to the 
theory of Forms and that Plato clearly indicates that mathematical principles are to 
be derived from the Form of the Good. 
In a way, Denyer also follows the assertoric way of reading the imagery as 
illustration of Plato’s views, because he takes the imagery to illustrate the role of the 
Good in teleological explanation.57 According to Denyer, the Good is to become 
‘the unhypothetical starting point of mathematics’ which can explain the existence 
and character of mathematical Forms teleologically ‘in something like the way we 
explained teleologically the shape of the ideal wheel and position of its axle’.58 
Penner is another example of assertoric reading. In his attempt to explain what 
the Forms are, he approaches the images as illustration of Plato’s own views.59 
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 Cross and Woozley 1966. They call for care in inferring from the images. They point out that ‘it 
must nevertheless be recognized that this part of the Republic does not provide any sound enough 
ground for any sweeping inferences about Plato’s general metaphysical views’” (258). 
56
 Cross and Woozley 1966, 257-261. 
57
 Denyer 2007. 
58
 See Denyer 2007, 306-7.  
59
 Penner 2006.  
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According to Penner the Forms are better treated as universals or attributes, much 
like the ‘real natures’ or the objects of the sciences or expertises.60 Moreover, the 
Form of the Good is the moral good we all desire, Penner argues.61 Though he 
rejects what he calls the self-predicationist interpretation of the imagery62 he does 
not differ from the self-predicationist interpretation in that he continues to treat the 
imagery as illustration of some doctrines or positions that Plato recommends. The 
difference between Penner and his opponent, the self-predicationist, lies only in 
what they see as the real “messages” disclosed in the imagery. Penner perceives the 
self-predicationist interpretation as misreading the imagery into suggesting that there 
are four kinds of cognition paired with four different kinds of objects, ranked in 
accordance with their degree of reality and truth, with the Forms being the highest 
objects and the only objects of knowledge. In other words, the Line and Cave 
illustrate the Degrees of Reality theory. Penner proposes an anti-reductionist 
interpretation of the imagery as he believes that Plato uses the imagery to illustrate a 
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 Penner 2006, 237. Penner is opposed to the account of Forms associated with Aristotle, according 
to which the Forms were a bit of both universals or attributes, and ideal objects, paradigms, and 
models. This account regarded the Forms the product of ‘a metaphysical confusion wherein Plato 
construed universals or attributes (such-es) as if they were objects – substances, things (this-es)’ 
(p.235, 237). Penner also rejects Universal Literal Self-Predication (which stipulates that ‘For any 
Form, F-ness, that Form is itself the one perfect instance of F-ness (except possibly for some other 
Forms), while all perceptible instances of F-ness are at best imperfectly F things.’) to which some 
interpreters took it that Plato was committed. 
61
 Penner 2006, 249 – 251. 
62
 Note, for instance, on page 250: ‘The Sun allegorizes the Form of the Good (517b – c, 532a, 
532c), as the other heavenly bodies probably allegorize the real natures (Forms) embodied in each of 
the kinds of animals’. 
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completely different view, namely ‘different degrees of truth in different 
conceptions of one object’.63 
   
1.2. Scholars who take it to be argument 
 
Rosen is among those who believe that the imagery is to be read as argument.64 
On the one hand, Rosen proposes to approach the imagery with caution. But on the 
other hand, he believes that we are ‘certainly entitled’ to the implications of the 
imagery on genuine being and complete nonbeing: ‘it would be dangerous to put too 
much pressure on the poetical language that Socrates is using in this passage, but we 
are certainly entitled, and even required, to notice the implications of that language. 
One such implication is that genuine being is entirely illuminated, whereas complete 
nonbeing is darkness without light. Thus the domain of genesis is a mixture of light 
and darkness’.65  
Pappas also believes that the imagery should be read as argument. He considers 
the Line to be an argument from analogy making “an emphatic assertion” on the 
relationships between objects of cognition and kinds of cognitions.66 He states: ‘on 
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 Penner 2006, 251 – 257. According to Penner, ‘Plato is claiming that: The square cannot be 
reduced to any shadows, to any physical objects or drawn squares, or even any entities of the sort a 
geometer might postulate as implicitly defined by the axioms of geometry. There are four different 
degrees of truth about what the square is, only one of which, when apprehended, gives us the actual 
truth (aletheia) about the square. There are, if you will, four different degrees of grasp of what the 
square is (einai, on). There are not four different degrees of reality. And there are no “mathematicals” 
in the Divided Line’ (257). 
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 Rosen 2006, especially 255 - 275.  
65
 Rosen 2006, 260 
66
 Pappas 2003, especially 145-154.  
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this last point – regarding the relationship between objects of cognition and kinds of 
cognition – the Divided Line passage is sometimes elusive. But it closes with an 
emphatic assertion of (12): (12) As the segments [of the line] to which [the 
affections of the soul] correspond participate in truth, so they participate in clarity. 
(511e)’.67 Yet Pappas is uneasy about the success of Plato’s strategy. He explains 
the complexity of the Line as resulting from Plato’s desire to argue for two points. 
First, Plato uses the Line to show how the objects of opinion are related to objects of 
knowledge in a reflection relationship. Secondly in the Line Plato assigns a special 
place to mathematics above all other skills, as a propaedeutic to philosophy. 
However, Pappas thinks that Plato cannot make the Line work in all these ways and 
the complexity of the Line leads to puzzles that call for much more complex 
solution.   
Annas also follows the assertoric way of reading the imagery. She considers it 
as an indirect argument explicating the place of the Good in the just person’s 
knowledge, and the form that knowledge takes.68 She speculates that Plato puts his 
thoughts in schematic imagery because either he has no idea how to argue for them 
or he thinks that the thoughts are not the kind of truth that can be argued for, but 
must be accepted in the light of other considerations and arguments taken as a whole. 
With this in mind she suggests that the Line has two functions: the first is to 
distinguish the visible and the intelligible realms and compare them with the 
image/original relationship; the second is to provide a classification of cognitive 
states and their objects so that our cognitive understanding can be graded according 
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 Pappas, 2003, 145-146. 
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 Annas 1987, 242-271. She suggests that ‘as with Forms generally, Plato offers no direct argument. 
Presumably we are to become convinced of the truth of his claim more indirectly, by the whole long 
passage which follows’ (245). 
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to their distance from full knowledge with understanding. Her suggestion is that the 
Line teaches three important points about knowledge: first, for Plato to know a thing 
is to know it directly; second, mathematics has an important role to play in the quest 
for knowledge as it forces us to think out problems rather than being satisfied with 
the appearances; third, and yet, mathematics is inadequate because it relies on the 
visible and its hypotheses are ungrounded.69 
Seeing the Line in this light, Annas examines the imagery with her customary 
philosophical seriousness. In particular, she identifies and discusses some oddities 
and problems with the Line’s classification of cognitive states and their objects.70 I 
shall mention three major problems here. The first concerns the purpose of the 
lowest stage of eikasia; the second the place of the Good in the Line; and the last the 
criterion for the classification of cognitive states. 
To begin with, Annas suspects that the lowest stage of eikasia is added to the 
Line only for the sake of the analogy to be made between visible and intelligible 
realms. Her evidence is that the lowest stage of eikasia does not correspond to 
anything significant in our lives as our everyday beliefs mostly fall under the stage 
of pistis (trust) and the stage in which one is forced to think things through and 
realize that there are Forms and particulars is the stage of dianoia (thought). 
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 Note in particular the following comment: ‘we learn from the Line various important points about 
knowledge. One is that the prominence of the image/original relation shows that Plato puts a 
premium on knowing a thing directly, rather than indirectly via reflections or images. Another is that 
in the crucial stage of moving from objects adequately apprehended by experience to Forms, an 
important role is played by mathematics. Another is that mathematics is nevertheless inadequate, for 
two reasons: it relies on visible illustrations, and it depends on hypotheses, whereas the true ‘intellect’ 
of the philosopher is free from these defects and operates only with reference to Forms (511b-c)’ 
(Annas 1987, 250). 
70
 Annas 1987, 248-252 
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The second problem is about the Good. Curiously it is not mentioned at all in 
the Line. This is odd because the Good is so supreme in the Sun and the Line is 
introduced explicitly as a continuation of the Sun (509c). Are we to suppose that the 
Good, which is so supreme in the Sun, is identical with the ‘unhypothetical first 
principle’ grasped by the person with noēsis in the Line? But according to Annas the 
Good cannot be just one of the contents of noēsis and it does not fit into the scheme 
of the Line very happily.  
The last problem is even more devastating. How are the cognitive states 
classified, by their objects or by their methods? Annas thinks that no answer seems 
quite right because Plato overloads his analogy with two different kinds of contrast. 
Suppose the classification is by the objects of cognition. This would mean each of 
the four cognitive states will pair with its own objects. Eikasia will pair with 
shadows and images whereas pistis will pair with the originals of the shadows and 
images. It would require different objects for noēsis and dianoia. Noēsis will pair 
with Forms. But what does the subsegment of dianoia contain?71 Annas rejects 
‘intermediate’ objects on the ground that the Republic says nothing about these 
things and such a claim conflicts directly with 510d, which clearly says that the 
mathematicians talk about the square itself and the diagonal itself (surely Forms) in 
mathematical reasoning.72  
Therefore the alternative is to suppose that the top part, noēsis and dianoia, 
share the same object (i.e., Forms) while pistis and eikasia contain different objects. 
But then the contrast between noēsis and dianoia would become a difference of 
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 This is one of the six key problems with the Line. I shall take a closer look at it as a key problem 
in section 2.4. 
72
 Annas is not taking a position on this issue. Her discussion does not maintain that dianoia contains 
Forms. She is only considering it as an alternative.  
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method as regards the same object (i.e., Forms).73 This contrast is not the same as 
that between pistis and eikasia (which is image/original contrast). In that case the 
scheme of the Line would break down: the structure of the bottom part (i.e., the 
visible) has no real analogy in the top part (i.e., the intelligible). Moreover, Plato’s 
classification of cognitive states and their objects at 511c would turn out to be 
misleading since contrary to the passage, there are altogether four cognitive states 
paired with only three objects. 
After considering the alternatives, Annas has to give up. The alternatives are 
‘unsatisfactory’. They create ‘expectedly annoying difficulties’. Plato’s analogy is 
‘inept’ and no answer seems quite right. Finally she concludes that the ‘insolubility 
of this problem is a good illustration of the difficulties that Plato runs into by using 
images to make a philosophical point’.74  
My thesis suggests that we should embrace Plato’s imagery much more 
positively. It is not a problem at all if his imagery provokes us into asking questions 
that cannot be answered within the terms of the imagery. For Plato’s imagery is not 
meant to be giving the final answer to our questions, or to be guiding our thinking as 
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 Annas believes that this difference is not foreign to the Republic. Her evidence is that ‘such a 
difference is not hard to find, especially in the light of Book 7: “thinking” studies Forms in isolation, 
for the purpose of special subjects like mathematics, whereas ”intellect” studies them for their own 
sake, and in systematic connection, as being dependent on the Form of the Good for their nature and 
intelligibility’ (251). 
It is also worth nothing here that Benson believes that there are two different kinds of contrast at 
work in the Line. The initial division of the Line and the subdivision of the visible part suggest an 
ontological focus but then the subdivision of the intelligible part follows a contract in methodologies. 
Benson believes that the philosophical method uses Forms and mathematical method uses the objects 
of pistis. (See Benson 2010, 188-208. I shall take up Benson’s discussion when I deal with the use of 
hypothesis as one of the six key problems with the Line in section 2.6.) 
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 Annas 1987, 252. 
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it proceeds from imagery to Plato’s philosophical position as the final conclusion. 
This is absolutely crucial. The imagery has already achieved its aim if our intellect is 
provoked and begins to consider problems about the Good, the visible and the 
intelligible realms, the task of the philosopher and the nature of his enterprise. 
Dealing with these problems in our own thinking is more formative than discerning 
what Plato really thinks about these problems. I shall further develop these ideas 
when I explain why the material should not be read as if it makes assertions about 
what Plato actually believes. 
 
1.3. Scholars who offer a more sophisticated view 
 
In discussing a puzzling feature of the Line, the fact that the two middle 
subsegments are equal in length, Smith advances the view that the Line is meant to 
be an imperfect image because according to Plato’s philosophy, images can never be 
perfect. Therefore Plato knowingly produces the Line with a subtle flaw. An 
imperfect image can save Plato from committing the sin of perfection.75  
Denyer also offers a more sophisticated view in this regard, although he also 
follows the assertoric way of reading the imagery as illustrating the role of the Good 
                                                 
75
 Smith 1998, 304-307. Rounding off his discussion of the problems posed by the two middle 
subsections of the Line that are equal in length, Smith says that ‘Given the incredible richness and 
substance of this very complex image, I am tempted to think that Plato might have purposefully 
woven this subtle flaw into the intricate fabric of his own image, because he wished to avoid the sin 
of perfection. According to his own philosophy, images can never be perfect, and Plato’s divided line 
is, after all, only an image. Plato’s line is certainly good enough to be a model of the excellence we 
can expect in the products of a philosophical craftsman. Perhaps it is also just bad enough to remind 
us, by contrast, of a perfection no image can equal.’ (Smith 1998, 307) I shall return to this when I 
discuss the proportions of the Line as one of the six key problems with the Line in section 2.3. 
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in teleological explanation. Denyer suggests some reasons why Plato might have 
purposely made the two middle subsegments equal in length. First, such design can 
help in a curious way to expound Plato’s idea that thought is superior to trust.76 
Secondly, it is central to Plato’s philosophy that an image is meant to be an 
imperfect copy of the original. Since the Line is an image, it has to be defective in 
some way.77 Also, the feature that the subsegments for trust and thought are equal 
in length can convey the message that thought is not superior to trust if we make the 
transition from trust to thought but then do not improve ourselves cognitively by 
moving from thought to knowledge.78 Finally Denyer supposes that the Line is 
meant to be puzzlingly contradictory because Plato wants to push us to start thinking. 
The Line is open to incompatible interpretations. We are thus provoked to think 
through the problems.79 As we shall see, my view differs from Denyer’s as he 
eventually proposes a doctrinal reading of the Line. 
Finally, Grube also offers a more sophisticated view of the Line. He suggests that 
we should not press the imagery too far since it was never intended to bear serious 
weight and so difficulties quickly arise: ‘it is better not to press his imagery further 
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 Denyer 2007. He reasons that ‘if the divided line does have the immediate purpose of expounding 
the superiority of thought over trust, then its very defectiveness for that immediate purpose would fit 
it to serve Plato’s purpose in the longer term’ (296). 
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 See Denyer 2007, 296. 
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 Denyer 2007. Thirdly, ‘perhaps the divided line is meant to hint that, in itself, thought is not after 
all superior to trust, that if we make the transition from trust to thought, but then go no further, we 
have not in fact improved ourselves cognitively, and that thought is superior to trust only in that 
thought is adjacent to, whereas trust is one step further removed from, the finest of all cognitive states, 
intellect. In this case, the fact that the divided line inevitably has equal subsegments to represent both 
trust and thought would be no defect at all’ (296). 
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 See Denyer 2007, 296. 
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than he does. It is not his way to schematize his philosophy and it is not very wise to 
try to do it for him. Some of the difficulties will recur’.80 
 
2. SIX KEY PROBLEMS WITH THE LINE AND ITS 
PROBLEMATIC INTEGRATION WITH THE OTHER IMAGES 
 
Despite a general sense of optimism and expectation amongst scholars making 
assertoric readings of three great allegories, many have found that there are 
insolvable problems and difficulties.81 These, I shall show, result from the way that 
they are assuming they should be read, namely as support for Plato’s doctrines 
regarding metaphysics, ethics, epistemology and ontology. I will focus my account 
of these difficulties around The Line (509d6 -511e5), which has seen the most 
attention.  
 
2.1. Should the Line be drawn vertical or horizontal?  
 
The first major problem is how the line should be drawn. To be sure, the layout 
of the Line raises some specific difficulties. For instance, should the Line be drawn 
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 Grube 1980, 28.  
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 The classic issues are summarised by Grube (1980), 27: ‘as so often, Plato does not work out the 
scheme of the line in detail and scholars have differed as to what exactly each section of the line 
should include. Are works of art to be condemned to the lowest section? What, besides the objects of 
mathematics, should we place in CE (i.e., the lower subsection of the intelligible world)? Are the 
natural sciences and such arts as strategy merely matters of belief? These and many similar questions 
Plato leaves unanswered’. 
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vertical or horizontal? To introduce the Line Socrates begins by recalling the 
distinction between the visible and the intelligible realms mentioned in the Sun 
(509d). Then he instructs Glaucon to divide a line into two unequal parts, one part 
representing the visible realm and the other the intelligible. These parts are further 
divided according to the same ratio. So assuming a vertical layout, the Line would 
appear as below such that AC:CE = AB:BC = CD:DE.82 
 
       A 
        
       B 
       C 
       D 
       E 
 
So far in Socrates’s instruction, only one feature of the Line is rather obvious, 
namely that the largest subsection must be at one end or the other.83 But we don’t 
yet know if the line should be drawn vertical or horizontal, or indeed diagonal.84 
Smith argues that Plato’s language at 511 appears to rule out both horizontal and 
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 For the sake of smooth reading, the layout of the Line produced here is the same as that of the 
representation in Smith 1998. However, the proportion shown in the diagram is not accurate. 
83
 The fact that the two middle sections have to be equal in length because of the ratio is less obvious. 
I will discuss this in section 2.3. 
84
 Smith considers this option in order to reject it in his discussion, but he does not seem to know of 
anyone who seriously suggests it. Smith 1998, 293. 
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diagonal representations.85 I accept Smith’s argument and so from now on I shall 
suppose a vertical line as most of the key interpretations assume a vertical line. 
 
2.2. Should the larger segment be made at the top or the bottom? 
 
Now, if the Line should be drawn vertical, there is another problem with its 
construction: should the larger segment be placed at the top or at the bottom of the 
line? Some put the larger subsection at the top, some place it at the bottom;86 in 
addition, some are indecisive on this issue.87 Smith himself argues that the text 
(especially 511e) clearly suggests that the Line ‘must be represented with the larger 
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 See Smith 1998, 293. Smith’s reasoning is as follows: ‘if Plato had a horizontal orientation in 
mind, we should expect some signal that one or more subsections were to the right or to the left of 
some other subsection; if a vertical orientation is in order, we should expect some sign that one or 
more subsections are above or below some other or others. For a diagonal orientation, some 
subsections would have to be both above and to the side of others. [Smith does not name anyone who 
suggest a diagonal line] In fact, Plato only makes it clear that some sections are above others: at 
511a6–7, we learn that the objects pertinent to one section of the line are below (ὑpiο-511a6) those 
belonging at another subsection; and at 511d6-8, we find that one of the four states of the soul 
(νόησις) is to be represented by the highest (ἀνωτάτω-511d8) subsection (AB). There is no hint, in 
this passage, that Plato conceives of one subsection as being to the side of any other subsection. The 
language Plato uses to orient the line, therefore, would appear to rule out both horizontal and 
diagonal representations’. 
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(clearer and truer) segment at the top, and the smaller (less clear and less true) 
segment at the bottom’.88 
The construction of the Line is actually more complicated. Denyer reports two 
different ancient interpretations of the Line, one by Plutarch and the other by 
Proclus.89 Both take the Line to be vertical, with intellect, thought, trust and fancy 
in that order from top to bottom. The difference is that in Proclus’s version, intellect 
has the longer segment and fancy takes the shorter, whereas in Plutarch’s version it 
is the reverse. Denyer suggests that Proclus’s reasoning is not hard to follow, 
because greater length correlates with greater clarity.90 In Plutarch’s reconstruction, 
intellect takes the shorter segment and fancy takes the longer, because, according to 
Plutarch a greater length represents a greater obscurity.91 
However, not everyone takes Plato’s vagueness on this matter to undermine the 
value of the Line. Denyer himself argues that the wrangle between Proclus and 
Plutarch serves only to confirm the arbitrariness of the choice to be made on the 
Line. Although Denyer does not take it to indicate that the Line is to be read 
non-assertorically, as I do, nevertheless he thinks that this particular issue is not a 
real problem and it does not need to be decided. Denyer suggests that Plato exploits 
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the manner in which we deal with images to expound to us the intelligible realm. 
The purpose of having us choose arbitrarily between making the opinion subsection 
longer than the knowledge subsection and making it shorter instead is to give us 
some practice in the kind of abstract thought which is needed to take us from the 
visible to the intelligible realm.92 So Denyer takes the purpose of the image to be at 
least partly practical, delivering training to the reader of the kind that Plato thinks is 
needed for the trainee philosopher kings.  
 
2.3. Is the equality of the two middle subsegments for thought (dianoia) 
and trust (pistis) a matter of importance or an irrelevant consequence 
originated in the proportions of the Line? 
 
The third problem: what should we make of the fact that the two middle 
subsegments for thought and for trust are equal in length? The equality is an 
inevitable result of the instructions given by Plato on how the Line should be 
constructed. Is Plato aware of this equality and its implications? This equality seems 
to be at odds with the idea that there is a continuous progression in degrees of clarity 
and reality of the four segments (i.e., of longer length and hence of greater clarity 
and reality, and supposedly thought should be better than trust because it is closer to 
knowledge).  
Morrison argues that Plato does not intend to convey the idea that the four 
segments of the Line are meant to stand for an increasing degree of clarity and truth 
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for this very reason that the two middle subsegments are equal in length.93 Morrison 
believes that Plato intends this equality, rejecting the idea the equality is 
unintentional or that Plato was unaware of it, because he believes that Plato was too 
good at geometry to have made such an obvious mistake.94 
Cross and Woozley take a different view on the equality. They suggest Plato’s 
silence seems to suggest that he did not want us to take it as something significant.95 
They even go so far as to suggest that leaving the equality aside is the right thing to 
do in interpreting the Line.  
On the other hand, Denyer gives some reasons why we might regard the equality 
of the two middle segments as a ‘surprising feature’ of the Line.96 As he points out, 
each segment of the line seems to be supposed to correlate with the value of the 
mental state it represents, in descending order of merit from the top downwards.97 
Denyer thinks that several passages come close to implying that the two middle 
segments are unequal, and have the same proportions as the two lower segments 
have to each other.98 
On the other hand, there are other reasons to think that the equality is not 
accidental.99 At 534a, for example, in the recapitulation of the Line, Socrates runs 
through a different set of proportions, between intellect and trust, and between 
thought and fancy, which are less obvious except to a geometer. This suggests that 
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Plato is well aware of the consequences, and can make his characters draw the less 
obvious as well as the more obvious ones.100 So surely Plato knew well enough that 
the two middle segments come out equal. 
Again, Denyer does not think that this insoluble puzzle is damaging to the 
Republic. He suggests instead that Plato might have chosen to make the two middle 
segments equal because it allows incompatible interpretations. Denyer offers two 
reasons why this might fit with Plato’s purposes. First it helps us to learn that images 
always fall short of the original, because the Line is itself an image. So its defects 
are part of the point. And secondly, it may be intended to make a serious point, 
hinting that thought is not after all superior to trust.101 So Denyer believes that the 
image deliberately makes space for incompatible interpretations.102 He compares 
this passage to the discussion of fingers and size in 523b-524d. For while the senses 
always report fingers as fingers, and hence do not provoke the mind to think about 
what a finger is, they do provoke the mind to wonder what big and small are because 
they tell the mind that the fingers are sometimes big, sometimes small. 
So although Denyer suggests that the images are deliberately designed to provoke 
thought, he also takes them to be offered in service of a doctrinal view. There is, he 
thinks, an answer to whether thought is better or equal to trust. The image is not 
good at delivering the information, but it is supposed to help us to get there, to 
Plato's own view (which was, apparently, clear). The image is at fault, because it 
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cannot adequately convey the truth that Plato wanted to get across. Its only merit is 
in alerting us to the inadequacy of images. 
Smith thinks that the issue of equality is seriously damaging and if we attend to it 
we are led to problems in our understanding of the relative merits of the two 
subsegments.103 Smith holds on to the idea that the lengths of the segments are 
supposed to represent varying degrees of clarity (509d9 and 511e3) as well as 
varying degrees of truth (510a8-9, 511e2-3). The measure of truth is said to follow 
the same proportions as the measure of clarity (511e2-4). Smith argues that the 
feature of equality of the middle subsegments is incompatible with the passages in 
which Plato obviously says that the lengths of the segments signify varying degrees 
of clarity and truth. Plato never considered thought to be no clearer than trust 
because this is rejected at 533d5, which explicitly said that thought is clearer than 
opinion, which includes both trust and fancy. In any case, since thought is clearer 
than the entire realm of belief, it must be clearer than trust which is only a 
subsegment of belief.  
To be sure, Smith admits that Plato’s Line is a complex image and there is no 
tidy solution to this issue.104 In fact, he concludes, the problem of the equality of the 
middle subsegments cannot be made to go away. But Plato may intend this to be so 
because according to his philosophy images can never be perfect and the Line is 
only an image. Therefore the problem of equality is intended to remind us of the 
doctrine that no image can be perfect. Insofar as the Line is taken to convey Plato’s 
doctrine, albeit inadequately, Smith’s interpretation counts as an assertoric reading 
of the imagery. 
                                                 
103
 Smith 1998, 307. 
104
 See Smith 1998, 306.  
62 
 
  
2.4. What kind of things should we find in the subsegment for thought 
(dianoia)? 
 
The fourth problem is concerned with the objects at each subsegment and in 
particular what objects should fill in the subsegment for thought. This is the most 
worked out problem and my earlier discussion has already shown how this problem 
poses an incredibly challenging difficulty. Smith thinks this problem is ‘a source of 
extreme difficulty for scholars’ and he complains that ‘scholars have created a chaos 
of possibilities’.105  Lesher refers to it as one of ‘the most enduring’ puzzling 
features of the Line.106 Annas simply gives up finding answer to this problem and 
concludes that it is insoluble.107 
Now I shall probe into this key problem. Socrates makes it clear to Glaucon that 
images, shadows, reflections in water and other polished surfaces, and all that sort of 
stuff should fill in the subsegment for fancy while ‘the objects which are the 
originals of images – the animals around us, and every kind of plant and artefact’ 
should fill in the subsegment for trust (510a). The visible segment and its two 
subsegments are divided in respect of truth (aletheia) and untruth and that the 
relation of image to original is the same as that of the visible realm to that of the 
intelligible (510a).  
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The intelligible segment of the Line is divided differently; it is divided by the 
different methods of enquiry the mind uses in each of them (510b).108 Nevertheless, 
it is revealed that the subsegment for knowledge represents Forms (510b, 511b).109 
What the subsegment for thought is supposed to represent is never explicitly stated 
in the analogy of the Line. To fill in the subsegment for thought, scholars have 
suggested mental images of Forms, ‘mathematical objects’, ‘mathematical realities, 
sciences’, Forms, mathematical intermediates, propositional axioms of geometry, 
‘figures’, visible originals (repeated from the subsegment for trust).110 
Smith’s position is to argue for the images of Forms—that is, we should find 
intelligible images of intelligible originals in the subsegment for thought.111 But 
what are the images of Forms? Smith believes that the images of Forms are the 
visible originals in the subsegment for trust employed as images in mathematical 
reasoning in the subsegment for thought.112 ‘In recognizing the originals of the 
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visible realm (CD) as the images in the intelligible realm (BC), we see one of the 
most famous features of Plato’s philosophy: sensible participants are really only 
images of Forms.’113  
Smith rejects intermediate objects like mathematical intermediates, ‘general 
notions’ or propositional images of the Forms. Smith thinks that they all suffer from 
a very obvious problem: they are not mentioned at all in the Line passage or in the 
Republic as a whole.114 Smith finds the omission strange. In addition, the suggestion 
of intermediates raises another problem. The image/original contrast in the Republic 
is always explicitly a feature of the participation of particulars in Forms. The 
intermediates would participate in the Forms and they would image the Forms, but 
the problem is how can the intermediates participate in the Forms as particulars 
when they are intermediates? The scholars who posit intermediates need to explain 
what the imaging relationship is supposed to consist in.115 
Smith’s proposal is to insist that the image/original contrast prevails throughout 
the Line. But this violates the rationale for the initial division of the Line into the 
intelligible and the visible realms. It follows from the initial division that the 
subsegment for dianoia should represent something intelligible. If the subsegment 
for dianoia is to represent images, the images should be intelligible images. The 
visible originals cannot be employed as intelligible images in mathematical 
reasoning, as Smith’s proposal has it. 
In response, Smith thinks that his proposal is compatible with the initial division 
of the line into two different realms because the separation of the two realms does 
                                                 
113
 Smith’s version of the Line is provided in the discussion in section 2.1. 
114
 Smith 1998, 300. 
115
 See Smith 1998, 300.  
65 
 
not require wholly different objects to appear on each side of the division.116 
Smith’s evidence is that in Plato’s discussion of the mathematical education of the 
trainee philosopher kings, visible things like fingers (523c4-524c13), visible shapes 
and diagrams (529d8-530a1), cubes and other solid objects (528a9-b3) are used as if 
they are appropriate images of the intelligible originals. These visible things are the 
originals of the sensible realm but they are seen as images of the intelligible 
originals when they are used by the mathematician in mathematical thinking. They 
are not the proper objects of mathematical study but they are required as images 
(510d6-7). In addition, Smith suggests that it is only an assumption that Plato could 
not recognize any overlap between the visible and intelligible realms.117 On the 
contrary, Smith argues, it is an essential feature of Plato’s metaphysical, 
epistemological and also his political projects that the visible can in some way or to 
some degree be made intelligible. 
As Smith himself notes, other scholars are deeply troubled by the notion that 
images of any kind could be included among the knowables.118 They believe that 
while the knowables can only be found in the highest subsegment of the intelligible 
realm the opinables can only be found in the subsegment for pistis. As Book V 
suggests, the objects of knowledge are originals and the objects of opinion are 
images of the objects of knowledge. There is no further subdivision of each class 
into images and originals. 
I should mention some further problems for Smith’s proposal. Although a 
sensible diagram is used in mathematical thinking as an image of the intelligible 
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original, it is never made the mathematician’s object of cognition. It is only used as 
an aid to apprehend the original; the thinking is never about the sensible diagram but 
the original (510d). The mathematician wants to know about the original, not the 
sensible diagram. Secondly, the contrast within the intelligible realm is most 
disputed: other scholars hold the view that it is a difference in methodologies, not 
the image/original contrast that Smith supposes.119  
 
2.5. What should be the meaning of eikasia?  
 
This is the fifth key problem with the Line. It is of great importance because what 
we see in the meaning of eikasia will turn out to have close bearing on the 
philosophical significance we assign to the lowest section of the Line.120 Annas 
doubts if the lowest section has any real philosophical significance other than 
making the analogy between the visible and intelligible realms. However, Cross and 
Woozley suggest that a fair case can be put up for taking the lowest section as of 
great philosophical significance in relation to Greek society as Plato knew it.121 
Contrary to what Annas thinks, the lowest section is not merely illustrative; it 
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represents an actual stage in the mind’s progression from the lowest degree of clarity 
to maximum clarity and it also fits in with the Cave.122 
Scholars use a variety of translations for eikasia. Denyer prefers ‘fancy’.123 
Lesher renders the word as ‘perception of images’.124 Grube and also Pappas use 
‘imagination’ 125  Penner uses ‘conjecture’ 126  Smith suggests ‘imaging or 
illusion’.127 Annas decides to leave eikasia untranslated in her discussion because 
scholars disagree about the correct rendering.128 Morrison also employs the word in 
Greek.129  
Cross and Woozley suggest that the translation ‘conjecture’ produces an 
ambiguity for it can mean guessing at originals through their likeness, or guessing at 
the relations of the shadows to one another.130  In the second sense, the conjectures 
are confined to the shadow world. The first sense is linguistically unobjectionable 
but it does not fit in with the state of mind of the prisoners in the Cave.131 Plato 
clearly emphasises at 514a that the prisoners cannot turn their heads and hence they 
should have no inkling that beyond the shadows there are originals casting the 
shadows. In another passage, Plato represents the prisoners as making conjectures in 
the sense of making guesses about which shadows will follow which (516c-d). 
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Therefore Cross and Woozley believe that for the sake of close correspondence 
between the Line and the Cave, we must not understand eikasia as ‘conjecturing 
about originals through their reflections’.132  
Since parallelism between the Line and Cave is most disputed, Cross and 
Woozley provide some independent ground for their understanding of eikasia. The 
contrast at 476c describes the non-philosopher as leading a dreaming life while the 
philosopher is not. The non-philosopher is dreaming in the sense of ‘thinking what is 
like something not to be like it but to be the thing itself, which it is like’. Unlike the 
philosopher who knows Beauty itself, the non-philosopher takes a likeness for the 
original. There is another passage on dreaming. At 533b the mathematician is said to 
be ‘dreaming about being’ in the sense that he takes a likeness for the original 
without realizing that it is a likeness. The mathematician is in the section of dianoia 
which is related to the eikasia section. Therefore the person who is in the state of 
eikasia does the same as the mathematician: they both take likeness for the original. 
The state of mind represented by the lowest section of the Line is not one of 
guessing at originals through their likenesses, but rather one of guessing at the 
relations of the likenesses to one another and thereby taking likenesses for originals 
and not realising that they are only likenesses.133 
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For the philosophical significance of the lowest section, Cross and Woozley think 
that the reflections and shadows of the lowest section of the Line (and the shadows 
on the wall of the Cave) symbolize the imitations of justice, goodness and so on 
created by the rhetoricians, sophists and politicians in Greek society.134 And the 
state of mind that accepts these misrepresentations without realizing they were mere 
imitations of the real thing is eikasia. The section of pistis stands for first-hand 
opinions i.e., the person who is in this state reaches his own conclusions about what 
is just or good. It is better than the uncritical acceptance of the imitations of justice 
or goodness as second-hand opinions. The two sections of the lower Line make up 
the whole world of belief but eikasia is at one further remove from real knowledge 
and it has the lowest degree of clarity.135 Cross and Woozley believe that they are 
not reading into what Plato says in the passages because throughout his dialogues 
Plato regards the sophists, rhetoricians and politicians as a substantial threat to the 
good life, a serious menace to a good society.136 But on the other hand, they also 
note that there is a great deal of divergence of opinion among scholars and 
commentators on eikasia and they are not optimistic that any final and definite 
interpretation is likely to be reached.137 
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2.6. How does the philosophical method proceed to an unhypothetical 
first principle (archē) and then finish with knowledge?   
 
Scholars and commentators generally agree that the inferiority of the 
mathematical method to the philosophical method should be explained in terms of 
two distinguishing marks stipulated in Socrates’s explanation that while dialectic 
uses only Forms in proceeding from hypotheses to an unhypothetical first principle 
(510b6-9), mathematical method uses sensible objects as images in proceeding from 
hypotheses to a conclusion (510b4-6). Unlike philosophical method, mathematical 
method makes assumptions (like the odd and the even, the kinds of angles, the 
Square itself and the Diagonal itself) which it does not explain (510c). The marks of 
inferiority are the use of sensible objects versus the use of Forms, and the different 
attitudes to hypothesis that put it to different uses. 
Benson believes that the philosophical method and the mathematical method are 
distinguished less by their formal features than by the manner in which these two 
methods are carried out.138 Since both employ the formal features of the method of 
hypothesis introduced in the Meno and Phaedo, the difference in outcomes reflects 
different applications of the method of hypothesis; correct application can achieve 
knowledge while incorrect application can achieve only dianoia. The key to correct 
application of the method of hypothesis is to provide complete logoi, that is, 
complete confirmation for the hypotheses used. 
 The dianoetic method’s application of the method of hypothesis is incomplete 
and thus incorrect because it treats its hypotheses as already known and confirmed. 
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Hence it fails to employ the confirmation process to the extent that it should.139 As a 
result, the dianoetic method falls short of the standard Plato requires of knowledge, 
namely that knowledge cannot be acquired by an argument whose premises are 
unconfirmed or unsecured.140 On the other hand, dialectic can achieve knowledge 
because it treats its hypotheses really as hypothetical assumptions, like stepping 
stones to the unhypothetical first principle, and then it tests the consequences of this 
higher hypothesis for consistency and against contrary evidence.141 Benson believes 
that for Plato, the goal of philosophical enquiry is to provide hypotheses which are 
derivable from the unhypothetical first principle and no one can rightly claim 
knowledge until the confirmation from the unhypothetical first principle is 
completed.142  
The use of sensible objects is the second mark of inferiority. Benson believes that 
Plato is not objecting to the mere use of sensible objects because the Phaedo appears 
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to recognize a useful role for ordinary sensible objects, as a kind of necessary 
catalyst and the Republic distinguishes between the features of sensible objects that 
do not turn the soul toward truth and knowledge and those that do.143 Benson 
believes that Plato uses the second mark of inferiority to emphasize the indirect 
nature of dianoetic as it seeks to know about the Forms by using the things that are 
images of Forms. 144  However, Plato never explains why this indirection is 
defective.145 Benson supposes that Plato’s idea is that the dianoetic method’s use of 
visible objects as images exposes itself to mistaking what are only contingent 
consequences of its hypotheses as genuine consequences. The dianoetic method 
cannot give knowledge because it takes contingent features of the images as genuine 
features of the Form and then it proceeds to make its logoi about the instances 
instead of about the Form itself. Dialectic can avoid this problem because it uses 
only Forms in proceeding from hypotheses to the unhypothetical first principle. 146   
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Cross and Woozley identify an obvious difficulty in proceeding to the 
unhypothetical first principle. Plato seems to suggest that the unhypothetical first 
principle is directly known as a result of some “final flash of intuition”. In other 
words, the philosopher grasps the unhypothetical first principle by some sort of 
immediate awareness.147 The philosophical method seems to appeal to some sort of 
psychological certainty or incorrigibility. But Cross and Woozley believe that 
although this is a problem but it should not undermine the importance of what Plato 
has to say about the hypothetical method in the Republic because it contains many 
ideas that have been fruitful in later thought. For instance, the notion of 
axiomatisation has become fundamental in later mathematics.  
On the other hand, Annas believes that the appeal to incorrigible or certain 
intuition is a misunderstanding. 148  The philosophical method is not such “a 
foolproof method” and Plato is not suggesting that knowledge is produced by a 
faculty that guarantees its own infallibility. 149  For Plato, direct knowing is 
associated with the kind of understanding that makes it wholly clear what the thing 
in question is, and only Forms can be directly known because only Forms are in 
principle completely intelligible. 
                                                                                                                                         
the unhypothetical archē this way views it partially or indirectly (grasping an image of it) as though 
in a dream’ (199). 
147
 Cross and Woozley 1966, 252-253. They also believe that the method Plato envisaged in the 
Republic is the hypothetical method of the Phaedo.  
148
 Annas 1987, 280-284. Annas summarizes the misinterpretation as follows: ‘on this view, dialectic 
culminates in a direct vision of the Good, and of everything else in the light of the Good, a vision that 
guarantees the certain truth of what is revealed, because the knowledge it gives is direct and leaves no 
room for any mediating process where error could enter’ (281). 
149
 Annas 1987, 281-282. Annas believes that Plato is not interested in the kind of directness (hence 
certainty) that precludes doubt about the truth of particular calms.  
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2.7. How do the stages on the Line integrate with the stages in the Cave? 
 
Assuming a full correspondence between the four subsections of the Line (two in 
the visible and two in the intelligible) and the four stages of the Cave (two within the 
cave and two outside), Morrison identifies a minor discrepancy.150 Whereas in the 
subsection of thought, the originals of the visible realm are used as likenesses, the 
prisoner looks at shadows and reflections after exiting from the cave. The shadows 
and reflections are not the same as the puppets, the originals of the shadows in the 
cave. Morrison thinks this discrepancy can be explained away because these two 
groups of objects are the same category of thing as far as truth and clarity are 
concerned, though they are not the same groups of objects in the cave.  
Cross and Woozley refer to the problematic relationship between the Line and 
Cave as a ‘vexed question’ as there is a great deal of discussion and a variety of 
divergent interpretations.151 They believe that Socrates’s instruction (517a-c) is to 
compare or liken “the region revealed through sight” in the Line with the Cave (i.e., 
the whole lower Line is parallel with the Cave); and the upward ascent from the 
Cave (as the ascent to the intelligible world) plainly refers back to the Line.152 The 
                                                 
150
 See Morrison 1977, 228-229. 
151
 Cross and Woozley 1966, 207. 
152
 Cross and Woozley 1966, 214-216. They render the key passage as follows: ‘now, my dear 
Glaucon, I said, you must apply this simile in its entirety to what we were saying before, comparing 
the region revealed through sight to the prison-dwelling, and the light of the fire in it to the power of 
the sun; and if you take the upward ascent and the sight of things in the upper world as the ascent of 
the soul to the intelligible region, you will be in possession of my surmise, since that is what you 
wish to hear’. (214). 
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shadow-original relationship is further evidence for parallelism.153 But on the other 
hand, Cross and Woozley mention some considerable difficulties in making the 
initial state of the prisoners in the Cave parallel with the lowest segment of the 
Line.154 The prisoners of the Cave look at shadows on the wall in the initial state. In 
the Line, the lowest segment stands for shadows and reflections (510a). Therefore, 
assuming parallelism, the prisoners should find themselves in the state of eikasia. 
But the problem is that Socrates refers to the prison-dwelling state as the normal 
condition of mankind (515a) which should (we might suppose) be pistis instead of 
eikasia. Another problem is that Plato has no need to distinguish pistis from eikasia 
in the Cave. The Cave is an allegorical introduction to Book VII which is concerned 
with two stages of higher education, that is, the mathematical study (which gives 
dianoia) and the philosophical study (which gives noesis). All that Plato is interested 
in at this stage of Book VII is the transition from the sensible to the intelligible 
world, which is the journey from a low degree of intelligence to the highest. The 
route is from pistis via dianoia to noesis; eikasia has no role to play in this 
progressive route.  
Annas refers to the problematic correspondence between the Line and Cave as “a 
subject of great dispute”.155 The first problem is that the Cave does not divide neatly 
into four stages. Secondly, the Line stresses the progress from the world of sense to 
that of thought and the image/original relation also stresses the continuity in what 
happens within those worlds. A move from image to original represents a move to 
more clarity. But then the Cave stresses the sharp division between inside and 
                                                 
153
 Cross and Woozley report Murphy’s view that even if Plato had not intended parallelism the Line 
may be said to apply itself to the Cave. 
154
 Cross and Woozley1966, 227-228. 
155
 Annas 1987, 254-256. 
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outside the cave as if they are two worlds. The conversion to enlightenment is 
inexplicable in the Cave; the release of the prisoner is never explained.  
Like Cross and Woozley, Annas also discusses the problems posed by eikasia, 
namely that it has a different range in Line and Cave. The root problem is that the 
Cave, being an image, is actually an extended metaphor for the universal human 
need for enlightenment. Within the metaphor there is another layer of metaphor: the 
puppets are literally puppets but they also image moral qualities like justice (517d-e). 
The shadows on the wall are literally shadows but metaphorically they are the 
prisoners’ unreflective opinions or “second-hand” beliefs about things like justice. 
Plato wants us to think of the prisoners’ state not just as part of the whole image but 
on a further level of metaphor. This extended metaphor can make Plato’s point 
graphically but only at the cost of wrecking correspondence with the Line, and the 
imagery has no consistent overall interpretation.156  
 
                                                 
156
 Annas 1987, 256. Annas blames Plato for overloading his imagery and not being alive to the 
dangers in the philosophical use of images as he himself warns against. 
‘Plato has got so carried away by his desire to stress the utterly contemptible nature of the state 
unenlightened by philosophical thought that the imagery, memorable though it is, has no consistent 
overall interpretation.’ 
‘Sun, Line, and Cave are philosophically frustrating; they point us in too many directions at once. 
Their power has always lain in their appeal to the imagination, and the harsh forceful contrast they 
draw between the life content with appearance and superficiality, and the richly rewarding life 
dedicated to finding out the truth. Their appeal is so strong that interpreters are perennially tempted to 
try to harmonize them in a consistent philosophical interpretation, despite Plato’s own warnings on 
the limits of the kind of thinking that is guided by images and illustrations.’ 
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3. MUST WE ADOPT THESE ASSERTORIC WAYS OF 
READING THE MATERIAL? 
 
Coming to the end of my extended discussion of the key problems with the Line 
and its problematic integration with the Cave, we can conclude that the assertoric 
ways of reading the imagery as either illustration or argument for Platonic doctrines 
in metaphysics, ontology and epistemology have constantly given rise to unresolved 
disputes. No definite interpretation has emerged, for reasons that seem to have to do 
with the very nature of imagery. The history of scholarship on this aspect of Plato 
seems to suggest that there is little prospect of a definite interpretation that accords 
with the assertoric reading’s expectation of reading off Plato’s view directly from 
the imagery. 
For this reason I would claim that all the assertoric readings have been 
unsatisfactory. However, most scholars and commentators seem never to have 
questioned their assertoric reading of the material and their expectation that one can 
read off Plato’s view directly from the imagery. When her assertoric reading gives 
no satisfactory result, Annas blames Plato and his use of imagery. She does not 
pause to review her own exegetical assumptions to see if they are responsible for the 
problems and difficulties that she has encountered. So Annas’s own practice of 
assertoric reading strikingly resembles the dianoetic method’s application of the 
method of hypothesis. Like the geometers in that section, Annas treats her exegetical 
hypotheses as confirmed and already known. Indeed the assumption that Plato uses 
imagery to communicate his views typically goes unchallenged. It is a fundamental, 
but undiscussed, tenet of all assertoric readings.  
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The charges that Annas brings against Plato include his ‘eagerness to use analogy 
and images to illustrate a point” and his “intellectual unclarity’. The problems she 
identifies with Plato’s imagery include resisting philosophical interpretation, giving 
rise to persistent disagreements, being ‘philosophically frustrating’, and letting the 
readers down because of lack of philosophical rigour.157  
Obviously these charges against Plato rely on the crucial assumption that Plato’s 
purpose is to illustrate his views with the imagery. The alleged problems of the 
imagery originate in this very assumption, which is what induces the readers to 
approach the imagery as if it somehow delivers or communicates Plato’s views. I 
suggest that we should give up this exegetical assumption because such assertoric 
readings have systematically failed to deliver a satisfactory account of Plato’s views; 
moreover, we can adopt instead a different and more fruitful approach to the 
material. 
                                                 
157
 A summary of her complaints is as follows:  
‘as often happens with Plato, his eagerness to use analogy and images to illustrate a point leads him 
into intellectual unclarity’ (249). 
‘the insolubility of this problem (which is equivalent to the forth problem in my discussion) is a good 
illustration of the difficulties that Plato runs into by using images to make a philosophical point’ 
(252). 
‘The Cave is Plato’s most famous image, dominating many people’s interpretation of what Plato’s 
most important ideas are. This is a pity, because, as with the Line, severe problems arise over 
interpreting the imagery philosophically, and there are persistent disagreements’ (252). 
‘Sun, Line and Cave are philosophically frustrating; they point us in too many directions at once. 
Their power has always lain in their appeal to the imagination...’  
‘Their appeal is so strong that interpreters are perennially tempted to try to harmonize them in a 
consistent philosophical interpretation, despite Plato’s own warning on the limits of the kind of 
thinking that is guided by images and illustrations’ (256). 
‘As, for example, Sun, Line and Cave are suggestive about the nature of the Good, but let us down if 
we seek in the imagery for philosophical rigour suitable only to direct investigation of the Good 
itself’ (281). 
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3.1 Giving Up the Assertoric Ways of Reading   
 
Sextus Empiricus reports a famous story about Apelles the painter:  
 
For it is said that once upon a time, when he was painting a horse and wished to depicted 
the horse’s froth, he failed so completely that he gave up and threw the sponge at the 
picture – the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints form his brush – and that in 
striking the picture the sponge produced the desired effect.  (PH 1 28) 
 
Like Apelles, I suggest, we should throw our sponge at assertoric reading of 
Plato's images in the Republic. We should give up the attempt to read off Plato’s 
views directly from the images. Once we give up this exegetical assumption, we 
open up ourselves to a new way of engaging with the images. Our mind can break 
away from the images and move beyond, as an inquisitive intellect exploring 
philosophical problems in a freer spirit. Annas is right when she claims that the 
images are suggestive about the nature of the Good and a revisionary account of 
knowledge. In her interpretative framework, Plato uses imagery to communicate his 
views and yet the imagery is at fault because it cannot adequately convey the truth 
that Plato wants to get across. To be sure, she is partially right; but the way in which 
the images are suggestive about these issues is not the way she supposes. 
According to the non-assertoric reading that I am proposing in this Chapter, 
Plato’s images are suggestive of the baffling questions that we encounter when we 
probe into the nature of the Good or the requirement of knowledge. Therefore we 
should not be put off by the interpretative problems with the Line. They are not 
unproductive difficulties or distracting. They point, rather, to different ways of 
thinking about the problems, and they draw our attention to more intricate problems 
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that may have escaped our notice previously. Going through such problems is a 
necessary exercise in the course of our thinking about the Good or about the 
requirement of knowledge. The puzzles make us do some philosophy ourselves. 
On my interpretation, Plato’s imagery is propaedeutic. It is to be treated as the 
initial steps or thought experiments that can start us on the journey to the highly 
abstract thinking required in the philosophical investigation of the Good and 
knowledge. The non-assertoric reading that I propose here considers Plato’s imagery 
as an invitation to do philosophy. The imagery may tend to prompt us into asking 
questions that cannot be answered within the terms of the imagery. But this is good 
because it is what it should be doing: pointing out different possible directions for 
more thinking. The imagery invites incompatible interpretations, the incompatible 
interpretations are not vicious but rather beneficial because they can be 
thought-provoking and they await our responses.  
By discussing these problems with interpreting the Line I have been trying to 
illustrate how futile is the attempt made by defenders of the assertoric reading to 
discern what Plato actually believes, on the basis of the imagery. By adopting a 
non-assertoric reading, we abandon the expectation that the imagery is an ascent to 
Platonic doctrines. Once rid of the urge to doctrinal understanding, we become 
immune to the temptation to harmonize the images into one consistent philosophical 
interpretation. The scholars and commentators who are drawn to assertoric readings 
have fallen under the spell of that temptation. But the non-assertoric reading is the 
antidote to this temptation.  
The assertoric reading of the imagery is deep-rooted. Exponents of the assertoric 
reading may disagree with my proposed non-assertoric reading. They may argue that 
seemingly insoluble disagreements are found everywhere in philosophy. For 
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instance, people dispute the validity of various arguments on the existence of God, 
but the dispute itself does not show that no one was trying to deliver a proof.   
Therefore it is one thing to observe the fact that scholars and commentators 
disagree on the interpretation of Plato’s imagery. But it is quite another thing to 
conclude that Plato did not mean to convey any doctrinal views in his use of 
imagery. Moreover, some exponents may think that they have a firm grasp on the 
imagery and people who disagree with them are just simply wrong.  
I do not want to deny that what happens with the imagery could be similar to the 
dispute on the existence of God. But the unresolved problems with the Line and its 
problematic integration with the Cave provide some good reasons for not taking it to 
be the right one. My proposal that Plato’s imagery is meant to be frustrating and to 
defy doctrinal interpretation does not compete with the assertoric readings at the 
same level. It does not deal with the imagery as if it is a metaphysical theory in 
disguise conveying some truths about the Good. It does not claim to unveil a 
different metaphysical doctrine. By not taking side in the search for Plato’s hidden 
doctrine, we can dissolve or eliminate the puzzles about what exactly Plato was 
trying to say. My proposal also solves the puzzle about why Plato did not assert his 
doctrines directly.  
We can move up one level by calling for a change of exegetical assumptions in 
dealing with Plato’s use of imagery. Taking the imagery as non-assertoric means 
accepting the fact that it is designed to frustrate the reader’s attempt to find a 
doctrine. In this way the imagery drives the reader to do philosophy – it is its 
success in this regard that should be judged by critics.  
There are already some compelling reasons to adopt my non-assertoric reading of 
the images. But in addition my reading fits neatly with two relevant features of 
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Plato’s work that further problematize the alternative approach of assertoric reading. 
The first feature is the fact that Plato’s dialogues are works of fiction characterised 
by authorial silence, and the second has to do with the elenctic style of many of the 
dialogues.  
 
3.2. Fiction and Authorial Silence 
 
Does a speech by Hamlet give us Shakespeare’s opinions? A work of fiction is an 
invented narrative. It would be absurd to say ‘Shakespeare says this and that’ when 
the person speaking, i.e., Hamlet was a character in a play. This is also true for the 
personae Socrates or the Athenian Stranger in Plato’s dialogues. The personae are 
not the voice of the author. This can be true even for a monologue: it would be just 
as true if Plato had written not a dialogue but a monologue in the voice of Socrates. 
Scholars often write about the dialogue form as though that was what made the 
difference between a treatise and a work in which Plato’s voice is not heard. But the 
issue is not whether there is more than one voice heard, but whether any voice is the 
voice of the author. My view is that Plato’s dialogues feature authorial silence 
despite the multiple voices heard. I am now going to explain that in Plato’s 
dialogues the ideas and arguments put forward by Socrates are not necessarily ideas 
that belonged to the real Socrates; nor are they certainly Plato’s own. My view is 
that certain features of Plato’s dialogues constitute authorial silence, so that the 
arguments can neither be attributed to the persona Socrates nor to Plato the author. 
Hence, Plato’s fictional dialogues become another prominent instance of 
non-assertoric discourse.   
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Plato’s dialogues seem to be a kind of fiction. The dialogue form itself is 
suggestive of the non-assertoric mood of his writing. Of course my point is not that 
anything written in the dialogue form in philosophy must be non-assertoric. This 
need not be the case, and indeed assertoric dialogues are easy to find. For instance, 
George Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous is overtly 
assertoric, with Philonous speaking Berkeley’s metaphysical views and Hylas 
representing his adversary. My point here is simply that the dialogue form can be 
ideal for non-assertoric discourse because it can put the author at one remove from 
the views expressed in the writing. The important points, however, for my purposes, 
are authorial silence (Plato himself does not speak as a character in the work) and he 
is not explicitly identified with any character. Apart from the Laws, Socrates makes 
at least a brief appearance in all Plato’s dialogues. Plato’s presentation of Socrates 
varies somewhat, however. Often Socrates is the principal speaker, who directs the 
course of discussion by subjecting the interlocutors to Socratic elenchus or 
cross-examination. But in some dialogues such as the Parmenides and Timaeus, his 
role is less prominent and other interlocutors take up the role of principal speaker. 
Moreover, Platonic silence prevails in the narrative of all dialogues. Plato’s usual 
practice is to let his personae do the narrative of the dialogues. But for those direct 
or dramatic dialogues such as the Euthyphro there is simply no narrative at all; the 
discussion just takes off from ground with minimal stage setting. On the other hand, 
for those narrated or reported dialogues such as the Phaedo and Theaetetus the 
narrative is done in the name of some personae but not in Plato’s own name. It is 
usually someone recalling and relating a discussion held earlier between Socrates 
and his interlocutors under some fictional setting. The discussion is featured as an 
indirect discourse with a pervasive sense of indirectness. It is not offered as Plato’s 
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first-hand verbatim recapitulation or personal testimony of any real conversation 
between Socrates and his interlocutors. The result of these is a phenomenon of 
multiple voices in the dialogues but none represents the voice of the author. 
Because the settings and conversations appear to be imaginary, and made up by 
Plato, there are two thoughts we might have. One is to think that nothing of it is 
Plato’s own view, because it is imaginary and he need not believe any of it (as 
fantasy novelist might not believe any of the claims made by his fantasy characters). 
This comes closest to my own view. On the other hand one might think that some of 
the views are Plato’s own (since he is not constrained to report historical 
conversations, but can write his own views into the conversations). That would lead 
us to assume that Plato does stand behind the words of some of his characters, or 
that some of them speak for him as a mouthpiece.158 Other scholars have supposed 
that the characters in the dialogue do not represent the authorial voice because Plato 
speaks in a hidden voice and the reader can get at the subtle answer by working hard 
at the dialogues. 159   
The important point for our purposes is that Plato never casts himself as an active 
participant in the dialogues. There is only one place where the text indicates that the 
real Plato was present on the occasion that is recorded or imagined, namely at the 
trial of Socrates, but even on that occasion he remains silent. Plato’s name is first 
mentioned by Socrates as among the young who are present during the trial and are 
willing to aid Socrates to rebut the charge of corrupting the young with their own 
personal experience with Socrates (34a). His name is mentioned again by Socrates, 
                                                 
158
 For instance Rowe 2006, 24. I will soon review Rowe’s ‘Two Voices Reading’ in section 3.2.1. 
159
 For instance Kahn 1996. I will soon review Kahn’s reading of the dialogue form as an ingressive 
mode of exposition in section 3.2.2. 
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in the later phase of the trial, as one of those who are willing to stand bail for 30 
minas if the jury should so decide (38b). But notice how Plato’s rare presence at the 
proceedings is characterized by complete silence. 
The Phaedo provides another excellent example. At the beginning of the 
narrative Plato is said to be ill and therefore absent from the death scene of Socrates 
(59b). Of course the Phaedo is only a dramatized dialogue and should not be treated 
as a faithful account recording the historical facts concerning the death of Socrates. 
But Plato’s alleged absence should be reckoned as what Plato the author wants the 
reader to see with regard to how he relates to the account given in the Phaedo. He 
wants to distance himself from the account. He also wants to distance his account 
from historicity. 
Plato begins the dialogue with Echecrates putting a request to Phaedo for a 
first-hand account of the death of Socrates (57a). Echecrates expresses his wish to 
have a definite account with details (57b) and he repeatedly asks Phaedo to tell 
everything as accurately as he can (58d). Phaedo responds to the request and begins 
to relate the tragic and heroic scene of Socrates’s last hours to Echecrates and the 
reader. No doubt the reader, like Echecrates, should naturally expect from Plato a 
personal testimony of the death scene of Socrates. Presumably Plato should 
anticipate this expectation. But contrary to expectation, Plato distances himself with 
his proclaimed absence. This absence serves Platonic anonymity by putting Plato at 
one remove materially from the account given in the Phaedo. 
The lack of authorial voice is also apparent in cases where there is a discrepancy 
between the positions attributed to Socrates in different dialogues. A classic example 
of this is discussed by Osborne in her article on ‘Socrates in the Platonic 
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Dialogues’.160 She draws the conclusion that Socrates is not delivering Plato’s own 
views, but is a tool created for each discussion and each issue to be addressed. But 
there is more to be said. It is not just that Socrates is not Plato’s voice. We need to 
see that Plato’s voice is completely silent. This Platonic silence creates grave 
difficulties for anyone who is trying to look for doctrines in the dialogues.  
I have been articulating a sketchy account of Plato’s persistent practice of 
detaching himself from the dialogues. This account may seem coarse but is useful 
enough for my purpose here. The overall impression is that Plato constantly hints to 
his reader the fictional nature of his dialogues which are essentially dramatic 
representations of dialectics instead of faithful testimony of any historical event or 
conversation. The prevailing authorial silence in both the narrative and the 
discussion produces an overwhelming sense of indirectness and ambivalence. As a 
result, the reader’s general feeling is that Plato is almost completely detached from 
his writing. No doubt Plato may have views and positions on the issues discussed in 
the dialogues; but he does not make them explicit in the dialogues. In short, the 
dialogues represent lively and yet fictional arguments between personae. They do 
not speak aloud Plato’s own views. 
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 A convincing view on this discrepancy can be found in Osborne 2006. According to her 
Tailor-made Socrates Reading, the Socrates in each dialogue is designed specifically for the dramatic 
setting that is to be depicted and for the philosophical inquiry to be developed in the dialogue. The 
Socrates of the Protagoras represents one Socratic personality and the Socrates of the Gorgias 
represents another. Plato creates them for different settings and philosophical inquiries. Therefore the 
Socratic character should not be committed exclusively to either of these conflicting positions on 
pleasure.  
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3.2.1. The voice of Socrates as the authorial voice: Rowe’s “Two Voices Reading” 
 
Rowe proposes to take the voice of Socrates in the Republic as the authorial 
voice communicating some substantive theses that Plato wants the readers to take 
away from his writing.161 Rowe rejects the possibility that Plato intended to offer 
his writing as an open text on the ground that such a reading does not square at all 
with Socrates’s absolutely serious tone and the passion with which he expresses 
himself in the dialogue as a whole.162 Rowe thinks that Plato may set out to 
challenge and provoke us but his purpose is not merely to shake us out of our 
assumptions and to get us think for ourselves. Underlying Plato’s writing is ‘a 
substantive, and connected, set of ideas, which needs to be carefully excavated and 
reconstructed’, and therefore the reader should determine exactly what these ideas 
are. 163 
Rowe thinks that to excavate and reconstruct Plato’s substantive ideas from the 
Republic the reader must be constantly aware of the need to distinguish between 
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 Rowe 2006, 7-24.  
162
 Rowe 2006, 8-9. The idea of an open text is that it allows the reader to place his or her own 
interpretation as the reader sees fit.  
163
 Rowe 2006, 9. But to excavate and reconstruct Plato’s view form the voice of Socrates faces two 
problems. The first problem is posed by the fact that the Socrates in the Republic says things that are 
different from what the Socrates says elsewhere in other dialogues. One response to this problem is to 
try to reconcile the discrepancies as changes of mind on Plato’s part as he gradually breaks free from 
his master Socrates and becomes more mature in his philosophical thoughts. Another response is to 
subsume the discrepancies under the view that underlying the play of each and every dialogue is a 
kind of subterranean flow of thought that is more or less constant. This response comes closest to 
Rowe’s own view.  
The second problem is concerned with the degree of firmness and seriousness with which the 
Socrates in the Republic says things. This problem also involves the uses of different tones and 
registers in the voice of Socrates. 
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what Socrates says when speaking to the assumptions and perspectives of others and 
what he says when speaking with his own voice.164 Because of this suggestion that 
the Socrates in the Republic speaks in two different voices, I refer to Rowe’s reading 
as the ‘Two Voices Reading’. According to Rowe, one voice resembles the voices of 
orators and rhetoricians—Socrates speaks in this voice when he is addressing the 
assumptions and perspectives of the interlocutors. The second voice is his own 
voice—Socrates speaks in his own voice when he is speaking of his own 
premises.165 Rowe thinks the first voice represents the rhetorical aspect of Plato’s 
writing, signifying what Plato merely borrows or appropriates, while the second 
voice represents Plato’s authorial voice, announcing what he is prepared to own. 
Rowe thinks it is ‘a fair guess’ that Plato’s view is, by and large, represented by the 
voice of Socrates in the Republic because ‘Socrates’ as a persona is always under the 
author’s control. 
 
3.2.2 Hidden Voice Readings: Kahn’s Ingressive Interpretation and Cornford’s 
Reading 
 
Kahn once acknowledges the difficulty created by authorial silence: ‘Since we 
never hear Plato’s own voice, how can we know where, and to what extent, what 
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 Rowe 2006, 19. 
165
 Rowe gives the following examples of Socratic premises in the Republic: ‘that a friend is 
someone useful (334e-335a: actually a premise volunteered by Polemarchus); that harming someone 
means making them worse (335b-c); that it does not belong to a just person to harm anyone (335e); 
that justice is a kind of cleverness or wisdom (350a-c); and that the unjust are at odds even with 
themselves (351e-352a)’ (14). 
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Socrates says represents what Plato thinks?’166 Kahn also mentions the exegetical 
difficulties posed by the dialogue form for the interpretation of Plato’s thought. 
 
The anonymity of the dialogue form, together with Plato’s problematic irony in the 
presentation of Socrates, makes it impossible for us to see through these dramatic 
works in such a way as to read the mind of their author.167  
 
Given the ‘anonymity of the dialogue form’, Kahn believes that to approach 
Plato’s dialogues as a direct statement of his own views would commit what he calls 
‘the fallacy of transparency’, or the failure to take account of the doctrinal opacity of 
the dialogues. But on the other hand, Kahn believes that some thematic connections 
as unifying links between the dialogues, and Plato’s hints of conclusions are actually 
‘more deliberate, more subtle, and more ubiquitous’ than is generally recognized.168 
Kahn believes that his hypothesis of ingressive exposition can capture ‘the artistic 
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 Kahn 1996, 36. Kahn continues: ‘the problem is made more acute both by the formal 
independence of the dialogues from one another, and by the discrepancy between the positions 
attributed to Socrates in different contexts’ (36-37). Kahn’s book argues and develops a unitarian 
reading of Plato’s dialogues. Roughly speaking, the unitarian view contends that Plato’s various 
dialogues contain one single philosophy and that this philosophy has remained unchanged throughout 
the entire Platonic corpus. This single unifying philosophy connects the various dialogues with one 
another at a very deep level while they explore the same problem from different directions. On the 
other hand, the developmental view believes that Plato changed his mind and such development in 
his thinking is reflected in different periods of the dialogues. I am not taking side with any of these 
views. My position simply argues that Plato’s dialogue features authorial silence and thus Plato 
stands at least one remove from his work. 
167
 Kahn 1996, 41. By ‘the anonymity of the dialogue form’, Kahn refers mainly to the features of 
Platonic silence and authorial anonymity in both the narratives and discussions of the dialogues. 
Kahn notes that the anonymity of the dialogue form presents scholars with a problem that is 
unparalleled for any other philosopher. 
168
 Kahn 1996, 38. Kahn notes that scholars do not dispute thematic connections between the 
dialogues; they only differ in what they see as the philosophical intention behind these connections.  
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intention’ with which Plato composes the dialogues.169 He also believes that Plato’s 
authorial design and authorial intent are inscribed in the text of the dialogues though 
none of them are explicitly spelled out in the text.  
 
It is, I suggest, because we all implicitly recognize such a design and such an intent 
that we know that it is Plato speaking, and not merely the dialogue persona of 
Socrates, in the central books of the Republic. Plato for us is the author of the 
dialogues. And it is the pattern of unity created by the network of thematic lines 
connecting the dialogues and meeting one another in the Republic that permits us to 
say: this is the author’s intention. He has designed these dialogues in such a way 
that, despite the anonymity of the dialogue form, we can securely recognize here 
the point of what he has written, the philosophic message he means to convey.170   
 
Cornford also proposes a hidden voice reading of Plato. The search for a 
definition of knowledge ends in aporia in the Theaetetus. Given that the discussions 
in many other dialogues also end in aporia, then a majority of the dialogues would 
appear to be confessions of ignorance or even confusion on Plato’s part, if the 
personae directly speak for Plato’s views. Cornford thinks that the real lesson from 
the failure in the Theaetetus lies rather on the negative side.171 On that view, 
Theaetetus’s unsuccessful attempt to formulate a satisfactory account of knowledge 
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 Kahn 1996, 42. Roughly speaking, Kahn’s ingressive exposition is a proposal to deal with the 
problem of what Plato means to convey in a particular text in the light of the larger world of Plato’s 
philosophy articulated in the middle dialogues. Kahn’s ingressive exposition emphasizes doctrinal 
continuity and construes the dialogues as the multi-faceted expression of a single philosophical view. 
On Kahn’s observations, some key notions like dialectic, the knowledge of good and bad, the Form 
of the Good, receive a treatment of progressive disclosure in the dialogues. Kahn cites these as 
evidence in support of his ingressive exposition. (See Kahn 1996, 59-62, also Chapters Six to Elven 
for more support of his hypothesis.) 
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 Kahn 1996, 65. 
171
 Cornford 1935. Cornford believes that the real lesson of the failure in the Theaetetus is that we 
cannot get knowledge by adding a logos in any of the sense considered in the discussion (162).   
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contributes to a better understanding of knowledge by eliminating the unlikely 
accounts and thus clearing the ground for the correct answer. The real purpose of the 
failure in the Theaetetus is to prepare the reader to apprehend Plato’s profound 
metaphysical insight that only the Forms and truths about them can be the object of 
true knowledge. But to grasp this insight, the reader has to bring relevant dialogues 
together and work on them.  
 
3.2.3. Whether any voice is the voice of the author 
 
My view stresses two salient facts about the dialogues: the author is concealed (if 
not totally absent) from the discussions in the dialogues, and the author remains 
silent behind the personae’s narrative voices and above all, the dialogues per se. 
Some scholars (like Rowe) assume that Plato has delegated the illocutionary act of 
asserting to Socrates and that Plato is interested in imparting knowledge into the 
minds of his readers. They fail to acknowledge and respond to the fictional nature of 
Plato’s mode of writing. We should not assume that Plato is presenting his own 
views or trying to get us to adopt some doctrines of his own through the voice of 
Socrates or any hidden voice. 
Rowe notes that the persona Socrates appears to speak in an absolutely serious 
tone and with passion in the Republic. He supposes it is a fair guess that Plato’s 
authorial voice is represented by the voice of Socrates in the Republic. But actually 
this assumption is not doing justice to the fictional nature of the work. In a work of 
fiction, a character may make weighty assertions about a lot of things. But the author 
stands at one remove from the assertions. The fact that the persona Socrates is under 
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the author’s control does not give the conclusion that the persona Socrates must 
represent the authorial voice.172 
Another problem with Rowe’s reading is that he seems to conflate the two 
different voices that he distinguishes in Socrates (i.e., the voice of orators and 
rhetoricians, and the authorial voice) into one single voice that speaks with an 
essentially doctrinal overtone. Rowe suggests there is a genuinely Platonic argument 
and position even when the Socrates in the Republic speaks of assumptions that he 
merely borrows or appropriates.173 But as Kahn once asked, because of authorial 
silence how can we know where and to what extent what Socrates says really 
represents what Plato thinks?  
Rowe thinks the dialogue form is intended to serve an important function in 
mediating between different positions as Plato’s aim is to draw his readers over from 
where they are to where he stands.174 The idea that the dialogue form can mediate 
between different positions comes closest to my view. But unlike Rowe’s reading, 
my view is that we do not have to suppose that Plato wants us to abandon our own 
thoughts and take up the substantive thoughts conveyed by Socrates in the dialogues. 
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 Therefore my view is opposed to Kraut when he suggests ‘our best chance of understanding Plato 
is therefore to begin with the assumption that in each dialogue he uses his principal interlocutor to 
support or oppose certain conclusions by means of certain arguments because he, Plato, supports or 
opposes those conclusions for those reasons’ (Kraut 1992). 
To give due consideration to the legitimate question of why Plato wrote dialogues seems to Kraut 
amounting to making irrelevant and hazardous assumptions about why Plato writes, and why he 
writes in dialogue form. 
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 Rowe 2006, 10 ‘In every context, I propose, even when he is beginning from assumptions that are 
not his own, there is a genuinely Platonic argument, and a genuinely Platonic position, in the offing.’ 
174
 Rowe 2006, 10. Rowe thinks the real, and deepest, explanation of Plato’s use of the dialogue form 
is that it ‘reflects his recognition of the distance that separates his own assumptions from those of any 
likely reader, and of the consequent requirement, if any effective communication is to take place at all, 
to find methods of mediating between apparently different starting points.’ 
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I think a more plausible explanation of Plato’s use of the dialogue form may lie in its 
pedagogical advantages: the dialogue form can facilitate the development and 
scrutiny of particular arguments.  
Finally Rowe notes that the form in which the Republic is written makes the 
interpretation of almost any aspects of the work more or less controversial.175  But I 
think the real challenge comes from authorial silence or the question whether any 
voice is the voice of Plato.  
I do not contest Kahn’s idea that the intention of the author can be inscribed in 
the text in some sense. But we should not immediately assume that the dialogues are 
designed to assert Plato’s doctrines in some subtle or concealed way, as Kahn or 
Cornford assume. We should not jump to the conclusion that Plato’s dialogues are 
actually philosophical treatises in disguise.  
Kahn’s reading has something in common with my view. But his ingressive 
interpretation aims at hidden doctrines while my view is anti-doctrinal. On Kahn’s 
reading, Plato conceals a subtle message for the reader, which is not simply 
conveyed in Socrates's own speeches. 176  Kahn provides two explanations for 
Plato’s choice of gradual disclosure. The first has to do with the pedagogical 
advantages of aporia: intellectual perplexity can be an effective stimulus on 
inquiring minds. The second has to do with Plato’s acute sense of the psychological 
distance that separates his visionary world view from that of his reader. Plato’s 
metaphysical vision is ‘grotesquely out of place’ in Greek society of the fifth and 
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 Rowe 2006, 8-10. 
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 Kahn 1996, 66. Kahn believes that Plato’s ‘lifetime loyalty to the dialogue form suggests a 
temperamental aversion to direct statement, reinforced by much reflection on the obstacles to 
successful communication for philosophical insight.’ 
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fourth centuries BC but aporia, the stripping away of received wisdom and accepted 
cultural norms, can prepare the reader for Plato’s vision of knowledge and reality.  
Kahn talks of the pedagogical advantages of aporia as some stimulus on 
inquiring minds. But then he suggests that aporia can prepare the readers for Plato’s 
hidden vision of knowledge and reality. Unlike Kahn’s (and also Cornford’s) 
suggestion, my view is that aporia is meant to lead the reader to further work, not to 
any hidden doctrines in the dialogues.   
Although Kahn once mentions the exegetical difficulties posed by the anonymity 
of the dialogue form for the interpretation of Plato’s thought he soon relapses into a 
search for the hidden message. Kahn thinks that the first problem with which any 
interpretation of Plato must begin is the distance between the text and the message 
that the author intends to transmit.177 Kahn’s ingressive interpretation approaches 
Plato’s work with the unwarranted assumption that the work is meant to transmit to 
the reader Plato’s doctrinal messages. But this just begs the question.  
According to Kahn the gradual disclosure of Plato’s hidden message begins in 
the threshold dialogues (from the Laches to the Symposium) and leads to the 
otherworldly vision in the Phaedo and Republic. Kahn believes this is Plato’s 
intended authorial design, and the problem of interpreting Plato’s dialogues is 
therefore the problem of deciding how the philosophical contents of the different 
dialogues are to be connected with one another while the dialogues present 
themselves each as an autonomous unit occupying its own literary space.178 Again 
this way of reading the dialogues just begs the question. Kahn’s ingressive 
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interpretation ascribes to Plato an authorial design that is not explicitly spelled out in 
the text. 
Kahn warns of ‘the fallacy of transparency’, that is, the mistake of reading the 
voice of Socrates as the authorial voice. This part of his interpretation is similar to 
my view. However, Kahn’s ingressive interpretation then takes a doctrinal turn.  
He quickly loses sight of the real issue, namely, whether any voice is the authorial 
voice. His reading begins to search for the hidden message. He believes that he is 
dealing with the dialogue form but actually the issue has to do with authorial silence 
which he has confused with the dialogue form.  
Some scholars have suggested that Plato’s use of a persona to create the effect of 
authorial anonymity in his writing is motivated by political considerations.179 On 
that view Plato’s absence in the dialogues might be intended to protect himself. 
Socrates did not write philosophy. He was tried and put to death because of his 
active pursuit of philosophy. Plato might have been alarmed by this tragic fate of his 
teacher. For his own protection, Plato might have come up with the idea of writing 
depersonalized and dramatized dialogues, perhaps using Socrates as his mouthpiece, 
or perhaps avoiding expressing his secret views directly at all.180  
At any rate these interpretations are all based on an assumption about Plato’s 
intention to deliver some definite doctrines. I shall now raise two more objections to 
this assumption. The first has to do with the use of imagery. The imagery in the 
Republic does not function as some smokescreen to stage Plato’s concealed 
illocutionary act of asserting his metaphysical insights. The way Plato carefully sets 
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 Leo Strauss is a famous proponent for this view. 
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 My reservation about the idea of political considerations is that it can only remain an open 
conjecture. If it ever tells of any partial truth, it does not tell the whole truth and it leaves the 
philosophical reasons for Plato’s detachment unanswered.   
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the stage for the imagery and his use of figurative language is more akin to delicate 
disclaimer of knowledge or doctrinal insights. For example, Socrates is pushed to 
offer the simile of the Sun as an indirect response to Glaucon’s repeated demand that 
he should state his own views on the Good. Having dismissed the equation of the 
Good with either pleasure or knowledge, Glaucon requests that Socrates should state 
his own views on the Good (506b – c). Socrates repeatedly denies any knowledge of 
the Good in the course of the discussion. He refuses to state his own views because 
he thinks it is not right ‘for someone to talk as if he knew what he doesn’t know’. 
This sense of refraining from making knowledge claims on the Good is noteworthy. 
It is consistent with Socrates’s constant disavowal of knowledge. 
Glaucon insists that Socrates should at least say what he thinks about the Good, 
‘not as if he knew, but as if he’d formed opinions – he should be prepared to say 
what he thinks’. But Socrates continues to excuse himself again (506c – d). It is only 
when Glaucon reassures Socrates that he and their friends would be happy with 
whatever Socrates would say of the Good that Socrates finally suggests that they 
should ‘forget about trying to define goodness itself for the time being’ and instead, 
he is ‘prepared to talk about something which seems to [him] to be the child of 
goodness and to bear a very strong resemblance to it’ (507e). Socrates finally agrees 
to articulate the Simile of the Sun. But before introducing the simile, he reiterates 
that he does not intend to cheat Glaucon by giving ‘a counterfeit description of the 
child’. Socrates tries so hard to hold himself back from accepting Glaucon’s request 
and only after so many precautions and caveats does Socrates eventually offer the 
Simile of the Sun. At the end of the Sun, Socrates issues another disclaimer by 
saying that he will ‘have to leave a lot out’ though he will ‘try to make it as 
complete as [he] can at the moment’ (509c).  
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The exponents of the hidden voice reading simply misunderstand Socrates’s 
effort to qualify his imagery as ‘defective, blind and deformed’ and that it is ‘not 
based on knowledge’. They take this holding back as a mere gesture. They assume 
Plato’s intention is to use imagery and figurative language to prompt his reader to 
recognize the truth about the Good in an inconspicuous way. But the fact is Plato 
does not make clear what his purpose is with the imagery. How can we get from 
Socrates, a fictional character, to what Plato thinks? The gap seems huge, if not 
unbridgeable. Also, my earlier discussion of various scholarly interpretation of the 
imagery has shown that the assertoric ways of reading the imagery as either 
illustration or argument for Platonic doctrines only succeed in generating unresolved 
disputes. To conclude, Plato’s style in the use of imagery does not encourage 
assertoric reading; he does not pretend to be making knowledge claims about the 
Good with the imagery in his writing of fictional dialogue. 
 
3.3. The Elenctic Mode of Argumentation  
 
To add some extra force to my view, I shall now take a closer look into the 
elenctic mode of argumentation. Most Platonic dialogues are structured according to 
a general form: there are two parties, a main speaker (who is also the questioner), 
and an interlocutor (who is also the respondent) and it is the main speaker who 
directs the course of discussion in the question and answer mode. Suppose in a most 
simple manner, the questioner may ask only yes-or-no questions and the respondent 
gives what he thinks is the correct answer to these questions. In this basic form of 
question-and-answer format, even the questioner does not formally endorse the 
argument but, as Frede rightly notes, by giving what he thinks is the correct answer 
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it is the respondent not the questioner who is committed to the premises, the 
conclusion, and the validity of the argument.181 The questioner may have no firm 
view but, if he does, his own view of the matter need not enter into the argument. 
There is no doubt that the questioner’s questions have a decisive influence on the 
course of the argument. But this influence does not make the questioner formally 
endorse the argument as his own argument. The argument only reflects the 
questioner’s views as to how different propositions, quite independently of their 
truth, are logically related to each other and as to which propositions have a strong 
bearing on the question at issue, or so at least Frede argues.182  
 Obviously in the dialogues Socrates seldom just asks yes-or-no questions, but 
the point I am stressing with the basic form of question-and-answer format is that it 
is an intrinsic formal feature of such a format that it resists the hypothesis that 
Socrates speaks Plato’s views. A closer look at the elenctic mode of argumentation 
in the dialogues would reveal even more built-in resistance to this hypothesis. To a 
very large extent, the argument in the dialogues can neither be attributed to the 
fictional Socrates nor a fortiori to Plato the author. 
 In the case of didactic dialectic the respondent assumes a very passive role as 
he only receives the argument and has no real influence on its course. It is the 
questioner who leads the respondent with an argument or even a proof already in 
hand. But Frede rejects the possibility that a general characterization of the argument 
in the dialogues could be ‘didactic dialectic’. According to Frede a substantial 
number of the dialogues are aporetic and this clearly suggests that Socrates is 
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engaged in elenctic dialectic.183 Frede believes that elenctic dialectic is unduly 
assimilated to didactic dialectic because the term ‘elenchus’ is generally rendered as 
‘refutation’ and such rendering gives the wrong connotation that the questioner’s 
task is to refute the respondent’s claim by producing an argument for, or a proof of, 
the truth of the contradictory claim. 184 
Frede protests that this assumption does not accord with elenctic dialectic and it 
does not make sense of the aporetic dialogues, in which the respondent no longer 
knows what to say about the question at issue because he is lost in the contradiction 
between his original claim and the conclusion of the ensuing argument. According 
to Frede, what really happens in the aporetic dialogues is that the questioner does 
not proceed to refute the respondent’s claim. Instead the questioner refutes the 
respondent’s claim to authority by showing that the respondent is committed to the 
contradictory of his original thesis. And what the questioner does is simply test the 
respondent’s expertise by asking the right questions. The respondent is then brought 
to see that some beliefs have to go but he is not in the position to decide which belief 
has to go. He is in the state of aporia.185  
 Elenctic dialectic requires the question-and-answer format because it can reflect 
the respondent’s contribution to the argument. The questioner shapes the course of 
argument by posing questions but his belief or knowledge does not matter for the 
purpose of elenchus. Because after all, it is not his belief or knowledge which are 
under cross-examination, but the respondent’s. According to Frede the upshot is that  
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 Frede 1992, 210. Frede also believes that there is an obvious connection between elenctic 
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given the elenctic character of the aporetic dialogues, their argument is not the 
argument of the questioner… however much and however clearly Plato may 
identify himself with Socrates, the questioner in these dialogues, he does not 
thereby commit himself in any way to the argument of these dialogues.186 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
By focusing on the difficulties around the Line and its problematic integration 
with the Cave, I have argued that all the assertoric readings of the material for 
Plato’s doctrines have been unsatisfactory. Underlying these assertoric readings is 
the assumption that Plato does communicate his metaphysical views in disguise 
through the words of Socrates or the imagery. This exegetical assumption can be 
found in Annas’s reading, in Rowe’s reading, in Kahn’s reading as well as in 
Cornford’s reading. This exegetical assumption goes unchallenged.  
My thesis is that we should give up this exegetical assumption for a number of 
reasons. First, assertoric readings have failed to deliver a satisfactory account of 
Plato’s views and the prospect of such an account being developed in the future is 
rather dim. Secondly, Plato himself does not speak as a character and he is not 
explicitly identified with any character in the dialogues. I call this feature authorial 
silence. Rowe’s attempt to identify the authorial voice in the voice of Socrates only 
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dialogues ‘seem to represent a spectrum of forms of dialectic falling between purely gymnastic 
dialectic, on the one hand, and didactic dialectic, on the other’ but he also notes that ‘the commitment 
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101 
 
evades the difficulties generated by authorial silence in a work that is fictional. Kahn 
has no problem in acknowledging the difficulties caused by authorial silence and the 
anonymity of the dialogue form. But he soon relapses into ascribing a hidden voice 
to Plato and he claims to recognize a gradual disclosure of Plato’s view that starts in 
the threshold dialogues and becomes more explicit in the Republic. However, the 
starting point of Kahn’s ingressive interpretation is false. Finally, because of the 
elenctic mode of argumentation in at least the aporetic dialogues, the arguments in 
these dialogues can neither be attributed to the persona Socrates, nor to Plato the 
author. Like Frede, I do not oversimplify the issue here and pretend that all the 
dialogues are the same in their logical structure. The important points, however, for 
my purposes, are elenchus as a negative technique for destroying knowledge claims, 
and the aporetic nature of the enquiry in some dialogues. The exponents of assertoric 
readings may take elenchus and the aporetic nature of the enquiry in some dialogues 
as constitutive of the authorial design and authorial intent. For Kahn, they form the 
initial stage of the ‘gradual disclosure’ of Plato’s otherworldly visions, as Kahn 
believes. But again, this assumption carries no necessity with it. 
My proposal is that we should give up the assertoric ways of reading the imagery 
either as illustrations or arguments for Plato’s doctrines. Once we give up the 
exegetical assumption that Plato does communicate his metaphysical views in 
disguise through the words of Socrates or the imagery, we open up ourselves to a 
new way of engaging with the dialogues and the imagery. My proposal of 
non-assertoric reading should merit consideration because in recognizing the fact 
that Plato’s imagery is meant to be frustrating and to defy doctrinal interpretation, 
my proposal provides a new perspective on the role they serve in Plato’s 
philosophical method and exposition. It eliminates the unresolved puzzles about 
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what exactly Plato was trying to say and why Plato did not assert his doctrines more 
forcibly. 
 In this chapter, I have explored to what extent Plato’s writing of philosophical 
dialogues, characterised by the use of images, authorial silence and the elenctic 
mode of argumentation as devices of non-assertion, can be construed as a paradigm 
case of non-assertoric discourse. In the next chapter, I shall consider a polar opposite 
of Plato’s approach to non-assertoric writing. Sextus Empiricus opens his work, the 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism, with a first-person authorial declaration, a first-person 
chronicler proviso (PH I 4) that the whole work is nothing more than a report of 
what appears to him at the moment. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE PROBLEMS OF INCOHERENCE: A CASE STUDY 
IN SEXTUS EMPIRICUS’S WRITING 
 
In this Chapter I discuss Sextus’s writing as my second case study of 
non-assertoric discourse. The Pyrrhonist assents to the appearance (PH 1 19-20) and 
speaks only of his impressions like a chronicler who reports of what appears to him 
to be the case (PH 1 4).187 Although the Pyrrhonist eschews dogmatic commitment 
to beliefs and suspends judgement about the real nature of things in this manner 
Pyrrhonian Scepticism has been subjected to the persistent problems of incoherence 
since its beginning. As we shall see in section 1.1, Pyrrho, Aenesidemus and Sextus 
are all confronted with the problems of incoherence against either Pyrrhonism or 
their uses of language. But unlike Pyrrho who resorts to aphasia (speechlessness) 
and non-writing, Sextus appears to be the first Pyrrhonist to undertake the task of 
clarifying the non-assertoric nature of his Pyrrhonian discourse in response to the 
charges of incoherence. Indeed Sextus’s writing not only attempts to rebut the 
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 Scholars and commentators disagree on whether the Pyrrhonist’s assent to the appearance 
amounts to belief in some sense. Sextus himself seems to address this issue in a crucial passage, that 
is PH 1 13, in his writing. I visit this controversy on the belief of Pyrrhonist in section 1.2. As I shall 
explain in section 1.2 my discussion in this Chapter assumes a mild form of Pyrrhonism which targets 
only dogmatic commitment to beliefs about the real nature of things. Consequently, Sextus, as an 
urbane Pyrrhonist, eschews theoretical beliefs in his use of language and writing. He refrains from 
expressing theoretical beliefs about Pyrrhonism and how things really are in his writing. 
104 
 
charges of incoherence but also elaborates on different crucial aspects of his 
non-assertoric speech. 
My view is that since Sextus formulates his writing in accordance with his 
non-assertoric speech therefore it is entirely apt to construe his writing as a 
non-assertoric discourse which, like his speech, expresses no beliefs of how things 
really are. To support my view it is incumbent on me to discuss in section 2 whether 
Sextus’s language-use is consistently non-assertoric. 
I distinguish four modes of non-assertion in the Pyrrhonian speech: avowal of 
appearance, the interrogative, the imperative, and the argumentative mode of 
non-assertion. Because of the Pyrrhonist’s attitude of non-assertion to what is the 
case, his utterances like ‘I am cold’ or ‘It is day’ become avowals of appearance 
conveying his phainomena and pathē without belief. 188  Secondly it is the 
Pyrrhonist’s common practice to use questions instead of assertions and unlike 
avowals of appearance, the interrogative mode of non-assertion does not report the 
Pyrrhonist’s phainomena and pathē (PH 1 188, 189).189 Thirdly, the Pyrrhonist 
sometimes uses the imperative to announce his phainomena and pathē without belief 
(PH 1 202-204).190 Finally when the Pyrrhonist uses his non-assertoric speech to 
argue against the dogmatic opponent, his ad hominem argumentation only reports of 
dogmatic arguments pro and con his opponent’s dogmatic belief. Just like ‘fire is 
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 Of the four modes of non-assertion, avowal of appearance is more controversial than the others. 
Avowal of appearance is actually a deviation of the normal use of declarative sentence. Secondly 
Pyrrhonian avowal of appearance is a general term as it actually covers two very different avowals: 
avowals of perceptual impressions and avowals of non-perceptual impressions. Commentators and 
scholars disagree on whether avowals of non-perceptual impressions may express belief in some 
subtle sense. I discuss these problems and issues in sections 2.2 and 2.3.  
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 I discuss the interrogative mode of non-assertion in section 2.2. 
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 Some elaboration of the imperative mode of non-assertion is offered in section 3.2. 
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signified to the person who sees smoke’ (PH 2 102, also M 8 157) the Pyrrhonist’s 
arguments remind his opponent and audience of what can be said in response to the 
dogmatic belief within its dogmatic context. Pyrrhonian argumentation is like 
commemorative sign; it does not justify assertions about anything on the basis of 
what appears to be the case.191   
My thesis is that Sextus’s speech is thoroughly non-assertoric and he reports 
things like a chronicler, who records how things appear to him without affirming 
anything in reality (PH 1 4).192 With his avowal of appearance and the imperative 
mode of non-assertion, Sextus can communicate his phainomena and pathē without 
belief. Secondly by using the interrogative and argumentative modes of 
non-assertion, he can argue against the dogmatists without asserting his own views 
on the real nature of things.  
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 See Glidden 1983 for an important discussion of Sextus’s appeal to commemorative signs or 
mnemonic signals in order to defend his Pyrrhonism against the charge that it makes discourse and 
even life impossible. 
I offer my non-assertoric reading of Wittgenstein’s statements in the Philosophical Investigations as 
non-assertoric reminders in Chapter Four.  
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 I shall refer to this disclaimer of assertion as the Chronicler Disclaimer throughout my discussion. 
On my view, this Chronicler Disclaimer recapitulates the Pyrrhonist’s attitude of aphasia 
(non-assertion) which I discuss in section 2.1. Given this disclaimer of assertion the reader should 
take Sextus’s account as nothing more than a report of what appears to him to be the case. It does not 
convey his beliefs about Pyrrhonism or anything whatsoever. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein 
renounces having advanced theories and asks his reader to discard what he has read as nonsense after 
using it as a ladder to ascend to the position in which he can see the world rightly. I discuss the 
Tractatus’s self-proclaimed nonsensicality (T §6.54) and Sextus’s Chronicler Disclaimer (PH 1 4) in 
Chapter 4 when I argue for my non-assertoric reading of Wittgenstein’s aim of elucidation in the 
Tractatus. No doubt Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Sextus’s works are obviously distinct in their form 
and purposes. My view is that in reminding the reader of the non-assertoric mode of expression in the 
texts, the two passages are indicative of the textual strategy employed in the texts. 
106 
 
In short, what makes Sextus’s writing non-assertoric is the use of non-assertoric 
speech throughout his work. Therefore, whether a fully non-assertoric language is 
ultimately consistent is an important issue. In order to assess the nature and 
consistency of Sextus’s non-assertoric speech, which is clearly integral to the 
cogency of my thesis, I will discuss (a) the attitude of aphasia (non-assertion) in 
section 2.1, (b) Sextus’s plea of katachrēsis for his avowal of appearance in section 
2.2, (c) whether his phainetai sentence that reports on non-perceptual impression 
expresses a state of belief in section 2.3 and (d) sceptical phōnai (expression) and 
the deep grammar of ‘ou mallon’ (no more this than that) in section 2.4. My 
comprehensive discussion in section 2 concludes that Sextus’s language is 
thoroughly non-assertoric. It follows that Sextus’s speech and writing do not register 
any belief claims as they do not communicate opinions about the non-evident or 
how things really are.   
Moreover, my thesis resists the assumption that Sextus’s writing (especially the 
‘general account’, that is, Book I of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism) is a metalinguistic 
account that aims at expounding his non-assertoric speech.193 As we shall see in 
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Against the Logicians (in two books), Against the Physicists (in two books) and Against Ethicists (in 
one book). These writings are incorporated with Against the Mathematicians and are conventionally 
known as M 7 – 8, M 9 – 10 and M 11 respectively. There is no common consensus on whether the 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism predates Against the Mathematicians or the other way around. The 
chronology of Sextus’s writing is a topic of scholarly debate and the order of the eleven books of 
Against the Mathematicians is also part of the debate. 
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section 2, Stough, Sluiter and Barnes do not dispute the consistency of Sextus’s 
non-assertoric speech. However the assumption that Sextus’s writing offers an 
explanatory account of his non-assertoric speech leads Stough and Sluiter to the 
conclusion that Sextus embraces the use of assertoric language to explain his 
non-assertoric speech at the expense of self-contradiction.194 I do not share their 
assumption because in fact Sextus repeatedly stresses that to articulate any 
explanatory account of his speech is unbecoming to his Pyrrhonian Scepticism (PH 
1 195, 207). I discuss this in greater detail in section 1.3.  
By contrast my thesis is that Sextus never stops doing scepticism, and in his 
writing he never ceases to contest dogmatism (not even in the ‘general account’). To 
be a Pyrrhonist is to have the disposition to use argumentation to oppose dogmatism 
in any issue (PH 1 8 – 11). The Pyrrhonist’s sceptical argumentation is set to 
produce equipollence of arguments in order to bring an end to dogmatising (PH 1 
12). Therefore my proposal is that Sextus’s writing does not correspond to an 
explanation of his non-assertoric discourse, though it can be considered an 
embodiment of his defence against the charges of incoherence. In my view, Sextus’s 
writing is consistent with his practice of sceptical argumentation, that is, to contest 
dogmatism in any topic that comes to his attention (PH 1 202-5). Sextus’s writing is 
divided into two groups: Book I of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism as the ‘general 
account’ and the rest (that is Book II and III of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, plus 
Against the Mathematicians Book I to XI) as the ‘specific account’ (PH 1 5 – 6). 
The general account deals with Pyrrhonian Scepticism as it ‘sets forth the 
                                                                                                                                         
See for instance, Bett 1998 in which Bett argues against the orthodox opinion that the Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism predates Against the Mathematicians. But Barnes reports an equipollence of arguments 
in this issue as he finds neither sides of the debate convincing. (See Barnes 2000, ‘Introduction’) 
194
 See Stough 1984 and Sluiter 2000. I discuss their views in section 1.3 
108 
 
characteristic traits of Scepticism’ whilst the specific account presents ‘objections to 
each part of so-called “philosophy”’ and dogmatic stances in other disciplines. Since 
different aspects of Pyrrhonism have become topics of contention Sextus has to 
contest dogmatic perceptions of Pyrrhonism in the ‘general account’. Therefore what 
appears to be an explanatory metalinguistic account in Book I is actually a counter 
report that serves to offset the impact brought by dogmatic perceptions. Sextus never 
offers his ‘general account’ as an assertive testimony on Pyrrhonism; rather it is only 
supposed to be a chronicler’s report of what Pyrrhonism appears to be. 
On my view, Sextus’s sceptical argumentation is therapeutic as it aims to bring 
about mental tranquillity by putting an end to dogmatising and detaching his 
audience from either side of the dispute about what is non-evident or the real nature 
of things. In the Pyrrhonist’s own experience, equipollence of arguments causes 
suspension of judgement which somehow inexplicably leads to ataraxia (PH 1 8). 
Sextus’s writing serves the same goal. It aims to give his audience a written 
presentation of sceptical arguments against dogmatic stances in a wide range of 
issues, some (especially those in the ‘general account’) concerned with Pyrrhonism 
itself, others (that is, the ‘specific account’) concerned with each part of philosophy 
and other disciplines. Sextus’s argumentation constitutes a special kind of refutation. 
As a Pyrrhonist, Sextus always aims to achieve balanced pro and con arguments on 
any dispute about what is non-evident and he refrains from making affirmations or 
negations about the real nature of things. In his view the dogmatists and the 
Academics make such assertions about the non-evident whilst the Pyrrhonists go on 
with further enquiry (PH 1 3). I will give a more sustained discussion of my thesis in 
Section 3.  
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1. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS’S WRITING AND ITS 
PROBLEMATIC STATUS 
 
1.1 Writing and the Problems of Incoherence in the Pyrrhonian 
Tradition  
 
I will now give a sketch of writing and the problems of incoherence in the 
Pyrrhonian tradition although I do not set out to consider the history of Pyrrhonian 
Scepticism. My survey will show that regardless of writing or not writing, Pyrrho, 
Aenesidemus and Sextus all face the problems of incoherence in different ways.  
Indeed, ever since the beginning of Pyrrhonian Scepticism the problems of 
incoherence followed it like a shadow followed its body. Pyrrho of Elis (c.360 – c.270 
BC) was the founder of Pyrrhonian Scepticism. He wrote nothing at all.195 He was 
famous for his detachment or indifference, as ‘he avoided nothing and took no 
precautions, but withstood everything as it occurred, carts, precipices, dogs, etc., 
placing no trust in the senses’ (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 9 
62). To his critics Pyrrho’s unusual way of life appeared to be more a hoax. His two 
anecdotes came to support the objection that a man cannot live without belief.  
 
                                                 
195
 Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers 9 102.  
It was Timon of Philus (c. 320 – c.230 BC), Pyrrho’s follower, who helped to spread out Pyrrho’s 
ideas. Timon wrote prose and verse. In his most famous work Silli Timon outlined Pyrrho’s 
philosophical outlook and also made a mockery of the dogmatic pretensions of the philosophers of 
other schools. Unfortunately Timon’s writing is lost and only its fragments are preserved in the work 
of bishop Eusebius of Caesarea who copies from Aristocles of Messene, a first century AD 
Peripatetic. 
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‘Once he [Pyrrho] got enraged in his sister’s defence… and said to someone reproaching 
him for it that it was not in the case of women that one should make a show of 
indifference. And when a dog rushed at him and terrified him, he replied to someone 
accusing him that it was not easy entirely to divest oneself of one’s humanity, but that 
one should strive against affairs with deeds as far as possible, and if that failed with 
words.’   
(Lives of Eminent Philosophers 9 66) 
 
In Pyrrho’s case, the problem of incoherence is concerned with whether his way 
of life is consistent with his philosophical ideal of a life without belief. It is a 
problem of theory and practice. So Pyrrho’s critics regarded the two anecdotes as 
evidences that Pyrrho failed to live up to his ‘theory’ in some situations. However, it 
is not easy to reconstruct a coherent account of Pyrrho’s actual views.196 After all, 
he wrote nothing. But on the other hand, a passage of his pupil Timon may contain a 
valuable sketch of Pyrrho’s ideas. 
 
‘Pyrrho left nothing in writing, but his pupil Timon says that whoever wants to be happy 
must consider these three questions. (1) How are things (pragmata) by nature? (2) What 
attitude should we adopt towards them? (3) What benefit will result for those who have 
this attitude? (1) Regarding things, Timon says that Pyrrho declared them equally 
indifferent, unstable and unresolved, and that for this reason neither our sensations nor 
our opinions are true or false. Therefore (2) for this reason we should not put our trust in 
these one bit, but we should be unopinionated, uncommitted and unwavering, saying of 
each thing that it no more is [this or that] than it is not, or both is an is not, or neither is 
nor is not. (3) The benefit for those who actually adopt this attitude, says Timon, will be 
first speechlessness (aphasia), then freedom from disturbance (ataraxia).’  
(Aristocles, in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 14 18 2-4) 
 
                                                 
196
 For an attempt at such a reconstruction see Bett 2000.  
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Though the fragment may represent our best evidence for Pyrrho’s ideas, its 
interpretation is disputed. 197  Bett believes that Pyrrho declared reality to be 
inherently indeterminate, and with this indeterminacy thesis Pyrrho’s philosophical 
position was significantly different from the later phase of Pyrrhonian Scepticism 
represented by Sextus in his writing.198  
It is true that Sextus shows ambiguous attitude to Pyrrho and seems detached 
from him in his writing.199 The question of the historical accuracy of Timon’s 
account of Pyrrho’s philosophical ideas is a further matter which need not concern 
us here and I pass no judgement on the relationship between Pyrrho and Sextus. The 
important point, for my purpose here, is that the problem of incoherence already lies 
at the heart of Pyrrhonian Scepticism since the time of Pyrrho. Secondly because of 
his aphasia (speechlessness) Pyrrho never committed his philosophical ideas (or 
verbal doctrines) to writing. But as we shall see in Section 2.1 for Sextus the notion 
of aphasia would somehow acquire a new meaning and become non-assertion, that 
                                                 
197
 For the interpretation of this fragment, see Long and Sedley 1987, 13-17. Also Hankinson 1996, 
58-64. For a more detailed discussion see Brunschwig 1994, Bett 1994, and also Bett 2000. 
198
 See Bett 2000. Bett’s view is that Pyrrho’s indeterminacy thesis was so radically different form 
Sextus’s suspension of judgement that it would not be appropriate to call Pyrrho a Pyrrhonist, as the 
term was used in the later phase of Pyrrhonism. 
But on the other hand, Burnyeat sees continuity in the Pyrrhonian ideal of a life without belief as a 
fundamental feature running through from Pyrrho to Aenesidemus and Sextus. (See Burnyeat 1998a, 
28-36) 
199
 In his writing, Sextus curiously gives only one direct and yet oblique remark on Pyrrho. Sextus 
reports that his sceptical tradition is named after Pyrrho because ‘it appears… that Pyrrho applied 
himself to scepticism more vigorously and conspicuously than his predecessors did’ (PH 1 7). Sextus 
mentions Pyrrho’s name again when he refers to a famous remark by Ariston who said of Arcesilaus, 
the head of the Middle Academy, that ‘He is Plato in front, Pyrrho in back, and Diodorus in the 
middle’ (PH 1 234). 
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is, ‘the avoidance of assertion in the wider sense, in which we say that both 
affirmation and negation are covered’ (PH 1 192). 
Pyrrhonian Scepticism came to a lapse after Pyrrho and Timon. Aenesidemus of 
Cnossus made himself a hero of Pyrrhonian Scepticism because he contributed most 
to its revival in the first century BC. Aenesidemus formulated the Ten Modes of 
Suspension of Judgement to challenge the justifications of perceptual judgements 
and beliefs about anything (M 7 345). Aenesidemus appeared on records to be a 
prolific author in the Pyrrhonian tradition. Most of his writings are lost; only a very 
brief summary of his Pyrrhonian Discourses is preserved in Photinus’s 
Bibliotheca.200 Aenesidemus was a major source for Sextus’s argumentation.201 
The revival of Pyrrhonian Scepticism in the first century BC by Aenesidemus 
enlivened a new problem of incoherence. Aristocles, for instance, raised the problem 
of incoherence as his critical response to Aenesidemus’s argument against the 
reliability of perceptual judgements. 
 
                                                 
200
 Aenesidemus’s other writings include an Outlines, an Elements (Eusebius, Praeparatio 
Evangelica 14 18 11 and 16), also Against Wisdom, On Inquiry (Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers 9 106) and finally a First Introduction (Sextus Empiricus Against the Mathematicians 
10 216). All these writings are lost. 
201
 Burnyeat believes that Sextus’s polemic against belief can be traced back to Aenesidemus. (See 
Burnyeat 1998a, 32-36) 
However Sextus alleges that Aenesidemus and his followers made Pyrrhonism a gateway to 
Heraclitean philosophy. Sextus dismisses this tendency to Heraclitean philosophy (PH 1 210-212).  
See Polito 2004 for a discussion of Aenesidemus’s alleged appropriation of Heraclitus’s ideas. 
Agrippa was another predecessor important for Sextus’s argumentation. He formulated the Five 
Modes of Suspension of Judgement. Sextus only vaguely ascribes the Five Modes to some ‘recent 
sceptics’ (PH 1 164). It is Diogenes who names Agrippa the author of the Five Modes (Diogenes 
Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers 9 88-9). Agrippa must have lived at some time in the period 
between Aenesidemus and Sextus. Other than this he remains a shadowy figure. 
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‘when Aenesidemus in his Outlines goes through his nine modes,202 in all of which he 
attempts to show that things are non-evident, are we to say he speaks with or without 
knowledge? For he says that there is a difference in animals, and in ourselves, and in 
states, and in the modes of life and customs and the laws. 
(Aristocles, in Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica 14 18 11) 
 
‘when he was making these and other fine speeches one would have liked… to ask him 
whether he was stating with full knowledge that this is the condition of things, or without 
knowledge. For if he did not know, why should we believe him? But if he knew, he was 
vastly silly for declaring at the same time that all things are uncertain, but yet saying that 
he knew so much’ 
(Aristocles, in Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica 14 18 12) 
 
In Aenesidemus’s case, his problem of incoherence is a matter of theoretical 
coherence. Aristocles was troubled by Aenesidemus’s arguments against the 
reliability of perceptual judgements. Aristocles’s worry was not without a point. He 
felt that the credibility of Aenesidemus’s arguments was somehow undermined 
because the Pyrrhonist never claimed to have any insight into the real nature of 
things. And yet Aenesidemus use rational arguments to establish the conclusions 
that perceptual judgements are not reliable and things are really non-evident. How 
could Aenesidemus convincingly argue that perceptual judgements are not reliable 
and things are really non-evident?  
Sextus Empiricus (c.160 – 210 AD), the last prominent figure in the Pyrrhonian 
tradition, is our principal source for Pyrrhonian Scepticism. This is not only because 
we have lost the writings of his predecessors; a greater reason has to do with the 
writing itself. Sextus’s writing appears to stand out as a Pyrrhonist speaking on his 
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 The talk of ‘nine modes’ is likely to be an error. See Annas and Barnes 1985, 27. 
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own ‘school of thought’.203 It not only provided us with our most extensive account 
on important aspects of Pyrrhonism (especially his non-assertoric use of language) 
but also recorded voluminous sceptical arguments drawn from his predecessors.  
On the other hand, we should note that Sextus’s writing marks a great contrast to 
Pyrrho’s non-writing. And if we recall the fact that Sextus’s predecessors Timon and 
Aenesidemus are also prolific writers, then Pyrrho’s non-writing appears more rare 
and exceptional in the Pyrrhonian tradition. If Pyrrho chooses non-writing because 
of some philosophical reasons, what happens to these reasons as his successors 
Timon, Aenesidemus, and Sextus choose to write about so many things, and even 
about Pyrrhonism itself? What can we make of this contrast in non-writing and 
writing between the first Pyrrhonist and his successors in the Pyrrhonian tradition? 
204
 As I have just mentioned, Bett suggests a discontinuity between Pyrrho and 
Sextus. But the relationships between Pyrrho, Timon, Aenesidemus and Sextus go 
beyond the scope of my discussion and hence I pass no judgement on this issue. My 
view is that regardless of the contrast in non-writing and writing Sextus’s 
non-assertoric style of writing attests to his Pyrrhonian identity which is manifested 
in ‘the avoidance of assertion in the wider sense, in which we say that both 
affirmation and negation are covered’ (PH 1 192). 
With reference to Sextus’s writing, the problem of incoherence comprises two 
issues: (1) despite Sextus’s frequent denial many statements in his writing seem to 
                                                 
203
 But as we shall see in the next section Sextus’s account seems to admit of radically different 
interpretations and thus gives two incompatible forms of Pyrrhonism: a radical Pyrrhonism that 
eschews all beliefs and a moderate Pyrrhonism that leaves everyday beliefs intact.   
204
 Marchand asks if this contrast means that Timon and Sextus ‘commit a kind of parricide against a 
philosopher whom they chose to present, if not as mater, at least as their main reference (See 
Marchand 2011, 114). 
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communicate the opinions he holds and therefore are expressive of beliefs on his 
part; (2) his attempt to give a descriptive account of Pyrrhonism in Book I of the 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism is inconsistent with his claim that he has no philosophical 
beliefs. How can someone who has no beliefs, suspends judgement, and refrains 
from making assertion, offer to give a descriptive account on anything? Sextus’s 
writing is problematic because of the fact that he is a Pyrrhonist and yet (so it 
appears) he attempts a descriptive account of Pyrrhonism. Any such attempt must 
evidently lead to incoherence. Aristocles questioned the creditability of 
Aenesidemus’s arguments because his Pyrrhonian Scepticism undermined them. 
Sextus’s reader may have a similar concern. Sextus would never want to assert the 
characteristic traits of Scepticism, then why should the reader believe his account? 
Indeed, in what manner should the reader take such an account (and how would she 
be able to judge the issue)? I give more elaboration of Sextus’s problem of 
incoherence in Section 1.3. 
 
1.2 Two Forms of Pyrrhonism 
 
Different ways of reading a crucial passage in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism would 
give two different breeds of Pyrrhonists and they operate with different notions of 
belief and assent to appearance. At PH 1 13 Sextus seems to explain in what sense 
the Pyrrhonist is not dogmatic. To read the passage as if Sextus intends to eschew 
beliefs of all kinds would give a radical Pyrrhonist, a full-blooded sceptic (this term 
is used by Frede in ‘The Sceptic’s Beliefs’) or a rustic sceptic (this term is used by 
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Barnes in ‘The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist’).205 To read the passage as if Sextus intends 
to eschew only theoretical beliefs would give a moderate Pyrrhonist or an urbane 
sceptic (this term is used by Barnes in ‘The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist’).  
Which breed of Pyrrhonist is Sextus? Is he rustic or urbane? Frede argues that the 
usual interpretation which ascribes a radical stance to Pyrrhonian Scepticism is 
fundamentally mistaken.206 Frede believes that it is compatible with his scepticism 
that the Pyrrhonist as represented in Sextus’s writing can have all sorts of views and 
beliefs. This type of Pyrrhonian Scepticism targets only beliefs of a certain kind, that 
is, those theoretical beliefs that depend on reasoned grounds whilst everyday beliefs 
are left intact.207  
According to Frede’s interpretation, the crucial passage, that is, PH 1 13 explains 
in what sense the sceptic is not dogmatic.208 The Pyrrhonist assents to whatever 
                                                 
205
 Frede’s article is first published in 1979. My pagination refers to the reprint in Burnyeat and 
Frede 1998. Barnes’s article is first published in 1982 and my pagination refers to the reprint in 
Burnyeat and Frede 1998.  
206
 Frede proposes to deal with the question by consulting Sextus’s writing. Frede gives two reasons 
why we need not be especially interested in what Pyrrho himself thought even if he has really thought 
that a proper sceptic has no beliefs. The first reason is that ‘Pyrrho is the only ancient sceptic to 
whom the doxographers ascribe a life that can easily be regarded as at least an attempt at a life 
without beliefs’ and secondly ‘it might very well be the case that Pyrrho’s influence on Pyrrhonian 
scepticism is far less than generally assumed’ (See Frede 1998, 4-6). 
207
 Frede 1998, 18-19 
208
 Frede’s translation of the PH 1 13 is as follows. 
‘We say that the sceptic does not dogmatize, not in the sense of ‘belief’ (dogma) in which some say, 
speaking quite generally, a belief consists in consenting to a thing (eudokein tini pragmati); for the 
sceptic does not assent to such affections which necessarily result when things appear to him in 
certain ways; he would not, for example, when he is hot or cold, say, ‘I believe I am not hot (cold)’; 
We rather say, he does not dogmatize, in the sense of ‘belief’, in which some say a belief consists in 
assenting to one of the nonevident things which the sciences have as their objects of inquiry; for the 
Pyrrhonean assents to nothing nonevident’ (Frede 1998, 16-17). 
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seems evident to him (or what experience suggests to him to be the case), and in 
accepting the judgement of phantasia a Pyrrhonist raises no objection against it and 
can thus be said to have beliefs (dogmata) in the wider sense.209 This Pyrrhonist 
eschews only those theoretical beliefs about the nonevident objects of philosophical 
or scientific inquiry (that is, beliefs in the narrow sense). He does not eschew 
everyday beliefs and this is compatible with his suspension of judgement on how 
things really are.210 Frede argues against the view that because the Pyrrhonist has no 
view about how things really are, he can only have a view about how things seem 
nonepistemically to him.211 Frede believes that the Pyrrhonist is content with what 
seems to him to be the case and that includes a large number of observations about 
the world around him.  
Suppose Sextus was to explain that his scepticism, as Frede suggests, was urbane 
not rustic. However, it is by no means clear that a less radical Sextus could escape 
the problem of incoherence. A moderate Pyrrhonist would be someone who operates 
                                                 
209
 Frede finds in the crucial passage i.e. PH 1 13 a distinction between a wider and a narrow sense 
of belief and for Sextus only beliefs in the narrower sense count as dogmatic. Therefore a serious 
Pyrrhonist can have beliefs in the wider sense: accepting the judgement of phantasia as a form of 
believing. Frede supposes that unlike the dogmatists, who see assent as a voluntary act, Sextus sees 
things differently and the Pyrrhonist has no criterion, on the basis of which he could decide whether 
or not to assent to assent to an impression. (Frede 1998, 9 and 16-18) 
210
 Frede argues that everything can be called into question and every question can be regarded as a 
question calling for a theoretical answer. Therefore every belief can be dogmatic, regardless of 
content. The distinction between dogmatic and non-dogmatic beliefs lies in the attitude of the person 
toward his beliefs. 
211
 Frede argues that there is a perfectly good sense in which the Pyrrhonist can have beliefs about 
how things are – namely, to the extent that it seems to be the case that things are so or so. Frede 
believes that the proper contrast for Sextus is how things really are and how things seem to him to be 
the case. The other contrast between how things really are and how things appear is simply 
misplaced. (Frede 1998, 9-15) 
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with a restricted notion of dogma and his scepticism would attack only some 
specific dogmas or certain kinds of beliefs (in particular, theoretical beliefs). A 
moderate Pyrrhonist could thus hold some non-theoretical beliefs or ordinary beliefs 
without being inconsistent. But this will not help. A moderate Pyrrhonist is happy 
with everyday ordinary opinions he would have no appetite for philosophical or 
theoretical beliefs at all. But beliefs about Pyrrhonism are certainly not ordinary 
beliefs. They fall under the class of theoretical beliefs. Hence it follows that even a 
moderate Sextus cannot have theoretical beliefs about Pyrrhonism and a consistent 
Pyrrhonist cannot communicate such beliefs in his writing.  
My discussion takes on urbane Pyrrhonism and accordingly Sextus assents to 
whatever seems evident to him and he only suspends judgements about how things 
really are. Since Sextus intends to eschew theoretical beliefs in his use of language 
and writing, he cannot express theoretical beliefs about Pyrrhonism and how things 
really are in his writing. Moreover as we have seen, the distinction between 
dogmatic and non-dogmatic beliefs lies in the attitude of the person toward his 
beliefs rather than in the content of beliefs. Therefore, as I shall argue, in offering 
his writing and also his account of Pyrrhonism Sextus cannot assume that he is 
theorising about the things that he talks about in his writing, After all, Sextus, as an 
urbane Pyrrhonist, remains cautious of the import of his speech and the implications 
it might have for matters of truth and real existence and his non-assertoric style of 
writing accords with this caution on his part. 
Burnyeat’s interpretation gives a rustic Pyrrhonist who gets rid of all beliefs.212 
Burnyeat argues that Sextus does not have a distinction between dogmatic and 
non-dogmatic beliefs because for Sextus dogma and doxa really do mean simply 
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 Burnyeat 1998a. 
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belief which must be connected with truth and reason.213 Burnyeat thinks that for 
Sextus to believe something is to assent to something non-evident; it is the accepting 
of something as true. Since the Pyrrhonist does not have a criterion of truth to 
determine to which opinion he should assent, he can neither accept conflicting 
opinions nor make a choice between them. Therefore the Pyrrhonist refrains from 
affirming or denying any one of the conflicting opinions is true.214  
Burnyeat believes that Sextus wants to clarify the sense in which the sceptic does 
not dogmatize in the crucial passage PH 1 13. According to Burnyeat’s 
interpretation truth is restricted to matters pertaining to real existence; it is closely 
tied to real existence as contrasted with appearance. The Pyrrhonist withholds his 
assent to anything not given in appearance. Statements which merely record how 
things appear are not called true or false. The Pyrrhonist assents to anything that 
appears in his impression (PH 1 19-20). The way things appear is a passive affection 
not willed by the Pyrrhonist who experiences it. The Pyrrhonist yields to things 
which move him affectively and lead him to assent by compulsion (PH 1 193). His 
assent to appearance is simply the acknowledging of what is happening to him. For 
the Pyrrhonist there can be no question of belief about appearance and his assent is 
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 Burnyeat 1998a, 47-53. However, Burnyeat later renounced his view that for Sextus dogma just 
means belief. (See Burnyeat 1998b) 
214
 Burnyeat notes that the conception of truth is pervasive in Sextus’s account of Pyrrhonian 
Scepticism. He points out that ‘the conflict of opinions is inconsistency, the impossibility of being 
true together (cf. M 7 392); the undecidability of the conflict is the impossibility of deciding which 
opinion is true; the equal strength of conflicting opinions means they are all equally worthy (or 
unworthy) of acceptance as true, epochē is a state in which one refrains from affirming or denying 
that any one of them is true; even ataraxia is among other things a matter of not worrying about truth 
and falsity any more’ (Burnyeat 1998a, 30).  
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not open to question. As he does not accept anything as true he simply suspends all 
beliefs.  
Suppose Sextus was to explain that his scepticism is rustic and therefore, as 
Burnyeat suggests, he held no beliefs of any kind, not even about his own 
philosophical position. Suppose Sextus further denied that his writing should 
commit him to beliefs of any kind. The problem of incoherence is still in the air. 
How can someone who has no beliefs describe anything? If Sextus’s writing merely 
records how things appear (nonepistemically) to him, the worry persists. For if 
Sextus does not assert in his account that things are really so and so in Pyrrhonism, 
why should the reader take his account as a trustworthy account on Pyrrhonism?215 
At any rate, the problems of incoherence prevail regardless of which view we 
take on the matter of moderate versus radical Pyrrhonism. Indeed, as Barnes rightly 
notes, the problem of incoherence is independent of the controversy between radical 
and moderate readings of Pyrrhonism.216 Barnes mentions two troublesome issues 
in the problematic status of Sextus’s writing.217 First, ancient critics of Pyrrhonism 
already argued that the many sentences in Sextus’s writing indicated a mass of 
ordinary beliefs on Sextus’s part. 218  Secondly, Sextus’s attempt to describe 
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 As we shall see soon in the next section, Stough 1984 raises a similar concern.  
216
 Barnes ‘The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist’. Barnes’s article appears first in 1982 in Proceedings of the 
Cambridge Philological Society N. S. 28 (1982), pp.1-29. Since then there are several reprints. The 
last one is in 1998 in The Original Sceptics. My pagination refers to the 1998 reprint. 
217
 Barnes 1998, footnote 17. 
218
 Barnes's initial response to the first issue is that the various remarks that Sextus makes do not 
commit him to beliefs because Sextus is not speaking in propia persona and the remarks could be 
read ‘catachrestically’ as the kind of appearances that he calls phainesthai (cf. PH 1 139, 195, 202; 
cf. M 9 18-19), that is, Sextus is not saying how things really are.  
121 
 
Pyrrhonism ‘is always close to incoherence – how can someone who purports to 
have no philosophical beliefs describe his own philosophical position?’219  
Of course Sextus is well aware of the alleged problems of incoherence in his 
writing and he provides his own defences. However, as we shall see in the next 
section, Stough rejects Sextus’s defences as unsatisfactory and undercutting 
Pyrrhonian Scepticism as a way of life. 
 
1.3 The Problematic Status of Sextus’s Writing: Implications and 
Defences 
 
The problematic status of Sextus’s writing has been a marginal issue. In those 
handful cases in which the problematic status of Sextus’s writing is addressed, it is 
usually approached only as a side issue in the footnote. In one sense we might say 
that Barnes is the first to bring up the problematic status of Sextus’s writing in 
modern times, although the chronology is a little unclear. Barnes’s essay ‘The 
Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist’ was published in 1982. As we have just seen, Barnes raises 
two troublesome issues in relation to the problematic status of Sextus’s writing but 
he did not substantially deal with them.220 About the same time Stough also 
addressed the problematic status of Sextus’s writing.221 
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 Barnes leaves the second issue aside because it is a side-issue for his discussion. He does pick up 
the second issue again but only years later. See Barnes 2000, xxii. 
220
 See Barnes 1998, footnote 17. 
221
 Stough’s article ‘Sextus Empiricus on Non-Assertion’ appears in 1984 in Phronesis vol. XXIX/2 
pp.137-164. But it is accepted in December 1982. According to her last footnote Barnes’s article 
(published in 1982) came to her attention only after she had sent off her article in final form and that 
in writing her article she was unable to benefit from Barnes’s article. Therefore, it seems reasonable 
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Stough examines Sextus’s disclaimers of assertion issued throughout his 
writing.222 To understand the language use of the Pyrrhonist, Stough investigates 
the force of his disclaimers, their status and how they are related to first-order 
utterances.223 Stough proposes to construe Sextus’s disclaimers of assertion as 
signifying his unwillingness to articulate a theory or set of beliefs about what is the 
case.224 Stough then infers that Sextus qua being a Pyrrhonist would never want to 
make any assertion and his enunciation of the Pyrrhonist position in writing would 
not articulate a body of beliefs.225 However, Stough believes that the status of the 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism as Sextus’s metalinguistic account is more problematic. 
Reviewing Sextus’s two strategies for defence (PH 1 4 & 206) against the charge of 
incoherence Stough concludes that they are either unsatisfactory or undercutting 
Pyrrhonian Scepticism as a way of life. I shall discuss Stough’s views soon. 
More than a decade after Barnes and Stough had raised their puzzles and 
objections against the status of Sextus’s written text, Hankinson alludes to the 
function of Sextus’s writing in his discussion on whether Sextus was prescribing 
                                                                                                                                         
to assume that Stough and Barnes come to raise issues with the problematic status of Sextus’s writing 
independently and around the same period. 
222
 Stough considered the following sorts of expressions as disclaimers of assertion: ‘the Sceptic does 
not “dogmatize”; he neither “affirms” nor “denies” anything; he adopts a stance of “non-assertion”; 
he says only “what appears to himself”; he does not “positively claim” that matters are as he says; 
and many of his utterances “cancel themselves” along with all other statements’ (Stough 1984, 137). 
I discuss Stough’s analysis of Sextus’s disclaimers of assertion in section 2.1. 
223
 In addition, Stough considers other relevant issues. For instance, how can the sceptic assent to 
phenomena without committing himself to the truth of some assertion? Can the sceptic avoid 
asserting something when he gives linguistic expression to the sensory and mental states that shape 
his actions? Stough proposes to defend an interpretation that meets all these difficulties. 
224
 Stough 1984, 144.  
225
 Stough 1984, footnote 12. 
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Pyrrhonian Scepticism in the opening sections of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism.226 
Hankinson’s discussion does not concern itself with the problem of incoherence. He 
believes that the function of Pyrrhonism was supposed to be autotherapeutic and 
therefore Sextus might produce the Outlines of Pyrrhonism as a self-help book for 
other apprentice sceptics. 
Finally a comparatively more focused discussion of the problematic status of 
Sextus’s writing comes in 2000. In her essay, ‘The Rhetoric of Scepticism: Sextus 
against the Language Specialists’, Sluiter discusses Sextus’s dealing with the 
language specialists, grammarians and rhetoricians in the first two books of Against 
the Mathematicians. Sluiter wants to show that Sextus was able to use the principles 
of his dogmatic opponents to arrive at a sceptic conclusion without committing 
himself to the truth of the principles. Near the end of her essay, Sluiter takes up 
Sextus’s views on the role and function of language in human communication and 
she explores briefly the relevance of Sextus’s views to his perception of the status 
and purpose of his own writing.227 
In my view, these various attempts at addressing the problematic status of 
Sextus’s writing are not satisfactory. Barnes may be credited for making the first 
attempt to address the problem of incoherence and also for giving a very helpful 
formulation of the problem. But he actually passes over the problem. By contrast 
Stough gives a detailed elaboration of the problematic status of Sextus’s writing. But 
I reject her view that the Outlines of Pyrrhonism is a metalinguistic account 
expounding Sextus’s language of non-assertion. Hankinson suggests that Sextus 
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 See Hankinson 1995, 304-306. Hankinson’s brief discussion on the function of Sextus’s writing 
forms part of his investigation on whether the Pyrrhonist’s attitude is really preferable to that of the 
dogmatists. 
227
 I discuss Sluiter’s analysis of Sextus’s views on language in section 2.2 
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produced his writing as a self-help book for other apprentice Pyrrhonists. Although 
Hankinson believes that his suggestion is promising he fails to develop it into a 
concrete solution to the problem of incoherence. Finally Sluiter suggests that 
explanatory metalanguage must be assertoric and there is no way that Sextus can 
avoid using the language of assertion in explaining his Pyrrhonism.228 Naturally, I 
do not agree with Sluiter’s view. My thesis is that Sextus’s writing does not amount 
to an explanatory account of Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Consequently, the charge of 
incoherence is misconceived. 
Now I shall go into Stough’s elaboration of the problematic status of Sextus’s 
writing and her critical review of Sextus’s two defence strategies (PH 1 4 & 206). 
Stough believes that the attitude of non-assertion prohibits the Pyrrhonist from 
making factual claims and it represents the Pyrrhonist’s attitude of caution in regard 
to the import of what he says, therefore Sextus cannot state his position.229 
According to Stough’s analysis, the various disclaimers of assertion signify Sextus’s 
unwillingness to articulate a theory or set of beliefs about what is the case. The 
Pyrrhonist refrains from making statements, or taking a side on questions of truth. 
He only gives reports of how things appear to him. His speech is informative of his 
assent to appearance without being descriptive of anything that appears.  
Stough thinks that the chronicler defence at PH 1 4 is not satisfactory because the 
notion of conceptually meaningful discourse cannot be conceived independently of 
the idea of true and false assertion. If Sextus wants to report how things appear at 
the level of conceptually meaningful discourse he must employ the language of 
assertion, that is, a descriptive use of language; otherwise Sextus’s account of 
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 Sluiter 2000, 95. 
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 Stough 1984, 138-144. 
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Pyrrhonism will not be accepted as a conceptually meaningful discourse. 230 
Sextus’s language of non-assertion is informative of his assent to appearance but it 
fails to describe anything, therefore Sextus simply cannot use the language of 
non-assertion to explain how his non-assertoric discourse is to be understood at the 
level of conceptually meaningful discourse. 
Stough believes that a better defence strategy can be found at PH 1 206.231 
According to Stough, since the chronicler defence does not work as intended, Sextus 
has no choice but to construe his account as assertions about Pyrrhonism and 
therefore his text is intended to be self-refuting.232 Stough believes that although 
this could be done only at the cost of damaging Pyrrhonism as a way of life, Sextus 
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 My thesis is opposed to Stough’s idea that for Sextus’s writing to be a conceptually meaningful 
discourse it must involve assertoric employment of language. In making the language of assertion the 
criterion for conceptually meaningful discourse, Stough has discounted the conceptual meaning of a 
whole range of writing (for example, poems and fictional novels). Moreover, we should note that 
although his statements usually take the form of factual claims, the Pyrrhonist purges from his speech 
the intention of making factual claims. It follows that the form of his statements is not indicative of 
the intended force of his statements and his statements are not meant to be ‘true’. I put forth my view 
at the end of this section. 
231
 Stough 1984, footnote 12. Stough gives no translation of PH 1 206. But apparently she 
understands the passage as indicating Sextus’s acceptance of self-refutation. 
232
 Other than Stough both Sluiter 2000 and McPherran 1987 also asserted that Sextus accepted 
self-refutation. McPherran characterized Pyrrhonian Scepticism as ‘homeopathy’. According to 
McPherran Pyrrhonian Scepticism as sceptical homeopathy is consistent with its own self-refutation 
because Sextus’s metaphorical accounts for sceptical self-refutation suggest a temporal gap. In 
Sextus’s metaphorical accounts, one first climbs the ladder and then kicks it over; the purgative first 
cleans the bowels and then ejects itself; fire first consumes the fuel and then consumes itself. 
I disagree with these authors on Sextus’s alleged acceptance of self-refutation and I will look into 
Castagnoli’s arguments against construing Sextus’s speech as self-refuting when I discuss Sextus’s 
language of non-assertion in section 2.4. 
126 
 
embraces this strategy without realizing the implied serious overtones for 
Pyrrhonism as a way of life.233  
Sluiter proposes a similar interpretation. She thinks that Sextus’s writing is just 
another instance of scepticism folding back to itself.234  She believes that the 
Pyrrhonist never intends to make any assertions, and hence his speech is indeed 
non-assertoric. However, when it comes to explaining his Pyrrhonism, Sluiter too 
thinks that there is no way that Sextus can avoid using the language of assertion. But 
since all sceptical discourse is parasitic on dogmatic arguments, the use of assertive 
language to explain the non-assertoric discourse is justifiable, and serves as ‘a 
temporary expedient only’. It will then make itself redundant once people know how 
to interpret the Pyrrhonist’s non-assertoric discourse.  
However, this alternative defence strategy fails again. Stough sees in this 
self-refutation defence elements that threaten a devastating result for Pyrrhonism 
both as a school of philosophy and as a way of life. She argues that the Pyrrhonist’s 
non-assertoric discourse is not sufficient to establish a real theoretical or practical 
difference between the Pyrrhonist and his Academic counterpart or the ‘negative 
dogmatist’. The Academic counterparts are negative dogmatists because, according 
to Sextus, they hold the dogmatic belief that contrary claims are equally strong. And 
on that basis, the Academic counterparts further believe that truth cannot be 
discovered. The Pyrrhonist certainly should not affirm the dogmatic belief that 
contrary claims are equally strong, even though, Stough suspects, that is how he is 
affected by the contrary claims.235 And as the Pyrrhonist goes on with his enquiry 
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 I shall move on to the serious overtones soon. 
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 Sluiter 2000, 95. 
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 Stough 1984, 162. 
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by confronting the dogmatist opponents with arguments, he will be doing things that 
are no different from what the Academic counterparts do. But Stough believes that 
their arguments may actually match each other in this regard. Therefore, she 
concludes that the Pyrrhonist is distinguishable only for his use of sceptical phrases 
and disclaimers of assertions; he will duplicate the philosophical tactics and 
maneuvers of the negative dogmatist in every other respect 
According to Stough’s criticism, the Pyrrhonist, of course, does not affirm or 
deny anything; he suspends his judgement and his non-assertoric attitude manifests 
only in his speech. In everyday life, the Pyrrhonist acts no differently from others. 
So his Pyrrhonism is evidently not given by his practice.236 His outlook or any other 
aspects would, in fact, be no different from those of the dogmatists. Stough argues 
this is the natural outcome which follows from the sceptic’s reluctance to have a 
theoretical position of his own. Of course the non-descriptive use of language does 
not prevent the Pyrrhonist from using arguments to refute the dogmatists. For 
                                                                                                                                         
Apparently the Pyrrhonist does not have an active programme of research. He is not in the state of 
wondering whether any of the contrary claims is the case because such wondering may induce 
anxiety and therefore undercut his ataraxia. All he can do is to regard it as an open question whether 
any side of the controversy is the case. But to attain ataraxia, the sceptic’s enquiring mind must come 
to a state of rest or equilibrium. Burnyeat believes that ‘the sceptic may hold himself ready to be 
persuaded that there are after all answers to be had’ because unlike the negative dogmatist the sceptic 
‘is not furnished with a priori objections that rule out the possibility of answer as a matter of general 
principle once and for all (cf. PH 1 1-3)’ (Burnyeat 1998a, 56).  
But the problem is if the sceptic is to attain ataraxia he must be satisfied in some sense that no 
answers are forthcoming and that contrary claims are indeed equal. Burnyeat thinks that Sextus 
cannot deny this is something he believes. I shall return to this in section 2.3 when I discuss a 
philosophically important ambiguity in the Pyrrhonist modal operator ‘phainetai’. 
236
 However as we have seen in section 1.1 Pyrrho seems to have lived an unusual way of life 
(Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 9 62). Sextus also notes that ‘Pyrrho applied 
himself to scepticism more vigorously and conspicuously than his predecessors did’ (PH I 7). 
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instance, the Pyrrhonist may argue against his dogmatic opponents over the problem 
of the criterion and he may intend his arguing as a gesture indicating his on-going 
investigation. But the practice of arguing does not in itself constitute a real 
theoretical distinction to secure for Pyrrhonism the status of a philosophical school 
of thought. There is actually no substantial thought to be found in it. Therefore 
Stough postulates that Pyrrhonism as a school of philosophy is nothing more than ‘a 
passive and indirect way of seeking the truth’ when what it actually does is to 
produce arguments and counterarguments against the doctrines of the dogmatists.  
Furthermore Stough believes that this production of arguments and 
counterarguments against the rashness of the Dogmatist cannot continue forever and 
as a result, the attitude of non-assertion is only provisional. The attitude of 
non-assertion indicates the Pyrrhonist’s inability to affirm or deny whatever matter 
is currently at issue in his enquiry. He just goes on with his enquiry. The attitude of 
non-assertion thereby distinguishes the Pyrrhonist from both the dogmatists who 
claim to have discovered the truth, and the Academic who declares that it cannot be 
discovered (PH 1 1-4, 7). But the attitude of non-assertion is only provisional and 
the production of arguments and counterarguments against the dogmatist can only 
be ‘a passive and indirect way of seeking the truth’. Therefore Stough imagines that 
the Pyrrhonist might in fact abandon his attitude of non-assertion and his suspension 
of judgement to embrace dogmatism if the occasion should arise at some point in his 
on-going investigation.237 
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 I agree that the attitude of non-assertion is provisional. But I do not agree with Stough’s idea that 
the Pyrrhonist will abandon the attitude of non-assertion and his suspension of judgement to embrace 
dogmatism. I share Barnes’s view that the onset of suspension of judgement is something which 
simply happens to us; it is an affection that comes about in our mind after the investigation. (Barnes 
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Finally Stough dismisses the Pyrrhonist’s undogmatic assent to appearances as 
only a trivial distinction and as a result Pyrrhonism becomes (in her words) ‘a highly 
theoretical metalinguistic “position” interpreting the sceptic’s discourse as 
expressive and regulative in function’.238 She argues that since Pyrrhonism as a way 
of life would show no discernible consequences, therefore what is essential to 
Pyrrhonism as a way of life, and to the attitude of mind that makes someone a 
Pyrrhonist, can only be given in propositional form. If that is the case, Pyrrhonism 
ceases to be a way of life anymore. It becomes a propositional account of the content 
of a way of life.  
Naturally, I do not agree with Stough’s views. Stough’s reasoning seems to run 
like this: for Sextus’s written text to be a conceptually meaningful discourse and his 
account to be successful in expounding his Pyrrhonian position, Sextus has no 
choice but to abandon his language of non-assertion and temporarily adopt the 
language of assertion. The same reasoning is also found in Sluiter’s discussion.239 
As these authors suggest, Sextus is supposed to propound his written account as 
self-refuting assertions. The use of assertive language is not consistent with his 
Pyrrhonian position of non-assertion but nevertheless, it is a necessity at the level of 
meaningful discourse.  
According to this line of thought—which I shall go on to reject shortly—it seems 
that the author of any descriptive writing must assert his beliefs about the subject in 
                                                                                                                                         
1998, 58-59) Therefore I do not see how the Pyrrhonist can give up or abandon suspension of 
judgement as a voluntary decision as Stough may imagine. 
238
 Stough 1984, 163. 
239
 Sluiter 2000, 95: ‘It is only when Sextus stops doing scepticism and starts explaining it that the 
risk of self-contradiction looms large. For clearly, there is no way in which he can make his 
explanatory metalanguage non-assertoric.’ 
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his descriptive account. Suppose I want to produce a recipe for some Chinese dish. I 
list the ingredients and give a step by step account of the cooking. My writing of the 
recipe conveys what I believe to be a good way to prepare the dish. I will carefully 
structure my narrative to follow some logic so as to enhance understanding. For 
instance, I will not give out random cooking instructions. They will be in order and 
with reasons. The purpose of my descriptive narrative is not to entertain people. I 
want to teach them how to cook the dish. I want to bring about understanding. And I 
attempt this by publicizing my beliefs about the dish with my writing of the recipe. 
If this is correct, it seems that Sextus is doing the same with his writing of at least 
Book I of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. 
Indeed the structure of Book I gives the impression that Sextus is conveying to 
his readers how he conceives of the important aspects of Pyrrhonism, in the way that 
the recipe book conveys the author's views on how to prepare a certain dish.240 It 
seems as though, by writing Book I in that systematic order, Sextus is actually 
publicizing his beliefs about the nature of Pyrrhonism, the various sets of Modes, the 
Pyrrhonist’s slogans, and how Pyrrhonism stands out from other neighbouring 
schools of thoughts. And it seems that the structure represents a deliberate decision 
on Sextus’s part. He does not compile his descriptive account randomly. Instead, 
Book I reads like the result of careful planning and articulation and it gives the 
essential characteristics of his philosophical stance. After this general account, 
Sextus moves on to what he calls the ‘specific account’ of Pyrrhonism in the other 
two books of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism and the eleven books of the Against the 
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 In Sextus’s own words, Book I is the ‘general account’ in which he ‘sets forth the characteristic 
traits of Pyrrhonism, stating its basic idea, its origins, arguments, criterion and goal, as well as the 
modes of suspension of judgement, and how we take the sceptic phōnai , and the distinction between 
Pyrrhonism and the competing philosophies’ (PH 1 5). 
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Mathematicians. The specific account consists of the Pyrrhonist refutation of the 
Dogmatist in different parts of philosophy and various disciplines (PH 1 6). Finally 
it appears that in his attempt at a descriptive account of Pyrrhonism Sextus has taken 
the effort to make sure that every section is well-planned and serves, in its own way, 
the whole project of explaining Pyrrhonism. 
It is important here to consider whether descriptive writings must entail beliefs 
on the author’s part. Can there be descriptive writing that expresses no beliefs or 
even bypasses beliefs? Some sorts of descriptive writings like poems and fictions 
can be descriptive of imaginary scenarios and fictional characters, and they do not 
require or entail beliefs about the unreal on the author’s part. I have discussed 
fictions as non-assertoric in Chapter One. Of course I am not suggesting that 
Sextus’s writing resembles poems or fictions, or they are non-assertoric in the same 
way. Sextus’s writing belongs to a different genre of writing and it is non-assertoric 
because it is composed with the non-assertoric use of language that comprises four 
modes of non-assertion. 
On my view, there are some important reasons why Sextus could not have 
articulated an explanatory account of his Pyrrhonism and his speech. First of all, 
Sextus has no intention to attempt any explanatory metalinguistic account of his 
speech because to articulate such account is unbecoming to his Pyrrhonian 
Scepticism (PH 1 195, 207). Sextus is well aware of the fact that he cannot 
assertively explain or state his Pyrrhonism because it requires the language of 
assertion, that is, a descriptive use of language, which is never consistent with his 
Pyrrhonian position of non-assertion. Secondly Pyrrhonism cannot be properly 
explained nor described from within because Pyrrhonism, unlike other rival schools 
of thought, if it can be said to be a school of thought in a very loose sense, has no 
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doctrine and no unique theory of its own. There is just theory or doctrine to be 
explained. Finally Sextus puts in the Chronicler Disclaimer (PH 1 4) at the 
beginning of his writing to renounce the aim of an explanatory account. The 
Disclaimer attests to Sextus’s awareness that it could only result in incoherence if he 
attempts to explain or describe Pyrrhonism in his writing. As a Pyrrhonist, Sextus is 
well aware of this peculiar nature of Pyrrhonism. The Chronicler Disclaimer is not 
Sextus’s only effort to keep his writing nothing more than a report of how things 
appear to him. His extensive uses of other minor caveats like ‘perhaps’, ‘I suppose’, 
‘I guess’ and the quasi-operator ‘It appears to me now that so and so’ are all 
consistent with this effort.  
On my view, the Disclaimer emphasizes the non-assertoric status of his writing 
as nothing more than a report of appearance and it also announces the textual 
strategy of his writing. For Sextus his writing is simply another instance of his 
practice of sceptical argumentation, that is, to contest dogmatism in any topic that 
comes to his attention, and in this practice, his non-assertoric speech expresses no 
beliefs of how things really are whilst his argumentation does not justify assertions 
about anything on the basis of what appears to be the case. 
Barnes believes that the problem of incoherence is a genuine problem and 
Sextus’s various remarks on his sceptical slogans (PH I 187-208) are designed as a 
response to it.241 Barnes argues that Sextus is not prevented from giving us ‘a 
reliable account of the nature and the aspirations of scepticism’ because ‘a mindless 
talker may be a reliable purveyor of information’.242 According to Barnes, the fact 
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that Sextus does not believe his own writing ‘is no reason at all for us not to believe 
what he says’ because ‘the words which flow from his mouth may tell truths’.243   
I have no quarrel with Barnes’s argument because it makes a great deal of sense 
to me. So if Barnes is right, it is possible for Sextus’s writing to promote 
understanding of Pyrrhonism in his readership. But this must happen without 
Sextus’s authorial intention. A reader may come to grasp the nature and aspirations 
of Pyrrhonism from Sextus’s writing but this appears to be an unintended result for 
Sextus. Because Sextus reports as a non-committal chronicler and therefore the 
reader cannot be assured that Sextus’s account is reliable. It is true that Sextus’s 
account may give a reliable account of Pyrrhonism but because of the lack of 
authorial commitment the reader can never have full confidence in Sextus’s writing. 
 
2. PYRRONIAN NON-ASSERTORIC SPEECH 
 
Sextus’s language of non-assertion plays an integral role in distinguishing his 
writing as a work of non-assertoric discourse. Indeed the idiosyncratic mannerism of 
the Pyrrhonist is manifested mainly in his non-assertoric speech acts. I will now 
discuss how this excessively egocentric use of language contributes to Sextus’s 
effort to produce his writing as a piece of non-assertoric discourse. Stough, Sluiter 
and Barnes all touch upon the Pyrrhonist’s non-assertoric mode of speech in their 
discussions of the problematic status of Sextus’s writing. By surveying their 
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 Barnes’s idea is that though Sextus’s non-assertoric mode of speech does not state anything and 
he does not purport to make any truth claim, his speech may still be true, just like parrots have no 
beliefs but they may tell truths. According to Barnes, what matters is ‘where the parrot got his 
information’ and ‘how he manages to reproduce it’ (Barnes 2000, xxii).   
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discussions we shall be able to inform ourselves regarding how the Pyrrhonist 
deploys language in a distinctive way. To work out a thorough analysis of the 
subtleties of the Pyrrhonist’s non-assertoric mode of speech I shall draw particularly 
on the works of Mates, Burnyeat and Castagnoli. 
 
2.1 The Attitude of Aphasia 
 
We should start, however, with Stough’s discussion which explores the attitude 
of aphasia (non-assertion) and the various kinds of caveats that pervade the Outlines 
of Pyrrhonism. These caveats are indicative of Sextus’s use of non-assertoric mode 
of expression in writing. Stough coins the term ‘disclaimers of assertion’ to 
incorporate all of Sextus’s various kinds of caveats. Her discussion aims to give an 
interpretation of Sextus’s non-assertion that can make sense of the force of the 
disclaimers. In a nutshell, it is obvious that the point of the disclaimers is to get rid 
of assertions in speech and writing. But the problem is Sextus frequently makes 
various seemingly assertive appearance statements in his writing. For instance, 
Sextus writes that ‘phantasiai do not arise from the same things because of the 
difference of the animals’ (PH 1 40) when he articulates on the upshot of the first 
mode of suspension of judgement. And when Sextus talks of different ways that 
animals are produced, he says that human beings are born viviparously and birds are 
born oviparously (PH 1 42). Such seemingly assertive appearance statements appear 
to commit Sextus to assertions about how different animals are born.  
These seemingly assertive appearance statements are problematic and Stough 
complains that grammatical form cannot be sure indicator of the force of his 
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speech. 244  She finds it important for her discussion to set forth how Sextus 
characterizes the distinction between assertion and non-assertion and she finds 
glimpses of this distinction implicit in Sextus’s various remarks on his use of 
language. 
 
In making an assertion (in the sense in which he wants to employ the term), Sextus says, 
one is using language to affirm or deny something, for instance, that it is (is not) day (PH 
1 192) 
assertion is speech uttered “dogmatically about what is non-evident” (PH 1 193) 
Non-assertion, then, would appear to be an attitude (called a pathos by Sextus at PH 1 
193) of caution on the part of the Sceptic in regard to the import of what he says. While 
the statements of other philosophers are meant to affirm or deny (with or without 
qualification) that something is the case (is true), the Sceptic construes his own 
pronouncements, along with all others, as “no more true than false” (PH 1 14-15, 200, 
206-208)245 
 
Stough believes that the Pyrrhonist purges from his speech the intention of 
making factual claims, because the Pyrrhonist refrains from assenting to the 
non-evident, and making factual claims is assenting to the non-evident. Therefore 
she thinks that the attitude of non-assertion rules out only those speeches that are 
dogmatic in force (PH 1 193, 203, 208).246 This attitude of non-assertion does not 
forbid the Pyrrhonist from making utterances like ‘it is day’ or ‘honey is sweet’ 
which seemingly resemble exactly the usual form of factual claims.247 As she has 
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 Of course, the Pyrrhonist regardless of rustic or urbane would suspend judgement on whether it 
really is the case that it is day or honey is really sweet because questions about how thing really and 
truly is count as non-evident matters of fact.  
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noted, the form is not indicative of the force of his speech. Stough postulates that the 
form of his speech does not commit the Pyrrhonist to affirmation or negation 
because it just reflects the Pyrrhonist's disregard for ordinary linguistic conventions 
and the fact that he is unmindful of the rules of ordinary discourse.248 Therefore 
Sextus would not be put off making utterances that have the outward form of factual 
claims. But the point is that he makes these utterances only undogmatically, so that 
the outward form has no force and the utterances have no implications on matters of 
truth and real existence. Speaking undogmatically, the Pyrrhonist assents to 
appearances and his affections, whilst his words commit him to no truth claims, and 
his speech determines nothing about matters of fact (PH 1 197, 200). The function 
of his speech is not to give a descriptive account of external features of the world. 
Therefore, if the Pyrrhonist says ‘it is day’ no one can contradict him by saying ‘it is 
not day’. As Stough puts it, ‘The distinction between assertion and non-assertion is a 
formal distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive (hence “not open to 
dispute”) uses of language.’249   
As for the problem of speaking categorically with utterances like ‘honey is 
sweet’, Stough tries to explain it away with reference to Sextus’s distinction 
between two senses of the word ‘is’ (PH 1 135, 198). Sextus notes in these sections 
that ‘is’ can be used to make factual claims about what is the case (is true). However, 
                                                                                                                                         
As we shall see, Sextus’s distinction between two senses of the word ‘is’ will give more force to his 
denial that his appearance-statements are expressive of beliefs. 
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he says that it can also be used noncommittally in the sense of ‘appears’, to merely 
register how something appears to someone. Obviously, the defence would be the 
idea that the Pyrrhonist does not use ‘is’ in the first sense. Speaking categorically, 
the Pyrrhonist reveals only how things appear to him; he is not making any 
statement about matters of fact. His utterances have no implications on matters of 
truth and real existence. Stough finds further support for this idea in Sextus’s claim 
that his categorical modes of speech are interchangeable with non-declarative modes 
of speech, such as the interrogative (PH 1 189) and imperative (PH 1 204) so long 
as they can effectively report how things appear to him. Stough thinks that the use of 
the grammatical alternatives to categorical modes of speech suggests that Sextus ‘is 
alluding to a function of language other than that which would provide an account of 
features of the world’.250   
Finally Stough concludes that Sextus’s non-assertoric speech performs the 
pragmatic function of informing others of the mental and perceptual states that 
determine his actions and Sextus as a language user refrains from making statements. 
Although he refrains from taking a side on questions of truth, he freely engages in 
discourse and expresses himself in a form of speech that signals his approval of the 
practical functions of language.251 
I agree with Stough’s interpretation of Sextus’s disclaimers of assertion and the 
upshot that Pyrrhonian utterances have no implications on matters of truth and real 
existence as their outward form has no force and the attitude of non-assertion rules 
out those speeches that are dogmatic in force (PH 1 193, 203, 208). However, there 
is an important error in her discussion. Stough seems to conflate different modes of 
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non-assertoric speech into one single category: avowal of appearances. But avowal 
of appearances cannot represent all modes of non-assertoric speech. For instance, 
interrogative (PH 1 189) and imperative (PH 1 204) modes of speech are also 
non-assertoric but unlike avowal of appearances they do not report the speaker’s 
present phainomena and pathē. Unlike avowal of appearances they do not report 
how things appear to the Pyrrhonist. Moreover, Pyrrhonian argumentation works 
like commemorative sign (PH 2 102, also M 8 157) as it reminds his opponent of 
what can be said in response to the dogmatic belief within its dogmatic context. Like 
interrogative and imperative modes of speech, Pyrrhonian argumentation does not 
tell us the Pyrrhonist’s present phainomena and pathē. Among these four modes of 
non-assertion, avowal of appearances is more controversial and I discuss the 
problems and issues it raises in the next two sections. I shall first discuss avowal of 
appearance as a deviation of the normal use of declarative sentence.  
 
2.2 The Plea of Katachrēsis for Pyrrhonian Avowal of Appearance 
 
In her discussion of Sextus’s views on form and meaning, Sluiter notes that 
Sextus adopts a practical and utilitarian approach to language.252 Sluiter agrees with 
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Stough in thinking that the Pyrrhonist does not intend to make an assertion when he 
utters a declarative sentence (that is, an avowal of appearance for the Pyrrhonist). 
The function of the utterance is rather to report how things appear to him at a 
particular time, she suggests. Therefore what the declarative sentences do for the 
Pyrrhonist is, according to Sluiter, to report how the sceptic feels affected by the 
world at a particular moment. Sluiter regards this peculiar use of language as a 
crucial deviation but also as a characteristic innovation which Sextus justifies with 
his plea of katachrēsis.253  
The Pyrrhonist’s avowal of appearance is a deviation because it violates common 
linguistic conventions with regard to the declarative mode of speech. But the 
violation is not arbitrary. According to Sluiter, the violation is ‘an emergency 
measure’ taken by Sextus to meet a linguistic constraint for the Pyrrhonist. The 
constraint occurs because his Pyrrhonism clashes with common usage and linguistic 
conventions on the declarative mode of speech. A Pyrrhonist does not issue his 
utterances with dogmatic force. He does not want his speech to commit himself to 
affirmation or negation of anything. But the problem is that, in the normal situation 
where one would casually say ‘it is day’ when it is day, the Pyrrhonist is bound to 
remain cautious of the import of his speech or the implications it might have for 
matters of truth and real existence. He does not want to affirm or deny that it is day 
with his saying ‘it is day’. He knows all too well that other speakers who follow 
common usage and linguistic conventions usually assume that saying ‘it is day’ 
implies that the speaker is asserting that it is day. And such assertion usually implies 
on the speaker’s part his implicit belief that it is day. However, the Pyrrhonist is 
determined to avoid these implications. And he definitely does not want to pass into 
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silence; he wants to engage in communication with others. Therefore in order to get 
out of the linguistic predicament, he appeals to a designated mode of speech, that is, 
his avowal of appearance which is serviceable in acknowledging his impression that 
it is day and yet without asserting that it is so.254 As a result, the Pyrrhonist does not 
regress into silence; his avowal of appearance allows him to communicate a pathos 
without asserting it and Sextus can be outspoken with his writing.  
Sluiter believes that Sextus’s account of his Pyrrhonian phōnai (PH 1 187-208) 
can reveal not only his views on the phōnai but also his views on the role and 
function of language in human communication. She argues that Sextus’s choice for 
the word phōnai is indicative of the essential nature of his non-assertoric speech and 
that Sextus purposefully use phōnai when there are other choices of words available 
to him. For instance, Sluiter argues, Sextus can use logoi, or apophthegma, or 
epiphonema, or an expression like scepticon.255 She suspects that Sextus is attracted 
to the term phōnē because in ancient philosophical language and linguistic theory, it 
‘indicates articulated sound without giving information about semantic content’. In 
addition, she says that Sextus likes to construe phōnas with propheresthai (which 
emphasizes sound-production rather than the production of logos which would be 
suggested by lēgō). His other choices of accompanying verbs like epiphtheggomai is 
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also mostly associated with interjection-like utterances and interjections express 
precisely a pathos, which is irrational, and of which no theory can be given. Finally 
Sluiter believes that Sextus’s phōnai (or disclaimers of non-assertion for Stough) are 
supposed to reflect just the personal experience of the speaker, and the choice for the 
word phōnai certainly does not commit Sextus to any theory of language.  
Before Sluiter, Mates has already pointed out that Sextus’s choice for the word 
phōnai is highly strategic and it reflects his defensiveness against the possible 
criticism that his words and slogans are in fact dogmatic assertions. Mates refers to a 
passage in Aristotle's De anima, 420b5, which defines a phōnē as a 'sound, properly 
the sound of the voice, whether of a human being or any animal with a larynx and 
lungs’.256 Mates assumes that Sextus chooses the word phōnai for (as he puts it) its 
‘somewhat deprecatory air’ so as to reinforce the idea that the Pyrrhonist does not 
offer his utterances as weighty assertions about anything; they are only reports of his 
personal experience. 
Sluiter thinks that a closer look at the passages on ou mallon (PH 1 188-191) can 
unveil the rationale for Sextus’s deviation from the common linguistic conventions 
with regard to the declarative mode of speech. According to Sluiter, Sextus makes 
the plea of katachrēsis when he remarks on the form and meaning of ou mallon. 
Regarding the form of ou mallon 
 
First, he points out (in PH 1 188) that the form is schematic: ou mallon should be 
supplemented to get a complete sentence. 
Secondly, the form is also indifferent: the same pathos can be expressed by a question 
‘why A rather than B?’ (ti mallon;).257 
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Regarding the meaning of ou mallon 
 
Sextus points out that it may look like (have the charakēr of), an assertion, but that it is in 
fact used katachrēstikōs (PH 1 191). 
 
Sluiter believes that the plea of katachrēsis can explain Sextus’s exploitation of 
the declarative mode of speech to generate his avowal of appearance in order to 
provide an ad hoc escape from his linguistic predicament. According to Sluiter, the 
Greek word katachrēsis can be used to refer to two distinct phenomena. The first is 
‘an improper use of language, an “abuse” even, when a term is employed in spite of 
the fact that a better choice was available, one that is more regular in form, or proper 
in meaning’. The second is ‘the more common meaning’ and it refers to ‘the 
extended use of a term, because there simply is no proper term to express whatever 
it is that needs to be expressed.’258 Sextus’s problem is the lack of a proper form of 
speech which can get him out of the linguistic predicament. He needs a form of 
speech that can express nothing more than the sole experience of a pathos. If it is 
acceptable to use a term beyond its usual meaning to express something differently 
when the proper term does not exist, perhaps the Pyrrhonist can do something 
similar, where the right form of speech does not exist. Therefore, he uses declarative 
mode of speech as an emergency measure in cases when the requisite form of speech 
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does not exist. Returning to Sextus’s remark on the form of ou mallon, it is clear that 
the Pyrrhonian usage is indifferent to the grammatical form; ou mallon and ti mallon 
are used as if they are identical. If Sextus were to spell out the Pyrrhonian usage 
with regard to grammatical form, it would be: Do not look at the form to determine 
the meaning. For the Pyrrhonian usage is indifferent to the grammatical form. Sluiter 
finds textual support from PH 1 190, 197, 201 where Sextus repeatedly stresses the 
idea that the meaning of the sceptical phōnai like ou mallon lies in the pathos of the 
Pyrrhonist.259 Finally Sluiter concludes that Sextus’s understanding of the role and 
function of language in human communication is unduly overlooked and he should 
be given a place in the history of speech acts theory.260 
I think Sluiter’s discussion is useful in drawing out the issues concerning 
Sextus’s avowal of appearance as a crucial deviation of the declarative mode of 
speech. However, there is an important misgiving in Sluiter’s discussion of excusing 
avowal of appearance as an ‘emergency measure’. Sluiter leaves an important 
question unanswered. Why does Sextus choose to borrow conventional usage of the 
declarative mode of speech when it is obvious that such borrowing would certainly 
invite confusion and objection? If the Pyrrhonist wishes to mark himself off from 
assertive speech, he can stick to his favourite form of statement ‘it appears to me 
now that so and so’. His plea of katachrēsis seems puzzling, if not irritating. 
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On this matter, Mates suggests that locutions of the form ‘it appears to me now 
so and so’ function as a kind of modal operator for Sextus and they resembles the 
so-called psychological verbs that, according to Frege, generate oblique contexts in 
which words and expressions no longer have their ordinary denotations. Mates 
himself proposes that the Pyrrhonist uses the appearance (to phainomenon) as a 
syncategorematic expression. A syncategorematic expression ‘contributes to the 
meaningfulness of more complex expressions in which it occurs but that does not by 
itself have any denotation or reference.’261 On my view, perhaps, as his distinction 
between two senses of the word ‘is’ suggests, Sextus chooses to borrow 
conventional usage of declarative form of speech because for him it is the content of 
what is said, not the actual forms of his statements that is important to him. This is 
also supported by his repeated stress on loose usage (PH 1 191, 195, 196).  
 
2.3 Philosophical Phainetai Pronouncement and Belief 
 
Barnes’s discussion deals with Sextus’s commitment to the phainomena in the 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism and also Pyrrhonian avowals of appearance.262 Barnes 
prefers to call Pyrrhonian avowals of appearance ‘phainetai sentences’ or ‘phainetai 
utterances’. Barnes believes that given Sextus’s willingness to say how things 
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appear the Pyrrhonist of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism is almost certainly committed to 
the phainomena. However, Barnes warns of the false move of taking the Pyrrhonian 
avowals of appearance that ‘it appears to me that so and so’ as meaning ‘I believe 
that so and so’.263 According to Barnes the avowals of appearance in the Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism do not carry the usual epistemic sense so that the appearing mentioned 
in the utterances is not epistemic but phenomenological. If his avowal of appearance 
is to imply an epistemic appearance statement, the Pyrrhonist would be expressing 
an assertion or a judgment about the thing that he talks about. He would be 
expressing a certain view and with the qualification that his judgement may be 
wrong. The speaker of epistemic appearance statements intends to affirm with 
qualification whatever that is being talked about. But on the other hand if his avowal 
of appearance implies only a phenomenological appearing, then the Pyrrhonist does 
not express a judgement on the thing that he talks about; he only reports on his 
experience.264  
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146 
 
Moreover, phenomenological appearing is not restricted to perception only. It 
comprises non-perceptual impression. One can, as Barnes suggests, say ‘That 
argument looks sound – but don’t be taken in by it’ in which the appearing is 
phenomenological but non-perceptual.265 But in any case, Pyrrhonian avowals of 
appearance are not totally cut off from epistemic readings. As Barnes sees it, the 
phenomenological avowals of appearance can imply beliefs in at least four different 
ways. 
 
First, the utterer appears to refer to himself, and hence to presuppose his own existence 
(and perhaps also certain facts about his own nature, e.g. that he is a being capable of 
perception and thought). Secondly, the utterer appears to refer to the present time, and 
hence presuppose that there is such a thing as time. Thirdly – and more strikingly – the 
utterer appears to refer to external objects, and hence to assume their existence; for if I 
say ‘That tower looks round’, I may be in doubt about the ‘real nature’ of the tower, but I 
can hardly doubt that there is a tower there of some sort or other. Finally – and most 
obviously – the utterer appears to be expressing a belief by his very utterance, namely the 
belief that the honey tastes sweet to him, etc. For the utterance of an indicative sentence 
functions characteristically as a manifestation of belief in the proposition expressed by 
the sentence.266 
 
On the other hand, Burnyeat argues that there is a very subtle way in which the 
Pyrrhonian avowals of appearance about impressions of thought can imply beliefs. 
As Burnyeat points out, Sextus’s avowals of appearance in the Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism trade on a philosophically important ambiguity which is crucial to 
Sextus’s assumption that the utterances ‘it appears to me that so and so’ and ‘I don’t 
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believe that so and so’ are in general logically consistent. But in fact, this 
assumption is wrong when the utterance is made about an impression of thought. 
Non-perceptual avowals of appearance that speak of some impressions of thought 
are not on a par with avowals of appearance that speak of sense-impressions. Sextus 
cannot insist that his avowals of appearance that speaks of some impressions of 
thought are mere announcements of his passive affection or mental states. Unlike the 
avowals of appearance that report on a perceptual state, his philosophical phainetai 
pronouncement implies a state of belief.267 
Burnyeat argues that what appears (to phainomenon) may be anything whatever 
given in the impression (phantasia), and in Sextus’s Pyrrhonian framework, there 
are impressions (phantasiai) which are not and could not possibly be thought to be 
sense-impressions.268 For instance, it would be impossible to regard the appearances 
in his phōnai like ‘I determine nothing’ (PH 1 15) and ‘Everything is relative’ (PH 1 
135) as impressions of sense. They speak of some impressions of thought. And as 
Sextus suggests his phōnai are not expressive of dogmatic beliefs. Instead they are 
mere records of appearance. Burnyeat therefore concludes that for Sextus, 
appearance is not exclusively identified with sense appearance it comprises 
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impressions of thought; things that appear (phainomena) comprise objects of sense 
as well as objects of thought (M 8 362).269 
Burnyeat thinks that the ultimate incoherence of the sceptic philosophy is found 
in his philosophical phainetai pronouncement as it is expressive of belief in a very 
subtle way despite its disguise as undogmatic avowal of appearance. An avowal of 
appearance that reports on the Pyrrhonist’s sense impression describes a genuine 
experience (a pathos, a phantasia) that awaits his assent. Suppose a Pyrrhonist 
reports on his sense impression by saying ‘Honey appears sweet’ (PH 1 20) and 
then he continues ‘But I do not believe that honey is sweet’. His refusal to assent to 
the first level proposition that honey is sweet does not invoke a self-contradiction 
because his utterances simply acknowledge to his perceptual state that honey 
appears sweet. He needs not assent to the first level proposition that honey is sweet. 
In short in Pyrrhonian avowals of appearance that speaks of sense impression assent 
and impression are logically independent. 
According to Burnyeat, in the case of philosophical phainetai pronouncements 
assent and impression are not logically independent. Suppose after experiencing a 
number of occasions in which contrary claims have equal strength a Pyrrhonist says, 
‘It appears to me that contrary claims have equal strength but I do not believe that 
contrary claims have equal strength.’270 This utterance, which speaks of some 
impressions of thought, is intelligible only if it carries epistemic sense. As Burnyeat 
suggests the philosophical impression that contrary claims have equal strength, 
‘being the effect of argument, is only to be made sense of in terms of reason, belief 
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and truth – the very notions the sceptic is most anxious to avoid’.271 His repeated 
impressions that no claim is to be preferred to its denial support the conviction that 
the generalization is true.272 
As Burnyeat sums up ‘accepting the conclusion that p on the basis of a certain 
argument is hardly to be distinguished from coming to believe that p is true with that 
argument as one’s reason.’ The Pyrrhonist’s impression that contrary claims have 
equal strength is actually identical to his assent to the conclusion that contrary 
claims have equal strength, which is a state of belief. It would not make sense for the 
Pyrrhonist to insist that that he does not assent to the conclusion as true because 
such denial would amount to contemplating a further act of assent to the assent 
already given, Burnyeat argues. The Pyrrhonist cannot treat his own thought as if it 
were the thoughts of someone else because such detachment from oneself is not 
humanly possible, Burnyeat concludes. 
Alternatively Barnes believes it is not anachronistic to explain Sextus’s avowals 
of appearance with speech acts theory.273 He reckons that Diogenes, for instance, 
used the notion of ‘confessions’ to refer to the Pyrrhonist’s utterances (Lives of 
Eminent Philosophers 9 104) and Sextus, for his part, refers to his own utterances as 
‘avowals’ (PH 1 4, 15, 197, 200, 203). Barnes observes that the notion of ‘avowal’ 
has attained currency in Wittgensteinian circles. He refers to a celebrated passage  
in the Philosophical Investigations (§244) where Wittgenstein elaborates on 
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‘Äusserungen’, that is, ‘expressions of feelings’ or avowals.274 In addition, Barnes 
also recalls Wittgenstein’s objection to the mistaken assumption that avowals of a 
feeling constitute statements.275 
The similarity between Wittgensteinian avowals and Pyrrhonian avowals is quite 
obvious here. A child expresses her pain by crying. She does not state anything; her 
cry is not a statement. Barnes suggests that the speech of the Pyrrhonist functions in 
the same way. When the Pyrrhonist is mentally affected, he would utter 
phenomenological phainetai sentences to express his pathos. His avowals express 
his pathos, not his belief that he is in certain pathos. He states nothing, not even that 
he is experiencing a certain pathos.276 Barnes thinks that since the Pyrrhonist’s 
avowals are not statements, they bypass belief.277   
I think Barnes’s discussion is helpful in drawing attention to the distinction 
between two very different kinds of Pyrrhonian avowals of appearance. The first 
kind involves perceptual appearance and in uttering this kind of avowals, the 
Pyrrhonist does not express judgement on the things that he talks about. He only 
reports on his perceptual experience. The second kind involves non-perceptual 
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impressions like contrary claims have equal strength. As Barnes rightly notes, 
Pyrrhonian avowals of appearance are not completely insulated from epistemic 
readings and thus may express beliefs. In this regard, the second kind of avowals is 
more controversial than the first kind. 
I think Burnyeat makes a very strong case for taking the second kind of avowal, 
that is, Pyrrhonian philosophical phainetai pronouncement, as implying a state of 
belief. Barnes argues that Pyrrhonian philosophical phainetai pronouncement is like 
Wittgensteinian avowal; it is not statement and therefore it bypasses belief. I think is 
this argument is not conclusive. 
But on the other hand, I think Burnyeat has overstated his argument when he 
claimed that in assenting to his impression that contrary claims have equal strength 
and yet failing to conclude that the generalization is true the Pyrrhonist invokes a 
kind of humanly impossible detachment from himself. Suppose someone is given 
two seeming incompatibles x and y to choose and to assist his decision-making he 
thinks through his options by considering a few self-addressed questions. He starts 
by asking himself questions like, ‘Are x and y equally worthy of choosing?’, ‘Do I 
really want x?’, ‘Will I regret if I choose x instead of y?’ Does it follow that in 
considering these kinds of self-addressed questions he is in the danger of splitting 
into two people or invoking some kind of humanly impossible detachment from 
himself?  
I think the self-addressed questions that he thinks through in his struggle to get a 
decision on the incompatibles are simply natural expressions of thoughts which we 
all may experience at some point in our lives when we are in similar situation. 
Therefore, I think the Pyrrhonist can assent to his impression that contrary claims 
have equal strength without also concluding it is true that contrary claims have equal 
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strength. The Pyrrhonist assents to his impression that contrary claims have equal 
strength. But he can withhold his assent from the generalization that contrary claims 
have equal strength. After all we should recall that Sextus characterizes Pyrrhonism 
as ‘zetetic (seeking or questioning) from its activity in investigation and inquiry’, 
‘suspensive from the state of mind produced in the inquirer after his search’ and 
‘aporetic from its indecision as regards assent and denial’ (PH 1 7). All things 
considered, I think it makes good sense to conclude that Pyrrhonian philosophical 
phainetai pronouncement does not imply a state of belief. The discussion on 
sceptical phōnai in the next section will give further support to my view.  
 
2.4 Sceptical Phōnai and the Deep Grammar of Ou(den) mallon 
 
I shall now consider dogmatic interpretation of sceptical phōnai. When a 
Pyrrhonist says ‘no more p than q’, is he attributing an absolute reality to his phōnai 
and thus comes to hold some dogmatic beliefs about reality, for instance, that it is 
really ‘no more p than q’ in the external world?  
Castagnoli suggests that this risk of dogmatic interpretation does not pass Sextus 
by, and he actually develops a defensive mechanism to stamp it out. Castagnoli 
argues that Sextus elaborates on a distinction between a dogmatic and a 
non-dogmatic interpretation of ouden mallon and he discards the dogmatic 
interpretation at PH 1 14-15. 278 According to the passages, in uttering his phōnai the 
                                                 
278
 Sextus says (at PH I 14-15): ‘But not even [all oyde] in uttering [prophēresthai] the Sceptical 
phōnai about unclear matters [peri tōn adēlōn] nonevident things – for example, ‘Nothing more’ 
[ouden mallon], or ‘I determine nothing’ [ouden orixō], or one of the other phōnai which we shall 
later discuss – does he [the Sceptic] hold beliefs. For he who holds beliefs posits as real [ōs uparchon 
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Pyrrhonist does not posit his phōnai as absolutely real, that is, pertaining to what 
really is the case, and therefore he does not come to hold beliefs. Castagnoli argues 
that Sextus does not posit ouden mallon as real because he wants to avoid asserting 
the implicit maxim that  
 
(M*) For every pair of conflicting unclear matters p and q, p is as persuasive as q and 
therefore one should believe neither the one nor the other (one must suspend judgement).  
 
At PH 1 14-15 Sextus also reports that the Pyrrhonist does not posit his phōnai as 
pertaining to what really is the case because he realizes that his phōnai, for instance, 
‘Nothing more’, resemble the claim that ‘Everything is false’. The claim that 
‘Everything is false’ is self-referring and its self-application conduces to an absolute 
self-refutation which is neither true nor false.  
Castagnoli argues that the crucial verb symperigraphei in Sextus’s passage 
should not be taken to signify any sense of self-refutation because for ou mallon, its 
self-application does not conduce to a self-refutation. Hence, he is opposed to 
McPherran who concludes that ou mallon is absolutely self-refuting as he construes 
the verb symperigraphei as meaning ‘to refute along with’.279  
                                                                                                                                         
tithetai] what he is said to believe, whereas the Sceptic posits these phōnai not as absolutely real 
[ouch ōs pantōs yparchoysas] . 
For they [the Pyrrhonists] suppose that, just as the phōnē ‘Everything is false’ says that it too, along 
with everything else, is false (and similarly for ‘Nothing is true’), so also ‘Nothing more’ says that it 
too, along with the everything else, is no more, and hence it cancels itself along with 
[symperigraphei] the other things. And we say the same of the other Sceptical phōnai… Sceptics 
utter their own phōnai in such a way that they are implicitly cancelled [perigraphesthai] by 
themselves.’ 
The translations are from Castagnoli 2000, 265-276. 
279
 Castagnoli complains that this line of interpretation is popular among many commentators and the 
incorrect translation informs the works of McPherran, Burnyeat, Stough, Fogelin, and Hankinson 
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Accoriding to Castagnoli, Sextus never uses perigraphein to indicate some form 
of refutation or self-refutation; its possible meanings in Sextus’s text are: ‘exclude’, 
‘delineate’, ‘define’, ‘determine’, ‘draw a line around’, circumscribe’, and 
‘conclude’. In Sextus’s usage, symperigraphein usually takes one of these possible 
meanings as ‘to cancel’ and it is a kind of cancellation that cannot be identified with 
refutation because the cancellation expressed by symperigraphein does not involve a 
falsification of the ‘cancelled’ item.280  
On Castagnoli’s view, the upshots of Sextus’s report on his phōnai (PH I 
187-208) concerning the correct meaning of the verb symperigraphein and the deep 
grammar of ou mallon are as follows.  
 
1 ouden mallon (interchangeable with ‘ou mallon’, ‘No more’) is elliptical: it implicitly 
stands for ‘No more one thing than the other’ (PH I 188).  
2 it makes clear the Pyrrhonist’s pathos; because of the equipollence of the opposed (i.e. 
conflicting) objects, the Pyrrhonist ends in equilibrium, i.e. he assents to neither side (PH 
I 190), where equipollence means ‘equality in what appears persuasive to us [the 
Pyrrhonists]’. ‘ouden mallon’ stands for ‘I do not know which of these things I should 
assent to and which not assent to’ (PH I 191), or for an equivalent question. 
3 the Sceptic does not use his phōnai about all things universally, but only about those 
unclear things, objects of dogmatic enquiry (PH I 208), which he himself has examined 
(PH I 199, 203).281 
                                                                                                                                         
(Castagnoli 2000, 264). Castagnoli’s view is that the rendering of the key verb as such is misleading 
and wrong because ‘Sextus never accepts, and so much the less embraces, the charge of 
self-refutation, either in relation to his phōnai or concerning the proof against proof’ and ‘what is 
interpreted by McPherran as an admission of self-refutation is actually an amazingly refined tool that 
Sextus uses against the charge of inconsistency and self-refutation that the dogmatist deploys against 
him.’ 
280
 Castagnili 2000, 270-1. 
281
 Castagnili 2000, 278-9. It follows form these generalizations that a tentative meaning of ou 
mallon is: ‘For every pair of conflicting unclear matters p and q I have examined, it appears to me 
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According to PH 1 13, the Pyrrhonist does not dogmatize because he does not 
assent to the non-evident; he assents only to the pathē that are forced upon him by a 
phantasia.282 Therefore Castagnoli argues that the final meaning of ou(den) mallon 
should be:  
 
For every pair of conflicting unclear matters p and q I have examined, it appears to me 
now that p is as persuasive as q, and therefore I can believe neither the one nor the other 
(I suspend judgement). 
 
Castagnoli argues that this is the deep grammar of ou(den) mallon for Sextus. If 
the Pyrrhonist is to hold beliefs in uttering ‘no more p than q’, his utterance would 
be purporting to make a truth-claim about some feature of the external world, 
something non-evident, that is, such that he is addressing the objective equipollence 
of p and q and thereby referring to an instance of intrinsic indeterminacy of the 
world. 
But the deep grammar of ou mallon suggests instead that when a Pyrrhonist utters 
‘no more p than q’, he is merely expressing his impression that p and q are equally 
worthy or unworthy of acceptance. Such frame of mind is merely contingent and 
subjective. The Pyrrhonist is mentally affected thus and so, but he does not assume 
                                                                                                                                         
now that p is as persuasive as q, and therefore I do not know which of these things I should assent to 
and which not assent to.’ 
282
 PH 1 13: When we say that the Sceptic does not dogmatize we are not using the term ‘dogma’ as 
some do, in its more common meaning, ‘something that one merely agrees to’, for the Sceptic does 
give assent to the pathē that are forced upon him by a phantasia; for example, when feeling hot (or 
cold) he would not say ‘I seem not to be hot (or cold).’ But when we assert that he does not 
dogmatize, we use ‘dogma’ in the sense, which others give it, of assent to one of the non-evident 
matters investigated by the sciences.  
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that everyone should be subject to the same affection. In the deep grammar of ou 
mallon, the quasi-modal operator ‘it appears to me now that’ and the first-person 
pronoun ‘I’ make it very clear that ‘no more p than q’ reflects a mere avowal of the 
Pyrhronist’s subjective impression that p and q are equipollent. He suspends 
judgement on which one is more worthy of acceptance.283 
Returning to the translation of symperigraphein, Castagnoli raises issues 
concerning the rendering of the verb as ‘to refute along with’. This translation seems 
to provide some defence for Sextus against the charge that he is dogmatizing with 
his phōnai because it is obvious that he cannot sensibly attribute an absolute reality 
to his phōnai if they are absolutely self-refuting and hence necessarily false. But 
Castagnoli detects two difficulties in this interpretation. The first one is a 
terminological issue. If Sextus really has self-refutation in mind, he could use his 
standard verb peritrepein or its noun.284 Castagnoli argues that symperigraphein 
denotes in ancient Greek ‘a very specific kind of cancellation: that kind of 
cancellation practised by copyists, correctors, and philologists on a text that we call 
‘expunction’ or ‘deletion’’ by putting different diacritical marks, which would 
become round brackets in our time.285 Therefore, Castagnoli concludes that the verb 
symperigraphein should be rendered as ‘to bracket along with’ and Sextus’s phōnai 
would become self-bracketing, that is, its self-application conduces to 
                                                 
283
 Castagnoli points out that if the quasi-modal operator and the first person pronoun are removed, 
ou mallon would cease to express an avowal and its meaning would be radically changed. It would 
transform into an implicit maxim, a dogmatic truth-claim about the external world: ‘For every pair of 
conflicting unclear matters p and q, p is as persuasive as q and therefore one should believe neither 
the one nor the other (one must suspend judgement)’ (Castagnoli 2000, 281). 
284
 Castagnoli 2000, 280, see also 265-273. 
285
 Castagnoli 2000, 286. 
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self-bracketing.286 But this self-bracketing is the result of the self-application of the 
phōnai by dogmatic interpretation. The Pyrrhonist does not intend dogmatic 
interpretation of his own phōnai. Finally the reason that ou mallon is not 
self-refuting lies in its deep grammar. According to Castagnoli, we find 
 
in the deep grammar of ouden mallon the epistemic concepts of appearance, degree of 
persuasiveness, assent, and belief, not the semantic concepts of truth or falsity. ‘p no 
more than q’ does not mean ‘p is false and q as well’ (nor ‘p is true and q as well’); its 
actual meaning is: I can believe neither that p nor that q because they appear to me 
equally persuasive.287 
 
To conclude, I have examined the nature and consistency of Sextus’s distinctive 
use of language by looking into his attitude of aphasia, the plea of katachrēsis for 
his deviation of the declarative mode of speech, his phainetai sentences, his 
sceptical phōnai and the deep grammar of ou mallon, together they comprise the 
crucial framework of his non-assertoric speech. My discussion has confirmed that 
Sextus’s speech is thoroughly non-assertoric. His utterances and writing do not 
register any belief claims as they do not purport to make any truth claims about the 
non-evident or how things really are. The result of my discussion can give much 
support to the cogency of my thesis. Therefore I conclude that it is entirely apt to 
construe Sextus’s writing as a non-assertoric discourse which, like his speech, 
expresses no beliefs of how things really are.  
 
 
 
                                                 
286
 I think this point is crucial for a fair grasp of Pyrrhonism.  
287
 Castagnoli 2000, 280. 
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3. Dissoi Logoi: Misology and the Premature Dialectician 
 
In this section, I discuss how Plato’s use of dissoi logoi, that is, the practice of 
arguing on both sides of an issue or argument, in his aporetic dialogues can be 
contrasted with Sextus’s sceptical mode of argumentation which leads to 
equipollence of arguments and then suspension of judgement. Then I shall complete 
my discussion in this Chapter by showing how Pyrrhonism represents a judicious 
course, a middle course caught between the threat of misology and the danger of 
premature practice of dialectic discussed in Plato’s Phaedo and Republic. 
Dissoi Logoi is the title given by posterity to a short collection of arguments for 
and against various theses authored by an Anonymous dated around 400 BC. 
According to Burnyeat, the work is ‘not a high-powered debate’ but there are 
numerous points of contact between its arguments for and against the teachability of 
wisdom and virtue, and Plato’s Protagoras (319a-328d) and Meno (89e-96d). Since 
nothing can be said with certainty about the work, we do not know what can be 
made of these points of contact. Another thing worth noting is that the work came to 
us as an appendix to the manuscripts of Sextus.288 Moreover, the work is written in 
Doric dialect; both Pyrrho and Aenesidemus came from Doric-speaking regions. But 
again, its murkiness prevents us from seeing the exact connection of this work to 
                                                 
288
 Again we do not know what can be made of this and there is no evidence that Sextus read the 
Dissoi Logoi although the work could have been of great interest to him given his passion with 
arguing for and against a thesis to induce suspension of judgement about it. 
159 
 
Pyrrhonism. And as Burnyeat advises, ‘Sober readers will suspend judgement on 
every question about the work’. 289   
Here for my discussion I use dissoi logoi to refer to conflicting arguments or the 
practice of arguing on both sides of an issue or argument. Dissoi logoi is an effective 
mode of arguing and in Sextus’s treatment of belief it becomes a form of 
confrontational dialectic and a sceptical strategy that leads to equipollence of 
arguments and then suspension of judgement. Suppose the dogmatist makes the rash 
assertion that p then Sextus argues for both p and not p so that the arguments pro 
and con come out even. As it appears no more p than not p the dogmatist can no 
longer hold on to his belief and he has to suspend judgement.  
Unlike Sextus, Plato does not argue to suspension of judgement. But the Socratic 
elenchus as depicted in Plato’s dialogues appears to be another instance of 
confrontational dialectic – the discussion usually comes to an impasse (aporia) and 
the interlocutor has no clue of how to get out of the impasse brought by the 
contradiction between his original claim and the conclusion of the ensuing argument. 
The Socratic elenchus thus appears negative.  
Cicero, writing in the first century BC, recapitulates at Varro 46 what he takes to 
be some essential features in Plato’s writing in the following lines: 
  
nothing is assented to; there are many arguments on both sides of a question, and on all 
matters there is much enquiry, but nothing firm is said 
 
                                                 
289
 Burnyeat 1998c, 107. According to Burnyeat, ‘Nothing can be said with certainty about it. Not 
only its author, but its text, date, overall purpose and intellectual affiliations remain matters for 
scholarly speculation. Speculation has run riot’ (Burnyeat 1998c, p.106). Therefore, I make no 
speculation about it. See also Bailey 2008. 
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Because of these contentious features in Plato’s writing, Cicero argues that 
Arcesilaus and the New Academy should not be taken as marking any radical 
departure from Plato and the Old Academy. On his view, Arcesilaus’s sceptical 
philosophizing actually resembled these contentious features in Plato’s writing. The 
speech at Varro 46 breaks off but Cicero expresses his view more completely 
elsewhere.290 
Of the three features Cicero mentions at Varro 46, the first concerns the form of 
writing. As I have argued in Chapter Two, although the reader may happen to find 
some very definite and strongly held ideas in the dialogues, the dialogue form 
together with Platonic silence and authorial anonymity make it difficult to hold Plato 
committed to the ideas voiced by the dramatis personae, be it Socrates or any other 
leading speakers. The result is that in the dialogues ‘nothing is assented to’.  
And this feature obviously gives rise to the third feature namely that ‘on all 
matters there is much enquiry, but nothing firm is said’. As I have argued in Chapter 
Two, the dialogues are not to be taken as a vehicle of Platonic doctrines. They are 
maieutic; they represent on-going enquiries about justice, piety and so on, and at the 
                                                 
290
 De orat. 3.67: ‘First [in contrast to his predecessors in the Academy, who had made no radical 
changes of teaching method] Arcesilaus, Polemon’s pupil, seized on the following in particular out of 
various writings of Plato and from the Socratic conversations: that nothing sure can be apprehended 
by either the senses or the mind. He is said to have employed an outstandingly attractive style of 
speaking in rejecting any judgements of the mind or senses, and to have been the first to set up the 
practice – though this was highly Socratic – of not showing what he thought but of arguing against 
what anyone else said that they thought.’ 
Also Fin. 2.2: ‘He [Socrates] had the practice of drawing out his interlocutors’ beliefs by 
conversation and questioning, so as to say what he thought in response to their replies. This custom 
was abandoned by his successors, but Arcesilaus revived it, and instituted the following practice: 
those who wished to hear him should not ask him questions but should themselves tell him what they 
thought: when they had told him, he would argue against it.’ 
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same time they invite the reader to think for herself on the issues. So we are left with 
the second feature. According to the second feature Plato is closely akin to 
Arcesilaus’s sceptical style and practice because in his writing ‘there are many 
arguments on both sides of a question’. Arguably this seems to suggest a kind of 
dissoi logoi structure in Plato’s dialogues. Why would Plato employ dissoi logoi in 
his dialogues? To what extent is Plato akin to scepticism because of his application 
of dissoi logoi?  
Cicero thinks that the feature of arguing on both sides, which we are calling 
dissoi logoi, reveals a sceptical Plato. Cicero’s view was somehow shared by an 
anonymous Neoplatonist commentator of the sixth century AD who compiled five 
arguments for a sceptical interpretation of Plato. 291  Anonymous’s first two 
arguments are as follows.  
 
In his discussion of things, they say, he uses certain adverbs indicating ambivalence and 
doubt – e.g. ‘probably’ and ‘perhaps’ and ‘maybe’; and that is a mark not of one who 
knows but of one who fails to apprehend any precise knowledge. 
They argue secondly that inasmuch as he tries to establish contrary views about the same 
things he clearly extols inapprehensibility (akatalēpsia) – for example, he tries to 
establish contraries when discussing friendship in the Lysis, temperance in the Charmides, 
piety in the Euthyphro.292 
                                                 
291
 The five arguments are preserved in an anonymous Introduction to Plato’s Philosophy. 
According to Annas, the anonymous Neoplatonist commentator was dated by the editor L.G. 
Westerink to the sixth century AD and in the school of Olympiodorus (Annas 1992, 62). The five 
arguments are also mentioned in Annas and Barnes 1985, 13-4.  
292
 See Annas 1992, 63-5. I discuss the first two arguments in section 3.1 and I leave the other three 
arguments aside because Annas convincingly argues that they do not carry much force. The other 
three arguments are as follows. 
‘Thirdly, they say that he thinks that there is no such thing as knowledge, as is clear from the fact that 
he refutes every account of knowledge in the Theaetetus, as well as number; how can we say that 
someone like this extols apprehension?’ 
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Anonymous’s second argument echoes Cicero’s argument that Plato is closely 
akin to sceptical style and practice because in his writing ‘there are many arguments 
on both sides of a question’. Both Cicero and Anonymous refer to the same style and 
practice, that is, dissoi logoi and because of this they both read Plato as a sceptic. 
However, there is one crucial difference on what they infer from it. Cicero concludes 
that in Plato’s writing ‘there is much enquiry, but nothing firm is said’. Anonymous, 
nevertheless, is more radical as he concludes that Plato embraces inapprehensibility 
because of his application of dissoi logoi. If both of them agree that Plato is closely 
akin to scepticism, they actually refer to different notions of scepticism. Not all 
forms of scepticism need to call upon inapprehensibility for credentials. Arcesilaus 
argues to inapprehensibility (akatalēpsia) but Philo abandons Arcesilaus’s radical 
scepticism after he becomes the head of the New Academy. According to Sextus 
Pyrrhonism has nothing to do with inapprehensibility and it is the ‘members of the 
New Academy’ who argue for inapprehensibility (PH 1 226). This difference has 
great implications and I shall return to it soon. Before that, I need to visit Annas’s 
discussion on whether the practice of arguing on both sides makes it plausible to 
read Plato as akin to the Pyrrhonist. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
‘Their fourth argument is this: if Plato thinks that knowledge is twofold, one sort coming through 
perception and other through thought, and if he says that each sort falls down, it is clear that he extols 
inapprehensibility. For he says, “We do not see or hear anything accurately; our senses make errors”; 
and again he says of objects of thought that “Our soul is entangled with this evil, the body, and 
cannot think of anything.”  
‘This is their fifth argument: they say that he himself says in his dialogue, “I know nothing and I 
teach nothing: all that I do is raise problems”. See how he says in his own words that he has no 
apprehension.” 
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3.1 The Premature Dialectician 
 
Annas reasonably dismisses Anonymous’s five arguments as either too weak or 
inconclusive to make it plausible to read Plato as a sceptic.293 She believes that it 
would be difficult to ascribe a sceptical mode of arguing to the Socratic dialogues 
because the Socrates in these dialogues only reduces his interlocutors to bafflement, 
admission of defeat, or silence, but never to suspension of judgement. Annas also 
notes that Plato occasionally uses the ou mallon description of the result of an 
argument but, unlike Sextus’s employment, Plato is not describing equipollence of 
arguments. 294  Annas argues that Plato recognizes sceptical argument to 
equipollence and sceptical use of ou mallon but he disapproves of it. She makes her 
case with a passage from the Republic Book VII in which Socrates suggested that 
getting used to refuting people too soon, one will acquire the muddled thinking that 
anything is ‘no more fine than foul, and the same with just and good and whatever 
else is esteemed’ (538d6-e2).295 Annas assumes that this passage expresses Plato’s 
own view on the undesirable effects of the premature practice of dialectic and she 
proceeds to argue that, 
                                                 
293
 Annas 1992. 
294
 Annas gives the examples found in Theaet.182e10, 181e5-7, Meno 78e6, Rep. 340b3-5. 
295
 Plainly it is only Socrates who says this in the dialogue but Annas argues in her text as if Plato is 
stating this as his own view, his disapproval of ou mallon. This over-interpretation of Plato’s text is 
certainly problematic given all the indirect features of the dialogue form which I have argued in 
Chapter Two. There is another problem with Annas’s reading of the passage. Socrates seems to be 
concerned only with the moral problem as he talks about fine and foul, just and good. The passage 
suggests that it is problematic if someone thinks that just and unjust are no different. But Annas 
makes the erroneous inference that in Plato’s view it is dangerous to think that on ANY matter one 
should expect the arguments pro and con to come out even. In the case of sense impressions surely 
there can be cases in which something is rightly fo
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Plato finds it dangerous to think, as the Pyrrhonist sceptics at least later did, that on any 
matter one should expect the arguments pro and con to come out even. Thinking this, for 
Plato, makes you irresponsible, aggressive, and negative in argument.296  

Annas brings up another passage of the Republic Book VII (523-5) where 
Socrates explains how some things provoke the mind to think while others do not. In 
some cases, our experience reports contradictory sense impressions regarding the 
same thing – we find there is much to be said for a thing’s being not-F as for its 
being F and we are thus stirred to attempt resolving the contradiction by carrying out 
more enquiry.297 So Annas argues that for Plato equipollence is not necessarily 
undesirable; the intellectual discomfort caused by equipollence can trigger more 
thinking and further enquiry so that the perplexity may eventually be resolved. 
Therefore Annas believes that for Plato the real problem with the premature 
dialectician lies not in the practice of arguing to equipollence but in his attitude – 
‘remaining satisfied with the resulting discomfort rather than enquiring further’. On 
her view, Plato and Sextus would agree on the need for further investigation as a 
proper response to equipollence but they are divided when Plato makes a 
controversial diversion to the realm of Forms which, for Sextus,  
 
s the typical fault of dogmatism: giving up too soon, staying complacently satisfied when 
there are further problems to enquire into. 

Sextus and the Pyrrhonist see themselves as persistent enquirers who keep pressing 
                                                 
296
 Annas 1992, 66-7. 
297
 Again Annas takes the passage (523-5) as representing Plato’s own views on the positive value of 
contrary argument. 
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on with their enquiry. However, Annas suggests, for Plato 
insistence on further enquiry, when one has found intellectually satisfying results, is 
immature; it is to avoid just this that he insists that the Guardians do years of study before 
launching into dialectic.298   
 
On Annas’s view, the contrast is that Sextus and the Pyrrhonist would appear 
immature to Plato because of their insistence on pursuing the question when there 
emerges satisfying results. But on the other hand, Plato would appear to be dogmatic 
to Sextus because he abandons the enquiry and settles with the dubious Forms.299  
According to Annas, the fundamental divergence is best explained in the 
different uses of arguing to equipollence in Plato and Sextus. In her view, for Plato 
arguing to equipollence is not part of a continuing enquiry. It is applicable only to 
cases where experience provides grounds for equipollence, which then leads the 
mind to the discovery of Forms as some intellectually graspable essences which are 
immune from the cognitive deficiency in perception. Hence, Plato’s use of 
‘argument for opposites’ in arguing for Forms becomes more comprehensible. It is a 
non-sceptical application of a form of argument which can be serviceable to 
establish a quintessentially dogmatic conclusion. The same form of argument, 
however, if applied in a sceptical spirit as Sextus does, leads first to equipollence of 
arguments and then suspension of judgement. Annas concludes that this may suggest 
‘a sceptical root of Plato’s major metaphysical claim’ which is arguably often 
neglected in Platonic scholarship but in any case it does not give a sceptical Plato.300  
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 Annas 1992, 67. 
299
 Such contrast depends on a doctrinal reading of Plato and the ‘Theory of Forms’. 
300
 Annas 1992, 68. 
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3.2 Objections to Annas’s Views 
 
My first objection to Annas’s view is that she overlooks the fact that quite a 
number of the enquiries depicted in Plato’s dialogues are aporetic or maieutic rather 
than dogmatic.301 To name a few examples, the enquiry on piety is brought to an 
impasse when Euthyphro no longer knows what to say about piety, and so does the 
discussion on the definition of knowledge in the Theaetetus. It is almost as if, in 
conformity with a certain authorial intent, the interlocutor is usually overcome by 
contradictions imbedded in his own thinking and then reduced by Socratic elenchus 
to aporia, a state of intellectual bafflement in which one is at a genuine loss as to 
how to get out of the contradictions or difficulties in finding the right response. 
Secondly Annas argues that Socrates often reduces his interlocutors to bafflement, 
admission of defeat, or silence but never to suspension of judgement. However, I 
think ‘bafflement, admission of defeat, or silence’ are all reminiscent of aporia and 
consistent with epochē which refers to a standstill of the intellect, as a result of 
which one neither asserts nor denies anything. But on the other hand, a possible 
difference may lie in the fact that for Socrates’s interlocutors the bafflement usually 
comes with distributing emotions and feelings whilst Pyrrhonian suspension of 
judgment is thought to lead to ataraxia. 
Moreover, Annas’s view seems to rely on the dubious assumption that Plato’s 
dialogues are primarily dogmatic and Plato’s authorial intention is to convey his 
metaphysical doctrines. However, in Chapter Two I have already challenged this 
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 The early Socratic dialogues (especially the three dialogues o definition: Laches, Charmides, 
Euthyphro) are aporetic because they typically end in aporia. The Meno and Protagoras are aporetic. 
The Theaetetus is also aporetic. But as I have shown, some readings render it euporetic because it 
seems to end with an implicit hint on finding the answer. 
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assumption and argued for a more reasonable position, according to which we must 
recognize the formal indirectness of the dialogue form and the salient fact that the 
majority discussions in Plato’s dialogues are either aporetic, or maieutic 
enquiries.302 So if Plato’s dialogues do not convey Platonic doctrines but represent 
on-going enquiries, it would bring us back to Cicero’s observation: ‘nothing is 
assented to; there are many arguments on both sides of a question, and on all matters 
there is much enquiry, but nothing firm is said’.  
My second objection to Annas’s view is that she wrongly suggests that the 
Pyrrhonist holds the view that on any matter one should expect the arguments pro 
and con to come out even. In PH 1 202-205 Sextus explains the slogan: ‘To every 
argument an equal argument is opposed’. His first point is that the slogan is not 
meant to be a piece of assertion establishing any dogmatic claim about future 
enquiries. The slogan is rather intended as registering the Pyrrhonist’s experience or 
impression that throughout his enquiry so far he has found that pro and con came out 
even. His final point suggests that the slogan expresses an injunction which the 
Pyrrhonist issues to himself but that should not be taken as making the assertion that 
the Pyrrhonist should expect arguments pro and con to come out even.  
The Pyrrhonist may be keen on arguing to equipollence but he would never 
commit himself to the view that arguments pro and con always come out even. 
Suppose the dogmatist holds the rash belief that p. Sextus’s response as a Pyrrhonist 
is to confront this rash belief and argue for both p and not p. If the arguments pro 
and con come out even, then the dogmatist is brought to equipollence. But Sextus 
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 Like Frede 1992, I do not pretend that all dialogues are aporetic. But on the other hand, any 
general account of the dialogues should account for the aporetic dialogues and the formal status of 
the arguments expressed in the discussions. 
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need not claim that he can always make it happen with his argumentation. 
The expectation that arguments pro and con always come out even is actually 
fostered by the dogmatic belief in inapprehensibility which is never held by the 
Pyrrhonist. Sextus ascribes this dogmatic position to the New Academy and on the 
other hand he is proud to announce that ‘the Pyrrhonist continues to search’ (PH I 
3).303 Suppose things are rendered not more X than not-X as a result of equipollence 
in arguments. The premature dialecticians would say that there is no difference 
between X and not-X. The Pyrrhonist would say that one should suspend judgement 
on the issue and the conflicting arguments call for further enquiry. The Pyrrhonist’s 
further enquiry serves two purposes: to settle the issue and attain the truth about it. 
Before he finds any truth, suspension of judgement is an expedient that prevents him 
from giving rash assent to either side of the issue. Secondly if more enquiries do not 
appear to improve things, he takes the opportunity to undermine dogmatizing and 
dogmatic beliefs on the issue by arguing to equipollence. These endeavours keep 
him immune to the pathology of the premature dialectician who holds the ou mallon 
view, that is, things are not more X than not-X.  
Annas does not deny that Plato employs dissoi logoi in his dialogues. She argues 
that Plato makes a non-sceptical application of arguing to equipollence in order to 
initiate the discovery of Forms. On her view, arguing to equipollence is limited to 
perceptual cases and it is only in these cases that there is as much to be said for a 
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 There may appear some tension between the idea of a continued search and of the epochē that 
sometimes seems to follow the observation of conflicting arguments. No doubt conflicting 
arguments, if unresolved, would force the enquirer to suspend judgement but this is only expedient 
and it need not put the enquirer off from further enquiry. He can be motivated to continue with the 
enquiry hoping that the conflicts can be resolved and a proper judgement can be attained. I disucss 
how continuing enquiry can be reconciled with the present ataraxia in section 3.3. 
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thing’s being not-X as for its being X. As such, dissoi logoi is just a means for Plato; 
it does not form part of his continuing enquiry but it is prior to the discovery of 
Forms. Hence Plato is drawn to dissoi logoi for the great philosophical harvest, that 
is, the discovery of Forms that it could bring about. However, on the other hand, he 
is aware of the harmful effects it could produce on the enquiring minds. This is why, 
according to Annas, he warns of the undesirable effects of the premature practice of 
confrontational dialectic. 
But on the other hand, Sedley has a different view on Plato’s use of negative 
elenchus. According to Sedley Plato’s early methodology before the Phaedo is 
‘largely confrontational – a way of subverting the theories, value-systems and 
prejudices of Socrates’s interlocutors’. 304  Sedley believes that Plato’s early 
methodology employs confrontational dialectic as a preliminary procedure in 
removing false beliefs before a joint search for the truth via cooperative dialectic is 
possible. And in the Meno the negative elenchus is refined as the first stage of 
cooperative dialectic. A further twist comes in the Phaedo when the Socratic 
elenchus is made part of the discovery process. Sedley believes that ‘Socrates’s 
method of enlightenment, again and again, is to encourage doubts to come out into 
the open, and then to find the right arguments to quell them.’ On Sedley’s view, 
properly motivated doubt can be a positive asset to the philosopher as it can provide 
a powerful lead towards the truth whilst wrongly motivated doubt, fostered by 
uncritical attitudes, can only blind us to the truth when we do meet it.305  
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 Sedley 1995, 21. 
305
 Sedley 1995, 22: ‘Doubts must not be suppressed, or they will subvert rational belief.’ 
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3.3 The Misologist 
 
I shall now discuss how Pyrrhonism represents a judicious middle course 
between the paths of the premature dialectician and the misologist. In Plato’s 
Phaedo there are some methodological passages on ‘misology’ or hatred of 
arguments outlining a critical diagnosis of the pathology of the misologist who, like 
the premature dialectician, falls under the spell of contradictory arguments. The 
undesirable effects of premature practice of confrontational dialectic are also 
brought up in the Republic which supposedly is written in roughly the same period. 
In the Phaedo, Plato makes his Socrates raise another concern about undue exposure 
to contradictory arguments. He elaborates on the concepts of ‘misology’ and 
‘misologists’ which are his terms for hatred of arguments and people who acquire 
this hatred. In the passage, Socrates said that there is no greater evil that could befall 
anyone than the hatred of argument (89d1-90d8). To explain how people acquire 
this condition, he related it to misanthropy because, in his view, both arise from the 
same source.  
 
Misanthropy develops when, without skill, one puts complete trust in somebody, thinking 
the person absolutely true and sound and reliable, and then a little later finds him bad and 
unreliable; and then that happens again with another person; and when it happens often, 
especially at the hands of those one would regard as one’s nearest and dearest friends, 
one ends up, after repeated hard knocks, hating everyone, thinking there’s no soundness 
whatever in anyone at all. (89d6-e4) [my italics] 
 
The resemblance is found, rather, when someone who lacks skill in arguments, trusts 
some argument to be true, and then a little later it seems to him false, sometimes when it 
is, and sometimes when it isn’t, and then the same thing happens with one argument after 
another – it is, as you know, especially those who’ve spent all their time on contradictory 
arguments, who end up thinking they’ve become extremely wise: they alone have 
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discerned that there’s nothing sound or secure whatever, either in things or arguments; 
but that all realities are carried up and down, just like things fluctuating in the Euripus, 
and never remain at rest for any time. (90b6-c6) [my italics] 
 
Then, Phaedo, it would be a pitiful fate, if there were in fact some true and secure 
argument, and one that could be discerned, yet owing to association with arguments of 
the sort that seem now true and now false, one blamed neither oneself nor one’s lack of 
skill, but finally relieved one’s distress by shifting the blame from oneself to arguments, 
and then finished out the rest of one’s life hating and abusing arguments, and was 
deprived both of the truth and of knowledge of realities. (90c8-d8) [my italics] 

These telling passages provide some very important ideas for me to finish this 
Chapter. The misologists, as described in the Phaedo, are people who have spent all 
their time on contradictory arguments. They put complete trust in some arguments 
but then find contradictory arguments equally convincing. Their trust in the 
arguments which once appeared absolutely true and sound and reliable to them 
somehow shatters and fades away. However, they are misled into thinking that they 
have become very wise because only they can make the insightful observation that 
there is nothing sound or secure whatever in arguments. They become the 
misologists who spend the rest of their life hating and abusing arguments and they 
are deprived of the truth and knowledge. 
On my view, Pyrrhonism represents a judicious course, a middle course caught 
between the threat of misology and the danger of premature practice of dialectic. 
Pyrrhonism is particularly prone to the charge of misology because the Pyrrhonist is 
notorious for the seemingly nihilistic result of his confrontational dialectic. The 
Pyrrhonist is suspensive and aporetic; he suspends judgement and is at a loss as to 
whether or not to assent to either side of an argument (PH 1 7). His arguments are 
intended to produce the same effects on his opponents. It follows that the 
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Pyrrhonist’s confrontational dialectic deprives both himself and his opponents of the 
truth and knowledge of realities. This is certainly a serious and overwhelming 
accusation that could be brought against someone who professes to the pursuit of 
truth. 
To defend the Pyrrhonist I need to compare the causal development of the 
misologists with a similar passage about the causal origin of Pyrrhonism.  
 
We say that the causal origin of Pyrrhonism is the hope of attaining ataraxia. Certain 
talented people, upset by anomaly in things and at a loss as to which of these things 
deserve assent, endeavoured to discover what is true in them and what is false, expecting 
that by settling this they would achieve ataraxia. But the main origin of Pyrrhonism is the 
practice of opposing to each argument an equal argument; it seems to us that doing this 
brings an end to dogmatizing. (PH 1 12) 

The resemblance is striking. Both Plato and Sextus mention people who dwell on 
contradictions in things and arguments. In Plato’s account, some of these people 
become misologists who abuse arguments. The sequence is: ungrounded trust – 
contradiction – disappointment – hatred of argument. In Sextus’s account, some of 
these people become the Pyrrhonists who argue to equipollence and find ataraxia 
after suspension of judgement. The sequence is: enquiry – contradiction – 
equipollence – epochē – ataraxia. What can we make of this partial resemblance? 
What makes the final difference? Is arguing to equipollence an instance of abuse of 
argument?  
The single theme present in all the three passages on misology is the importance 
of skill. The first passage refers to people’s skills whereas the other two passages are 
concerned with skills in arguments. Socrates’s diagnosis in the Phaedo seems to 
suggest that the root cause of misology is the lack of skills in arguments. Those 
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people who have spent all their time on contradictory arguments are retarded by 
their poor skills in arguments. However, they fail to identify the real problem within. 
Therefore, when they cannot distinguish the true and secure arguments from the 
false and unreliable arguments, they hastily shift the blame to arguments. This is 
why misology is about the hatred of arguments. 
In Sextus’s account, a crucial difference lies in the fact that the settlement of 
anomaly in things by arguments is a means to ataraxia. Sextus defuses the danger of 
misology and the potential threat of the undesirable effects of premature practice of 
confrontational dialectic by making ataraxia the telos and epochē the means to it.306 
The Pyrrhonist does not place ungrounded trust on either side of the argument 
during his search for the truth. In the causal account, the early Pyrrhonists embark 
on their search for the truth precisely because they were made puzzled at the 
beginning. They just did not know what to trust and what not to trust, and their 
search did not make things any better. But this intellectual loss became a blessing. It 
prevented them from assenting rashly to either side of the argument. As if by luck, 
they escaped the fate of becoming the misologists who stopped investigation 
thinking there was nothing sound or secure whatever in arguments. On retrospection 
the Pyrrhonists came to recognize the importance of not giving up investigation and 
not putting unjustified trust on either side of the argument. They also came to 
recognize the importance of putting arguments and beliefs to the test of arguing to 
equipollence and they emphasized putting their trust only on those arguments and 
beliefs that can survive the test of equipollence. In doing so they could avoid rash 
assent on their part and they could contain their opponents’ dogmatizing and 
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30). But I think for Sextus epochē during investigation remains the means to ataraxia. 
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dogmatic beliefs in their own dogmatic contexts. Finally arguing to equipollence 
could immerse them in dialectical exercises and drill their skills in argument. All 
these can serve the pursuit of truth. 
People who pursue something would inevitably fear not attaining what they 
pursue. However, it is better to confront the fear instead of ignoring and eventually 
letting the fear overtake us especially when the pursuit comes to a standstill. It is at 
this point that Sextus and the Pyrrhonist come with the promise of Pyrrhonism. By 
arguing to equipollence Sextus releases the fear inside. Obviously, the impasse 
should not be exaggerated as though it removes any hope of bringing the pursuit to a 
fruitful end; and the good news is that we may even find ataraxia after suspension 
of judgement. 
But we should recall that whether ‘ataraxia enters the soul along with epochē’ is 
more a chance event (PH 1 10, 26, 29). There may appear some tension between the 
Pyrrhonist’s continuing enquiry in the future and his present ataraxia which has 
followed epochē. If ataraxia follows from epochē then the Pyrrhonist should not 
want to escape from his present condition of epochē and there should be no need for 
continuing enquiry.  
My view is that the Pyrrhonist’s enquiry incurs two different kinds of ataraxia: 
the first kind is his intended goal (his telos); the other is an expedient result. I call 
the first one ataraxia as telos and the second one expedient ataraxia. The expedient 
ataraxia follows from epochē but the Pyrrhonist has not anticipated that it will enter 
his soul along with epochē. From the very beginning, the Pyrrhonist’s intended goal 
is to attain the first kind of ataraxia by discovering what is true and what is false in 
the anomaly in things (PH 1 12). But his failure to resolve the conflicting arguments 
forces him to epochē and then to his surprise he finds ataraxia.  
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But I think this ataraxia which follows from epochē is very different from 
ataraxia as telos. The expedient ataraxia is more like a temporary state of at ease or 
unperturbedness with conflicting arguments. For the enquiring mind of the 
Pyrrhonist the expedient ataraxia is only transient because if it can just enter his 
soul along with epochē without his volition, it can go anytime. This expedient 
ataraxia is not secured. Secondly, the possibility of finding out the ultimate truth 
about the anomaly in things remains a disturbing sword of Damocles hanging over 
his expedient ataraxia. Therefore for the Pyrrhonist only the first kind of ataraxia is 
his proper goal. It is only through successfully resolving the anomaly in things can 
his enquiry mind finds the long-sought peace of mind.  
Sextus and the Pyrrhonists are not the premature dialecticians who always expect 
the arguments pro and con to come out even. Nor are they the misologists who have 
lost their faith in the power of arguments. Unlike the premature dialecticians and the 
misologists, the Pyrrhonists refrain from giving up too soon or taking side too early 
on contradictory arguments and in this way they are persistent enquirers who 
continue to search. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
A CASE STUDY IN WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS AND 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
 
The self-proclaimed nonsensicality of the Tractatus (T §6.54) and its bearing on 
the status of its statements will be the main focus in the first section of my 
discussion in this chapter whilst the anti-doctrinal character and therapeutic nature of 
the Philosophical Investigations, as well as its dialogical structure will be the main 
concern in the second section.  
As we shall see, my thesis is that we should take Wittgenstein’s intention of 
non-assertion more seriously and thus recognize the non-assertoric status of his 
remarks in both the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations. This recognition 
can helpfully inform our understanding of the non-assertoric mode of expression 
featured in his works so that we would be in a better position to see that the 
seemingly theoretical or doctrinal remarks are not theoretical assertions or some 
stated principles on the essences of language and meaning. Following this idea, it 
can never be right to turn his non-assertoric remarks into ‘the picture theory of the 
propositions’, ‘the doctrine of showing’ or ‘the theory of meaning as rule-governed 
use’. In my discussion of other theoretical readings of the Tractatus, I also make 
clear important aspects of my non-assertoric reading whilst a full exposition of my 
reading of the Tractatus’s spirit of non-assertion is provided in section 1.2.1. For the 
Philosophical Investigations I articulate my non-assertoric reading in section 2.2. 
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1. THE TRACTATUS AND THE AIM OF ELUCIDATION 
 
I shall start with a review of some notable theoretical interpretations of the 
Tractatus and the problem of its self-proclaimed nonsensicality. My review in 
section 1.1 will show that these theoretical interpretations construe the remarks of 
the Tractatus as either: (a) theoretical statements pertaining to philosophical theories 
or doctrines, or (b) meaningless but instructive or useful propositions found in 
philosophical works. I will also show that in each case they encounter some 
problems and difficulties in ascribing theories to the Tractatus whereas my 
non-assertoric reading can avoid these problems. 
Although there are important differences between the theoretical interpretations 
that I am going to discuss in section 1.1, they have the same point of departure. They 
all share a broadly similar assertoric approach to the Tractatus insofar as they 
construe the remarks of the Tractatus as theoretical statements or assertions and 
attribute various theories and doctrines on language and meaning to Wittgenstein 
though he declares his aim of elucidation at T §6.54. 
 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me 
eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb 
up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up it.) 
He must transcend these propositions; then he will see the world aright. (T §6.54) 
 
Wittgenstein himself explicitly acknowledges the nonsensical nature of his 
remarks and he provides an immediate defence by declaring his aim of elucidation 
and thereby renouncing having constructed any theory in the Tractatus. T §6.54 is 
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among the most controversial remarks of the Tractatus. In announcing 
Wittgenstein’s elucidatory aim, it seems to overrule the rest of the remarks and 
explicitly acknowledge their nonsensicality. My discussion in section 1.1 will show 
that the interpretation of the Tractatus depends on how one interprets T §6.54. Those 
who read the Tractatus by theoretical lights and thus a work of theoretical 
philosophy generally play down or neglect the importance of the instruction at T 
§6.54. By contrast resolute readings suggest that the reader should take the 
instruction of throwing away the ‘Tractarian ladder’ more resolutely, that is, to read 
the Tractatus as a work of elucidation and since none of its remarks are meant to 
present or argue for any philosophical doctrines or theories the reader should throw 
away the remarks as plain nonsense. I discuss resolute readings as a possible way to 
understand the textual strategy of the Tractatus in section 1.2.2. 
 
1.1 The Cardinal Problem of Philosophy: The Distinction between What 
can be Said and What can only be Shown 
 
In his letter to Russell dated 13 March 1919, Wittgenstein announces the 
completion of a manuscript for his book “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”. In 
1922 the manuscript is eventually published but under Moore’s suggestion it bears a 
different title “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”. The Tractatus is the only 
philosophical book that Wittgenstein publishes during his lifetime.  
Wittgenstein has high hope that Russell would understand his work.307 In his 
letter to Russell Wittgenstein speaks of his worries that nobody will understand his 
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 Frege is on Wittgenstein’s list too. I discuss his reading of the Tractatus in section 1.2.1. 
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work and that even Russell ‘would not understand it without a previous explanation 
as it is written in quite short remarks’. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein contends that his 
work ‘is all clear as crystal’. But as things turn out Wittgenstein’s hope of being 
understood by Russell (as well as Frege) is eventually shattered. After some intense 
discussions in letter and during their meeting at The Hague in 1919, Russell remains 
suspicious of what Wittgenstein regards as the main contention in his work, that is, 
the distinction between what can be said (gesagt) and what can only be shown 
(gezeigt). Whilst for Wittgenstein, Russell can only understand what he has said 
about the general form of the proposition and logic in the Tractatus, which is only ‘a 
corollary’ to his main contention about saying and showing, which according to 
Wittgenstein, is also ‘the cardinal problem of philosophy’.308  
Ever since its publication, the cardinal problem of the Tractatus is: what has it 
shown to the reader? My following discussion will look at the answers given by 
Russell, Kenny and Fogelin. 
 
1.1.1 Russell’s Reading of the Tractatus 
 
Wittgenstein is so disappointed with Russell that he repudiates Russell’s 
introduction to the Tractatus in which Russell acclaims the Tractatus as ‘a work of 
extraordinary difficulty and importance’ and praises Wittgenstein for having 
‘constructed a theory of logic which is not at any point obviously wrong’. 
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 Russell reiterates his doubt again in his introduction to the Tractatus. See Russell 1922, 21-23. 
Ramsey, in response to the distinction, is reported to have remarked, ‘What can’t be said, can’t be 
said and it can’t be whistled either.’ 
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Nevertheless, Russell detects a fundamental tension in the Tractatus and he gives an 
account of it in his introduction. 
 
Mr Wittgenstein maintains that everything properly philosophical belongs to what can 
only be shown, to what is in common between a fact and its logical picture. It results 
from this view that nothing correct can be said in philosophy. Every philosophical 
proposition is bad grammar, and the best that we can hope to achieve by philosophical 
discussion is to lead people to see that philosophical discussion is a mistake.  
 
“Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word ‘philosophy’ must mean 
something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences.) The object 
of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an 
activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of 
philosophy is not a number of ‘philosophical propositions,’ but to make propositions 
clear. Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, 
as it were, opaque and blurred” (4.111 and 4.112). 
 
In accordance with this principle the things that have to be said in leading the reader to 
understand Mr W’s theory are all of them things which that theory itself condemns as 
meaningless. 
(Russell’s Introduction p.11) 
  
After registering ‘this proviso’, Russell sets aside the problem of the 
self-destructive nature of the remarks (or the problem of inherent nonsensicality) in 
the Tractatus and continues with his exposition of the various theories and systems 
that he finds in the Tractatus.309 
Russell cannot be completely unaware of Wittgenstein’s aim of elucidation in the 
Tractatus because it is explicitly conveyed at T §6.54. In fact the two remarks that 
Russell just quoted (T §4.111 and §4.112) clearly communicate Wittgenstein’s 
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 Russell’s introduction is concerned to expound Wittgenstein’s theory of symbolism, his theory of 
molecular propositions, his theory of the construction of truth-functions, and his theory of number.  
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unconventional conceptions on philosophy and philosophical work to which his aim 
of elucidation in the Tractatus is only a corollary.  
On my view, T §4.111 and §4.112 are indicative of Wittgenstein’s anti-doctrinal 
aim in the Tractatus. If we read the two passages more seriously as they demand, 
then it is very unlikely that we could have failed to grasp Wittgenstein’s aim to do 
away with philosophical theories or doctrines in his act of philosophizing. I 
reformulate Wittgenstein’s anti-doctrinal conception on philosophy and 
philosophical work conveyed at T §4.111 and §4.112 as follows.  
 
i. Philosophy as the logical analysis of thoughts makes propositions clear. 
ii. Philosophy as an activity of elucidation does not result in philosophical 
propositions. 
 
And most importantly: 
 
iii. A philosophical work consists of elucidations. 
 
As a result, concerning the Tractatus it follows from (iii) that 
 
iv. The Tractatus being a philosophical work consists of elucidations.310  
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 (iv) may not necessarily follow from (iii) because it is possible that the Tractatus is actually a 
theoretical work and thus not elucidatory. However, §6.54 comes to our aid as it unequivocally 
communicates the author’s aim of elucidation. 
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And concerning Wittgenstein’s own philosophical activity in the Tractatus it 
follows from (i) and (ii) that 
 
v. Wittgenstein’s activity of elucidation in the Tractatus makes certain 
propositions clear without resulting in any philosophical propositions.311  
 
Surely this inference could not have escaped the attention of Russell the great 
logician. It is very unlikely that Russell could have failed to notice Wittgenstein’s 
obvious aim of elucidation in the Tractatus when he quotes T §4.111 and §4.112. I 
believe the real problem for Russell is that because of his theoretical yearning and 
preoccupations, he could not concur or duly identify with (a) Wittgenstein’s aim of 
elucidation in the Tractatus, (b) Wittgenstein’s innovative conception of philosophy 
as the logical clarification of thoughts, and (c) Wittgenstein’s novel conception of 
philosophy as an activity of elucidation. Whilst (a) is primarily concerned with the 
Tractatus (b) and (c) would have more far-reaching implications on the 
methodology of philosophizing and philosophy per se. On my view, they are all 
corollaries to Wittgenstein’s spirit of non-assertion and if one can grasp them 
altogether one is in touch with Wittgenstein’s spirit of non-assertion.312  
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play down its importance whilst the resolute readings suggest that the reader should take §6.54 
resolutely and throw away the remarks in the Tractatus as nonsensical. I discuss resolute readings in 
section 1.2.2. 
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 I argue for my view in section 1.2. 
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Obviously Wittgenstein’s innovative conceptions are too foreign, if not 
altogether absurd, to someone like Russell who, with his theoretical yearning, is 
already too deeply occupied with his own doctrinal convictions and theoretical 
pursuits in philosophy. Therefore it is no wonder that he insists on pressing a 
theoretical reading of the remarks in the Tractatus despite his privilege to ‘a 
previous explanation’ supplied by the author on numerous occasions over the 
years.313  
I shall now suggest as a result of his own theoretical yearning for and conviction 
of a hierarchy of languages, Russell is mistrustful of Wittgenstein’s declared aim of 
elucidation in the Tractatus and he finds the distinction of saying and showing 
equally suspicious. 
In his introduction Russell makes great effort in explaining ‘the theory of 
Symbolism’ which is also known as the picture theory concerning the general form 
of proposition. In pinpointing what he takes to be ‘the most fundamental thesis of 
Mr Wittgenstein’s theory’ Russell states that it is in Wittgenstein’s ‘phraseology’ 
that logical structure can only be shown but not said or represented in language.314  
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 That should include their meeting in The Hague in 1919, Wittgenstein’s viva in 1929 in 
Cambridge and the exchanges in letter over the years. 
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 Russell’s account of the most fundamental thesis of the picture theory is as follows.  
Russell 1922, 8: ‘The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts. 
In order that a certain sentence should assert a certain fact there must, however the language may be 
constructed, be something in common between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the 
fact. 
That which has to be in common between the sentence and the fact cannot, so he contends, be itself in 
turn said in language. It can, in his phraseology, only be shown, not said, for whatever we may say 
will still need to have the same structure.’ 
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After explaining how the picture theory begins with T §2.1 Russell gives a 
preliminary general outline of the theory.315 It is in the middle of this outline that 
Russell brings up the paradox of the Tractatus. As we have seen, he sets it aside and 
continues with his more technical exposition of the various theories that he finds in 
the Tractatus. However, Russell only temporarily passes over the paradox of the 
Tractatus. 
Near the end of his introduction, he returns to the distinction of saying and 
showing and relates it to Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘the right method of teaching 
philosophy’ (T §6.53). He deems that Wittgenstein uses ‘very powerful arguments’ 
to support the idea in the Tractatus and yet he admits that on his part he still has 
hesitation in accepting this right method because of ‘the fact that after all, Mr 
Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting 
to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy 
of languages, or by some other exit.’316  
Owing to his yearning for and conviction in an ideal language Russell finds the 
idea that logical structure cannot be said but only shown unsettling. As he expresses 
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 Russell accounts of the picture theory as follows: 
Russell 1922, 10-11: ‘The fact that things have a certain relation to each other is represented by the 
fact that in the picture its elements have a certain relation to one another.  
A picture can correspond or not correspond with the fact and be accordingly true or false, but in both 
cases it shares the logical form with the fact.  
The proposition and the fact must exhibit the same logical “manifold,” and this cannot be itself 
represented since it has to be in common between the fact and the picture.’  
316
 Russell fully spells out his reservation. (See Russell 1922, 22: ‘The whole subject of ethics, for 
example, is placed by Mr Wittgenstein in the mystical, inexpressible region. Nevertheless he is 
capable of conveying his ethical opinions. His defence would be that what he calls the mystical can 
be shown, although it cannot be said. It may be that this defence is adequate, but, for my part, I 
confess that it leaves me with a certain sense of intellectual discomfort.’ 
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his own thinking: ‘there may be another language dealing with the structure of the 
first language and having itself a new structure, and that to this hierarchy of 
languages there may be no limit.’317 However he reckons that ‘Wittgenstein would 
of course reply that his whole theory is applicable unchanged to the totality of such 
languages.’ Thus it is obvious that actually Russell sees for himself the theoretical 
conviction in a hierarchy of languages is one of the principal fault lines separating 
himself and Wittgenstein. 
 
1.1.2 Kenny’s Reading of the Tractatus 
 
Kenny also gives a doctrinal reading of the Tractatus. On his view, Wittgenstein 
pursues three important tasks in the Tractatus: (i) to spell out the relationship 
between an ideal language and ordinary language, ‘(ii) to indicate how everyday 
propositions were to be analysed so as to remove their non-pictorial appearance, and 
(iii) to describe the structure of the world in so far as the nature of language revealed 
this as a precondition for the possibility of propositions’.318    
Kenny suggests that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein ‘prefaces his theory that a 
proposition is a picture with some considerations on the nature of pictures in 
general’.319 According to Kenny these considerations form a general theory of 
representation which Wittgenstein applies first to thoughts and then at a greater 
length to propositions in order to develop his picture theory of the proposition. 
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After giving a general exposition of some key notions like picture relationship 
(abbildende Beziezhung), pictorial form (Form der Abbildung), logical form and the 
relevant remarks, Kenny assembles and then discusses eight theses which, in his 
view, make up Wittgenstein’s picture theory of the proposition.320  
Kenny’s approach is broadly similar to Russell’s in that they both construe the 
remarks in the Tractatus as theoretical assertions or stated principles pertaining to 
Wittgenstein’s theories on the essences of representation and proposition. 321 
Kenny’s exposition is more sophisticated and worked out in greater detail as he has 
made great use of Wittgenstein’s other works like his Notebooks 1914-1916, and the 
Prototractatus. 
However Kenny’s interpretation suffers from some critical problems. In ascribing 
the picture theory of the proposition to Wittgenstein, Kenny’s interpretation 
attributes a fundamental inconsistency to Wittgenstein and a perplexing paradox to 
the Tractatus. Kenny’s interpretation violates a central idea of the Tractatus, that is, 
to say what cannot be said. If it is of the essence of propositions that they represent 
contingent states of affairs, and all propositions are either true or false, then what is 
necessary simply cannot be expressed in propositions. However, according to Kenny, 
                                                 
320
 Kenny 2006, 50-57. 
The eight theses are as follows. 
1) A proposition is essentially composite. 2) The elements which compose a proposition are 
correlated by human decision with elements of reality. 3) The combination of such correlated 
elements into a proposition presents – without further human intervention – a possible state of affairs. 
4) A proposition stands in an internal relation to the possible state of affairs which it presents. 5)  
This internal relationship can only be shown, it cannot be informatively stated. 6) A proposition is 
true or false in virtue of agreement or not with reality. 7) A proposition must be independent of the 
actual state of affairs which makes it true or make it false. 8) No proposition is a priori true. 
321
 Kenny also follows Russell in ascribing the metaphysical doctrine ‘logical atomism’ to 
Wittgenstein, though he is aware of the differences between the thoughts of Russell and Wittgenstein. 
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one of Wittgenstein’s important tasks in the Tractatus is ‘to describe the structure of 
the world in so far as the nature of language revealed this as a precondition for the 
possibility of propositions’. In claiming that Wittgenstein offers his remarks in the 
Tractatus as theoretical statements about the necessary features of reality and 
language, Kenny’s interpretation attributes a fundamental inconsistency to 
Wittgenstein and a perplexing paradox to the Tractatus.  
Kenny’s approach results in another inconsistency in his interpretation. In his 
discussion of the last thesis (that is ‘No proposition is a priori true.’) which, in his 
view, makes up Wittgenstein’s picture theory of the proposition, Kenny notes that 
‘all genuine propositions are contingent propositions’ and logical propositions are 
only ‘proposition’ by courtesy because they can be seen to be true from the symbols 
alone.322 In addition strictly speaking logical would-be propositions, whilst being 
tautologies, are not pictures or propositions and therefore they cannot be called 
‘true’. 323  It is therefore puzzling to see how Kenny’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s picture theory of the proposition, which states the essence of 
propositions, can fit in with the conception that no proposition is a priori true which 
he also ascribes to Wittgenstein.  
Consequently it is incumbent on Kenny to look at the status of the remarks in the 
Tractatus. Kenny notes that ‘the propositions of philosophy and of the Tractatus 
itself fall under the axe which cuts off pseudo-propositions’ and the activity of 
philosophical clarification applied to philosophical propositions, ‘it reveals them as 
nonsensical.’324 Kenny notes that there is only one way in which a proposition can 
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 Kenny draws on the Notebooks 1914-1916 (NB 21), the Prototractatus 4.44602, and the 
Tractatus 6.1-6.11 to support his exposition. 
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 Kenny 2006, 80. 
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be meaningless, namely, when the speaker fails to give meaning to a certain sign in 
the proposition and this usually happens when the speaker wants to say what can 
only be shown. According to Kenny the propositions of the Tractatus are 
meaningless because they are Wittgenstein’s attempts to say what can only be 
shown. However, Kenny believes that this does not make the meaningless 
propositions of the Tractatus useless because ‘their very failure, and the way in 
which they break down, is instructive.’ 
Kenny unhesitatingly believes that the author of the Tractatus attempts to 
communicate what can only be shown (in other words, to convey some ineffable 
truths) though he himself also knows so well about the cost involved in doing so: his 
propositions will be meaningless.325 But clearly this assumption is dubious for two 
reasons.  
Given all the problems of inconsistency caused by this assumption, it seems that 
the assumption itself should be subject to scrutiny. In other words, before one 
proceeds to read any theories or doctrines into the Tractatus, one must consider 
whether the author of the Tractatus really meant to advance theories or doctrines of 
any sort at all. 
On my view, Kenny’s doctrinal reading suffers from the critical problems that I 
have discussed. The reason that these problems arise is not because Kenny has 
messed up with some details of the general theory of representation or the picture 
theory of the proposition. Rather it is because Kenny’s approach has been trying to 
fit the Tractatus into a conception of philosophy that is itself in jeopardy, if not 
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 Hacker in his article ‘Was He Trying to Whistle it?’ holds a similar assumption as he believes that 
‘there are, according to the author of the Tractatus, ineffable truths that can be apprehended’ (Hacker 
2000, 368).  
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completely rejected, in the Tractatus. Therefore my reading suggests that we should 
refrain from imposing a theoretical conception of philosophy on the Tractatus and 
we should prioritise Wittgenstein’s anti-doctrinal conceptions on philosophy and 
philosophical work over the urge to read into any theories or doctrines in the 
Tractatus.   
 
1.1.3 Fogelin’s Reading of the Tractatus 
 
Fogelin’s approach to the Tractatus is ‘chiefly indebted’ to Russell and 
Ramsey.326 However, Fogelin’s theoretical reading is remarkable because he also 
argues that ‘Wittgenstein’s philosophy bears a close resemblance to Pyrrhonism’ 
despite the fact that ‘anti-scepticism seems to be a persistent theme from his earliest 
to his latest writings’.327 Instead of looking into Fogelin’s exposition of the various 
theories that he finds in the Tractatus, I want to go straight to his view that 
‘Wittgenstein’s philosophy bears a close resemblance to Pyrrhonism’.328 
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 Fogelin 1987, xi. 
So it is natural that Fogelin pursues a more or less theoretical reading of the Tractatus. His exposition 
shows how Wittgenstein ‘elaborates or unfolds’ his ontological atomism and then it takes on ‘the 
picture theory’. However there are two dissimilarities. First unlike Russell, Fogelin argues in his 
exposition that ‘the logic of the Tractatus is fundamentally flawed’ (See Fogelin 1987 Chapter VI.). I 
discuss the second dissimilarity in the main text. 
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 Fogelin 1987 chapter XV.  
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 In his later work, Fogelin argues that given the evidences of conflicting strains of neo-Pyrrhonian 
and non-Pyrrhonian commitments in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, it is better to read his later 
writings as ‘a constant battle between these two aspects of his thought’ or as ‘a conflict between 
doing philosophy and doing away with it’ (See Fogelin 1994). 
Fogelin is not alone in associating Wittgenstein’s philosophy with Pyrrhonism. Following Fogelin, 
David G. Stern also believes that the tension between Pyrrhonian and non-Pyrrhonian approaches to 
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 To begin with Fogelin notes that from the early Tractatus to his later work, On 
Certainty Wittgenstein offers essentially the same response to scepticism and what 
makes Wittgenstein’s philosophy an adequate response to the sceptic’s challenge 
can easily be seen within the Tractarian system. According to ‘the principles of the 
Tractatus’:  
 
Any question with a sense must have an answer which is, in principle at least, determined 
by an appeal to the contingent combination of things in the world. By its very intention, 
however, the system of sceptical challenges is non-terminating, and thus, by the 
principles of the Tractatus, must lack sense. General scepticism is nonsensical, then, just 
because it is, in principle, invulnerable.329  
 
Fogelin notes that ‘within the context of the Tractatus this “refutation” has an 
ambiguous status since, in being senseless, the sceptic’s questions are no worse off 
than Wittgenstein’s own pronouncements’. This is because it follows from ‘the 
principles of the Tractatus’ that Wittgenstein’s own pronouncements are nonsensical 
and so they are on a par with the sceptic’s questions.  
Despite his remark to set aside the question of actual influence of Pyrrhonism on 
Wittgenstein, Fogelin suggests that Wittgenstein’s defence at T §6.54, that is, the 
                                                                                                                                         
philosophy is at work in both the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations. Moreover Stern puts 
different interpretations of Wittgenstein into two groups: Pyrrhonian Wittgensteinians and 
non-Pyrrhonian interpreters. He identifies Diamond, Conant, later Baker as Pyrrhonian 
Wittgensteinians and Hacker, early Baker, Pears, Hintikka and Hintikka, von Savigny as 
non-Pyrrhonian interpreters. (See Stern 2004, Chapter Two.) I discuss Stern’s view when I conclude 
this section. 
329
 Fogelin 1987, 229. 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of sceptical doubts in his later work On Certainty is similar. Accordingly 
sceptical doubts cannot be answered because they make no sense and hence the refutation or 
dissolution of sceptical doubts involves exposing them as illusions. (See On Certainty #3, 19, 481)  
191 
 
Tractarian ladder is an allusion to both Sextus and his response to peritropic 
refutation of scepticism.330  
Fogelin suggests that Wittgenstein’s arguments against sceptical doubts do not 
bear upon Pyrrhonian scepticism at all for the simple reason that Pyrrhonian 
scepticism was ‘a critique of philosophizing and the anxieties it generates’ and the 
Pyrrhonists did not raise hyperbolic doubts against common beliefs modestly 
held.331 Fogelin believes that what makes the similarity between the positions of the 
Pyrrhonists and Wittgenstein evident is the common goal of eliminating philosophy 
as traditionally practiced.332  Fogelin suggests that ‘Wittgenstein agrees on the 
central point of ancient scepticism: philosophy is not possible as a theoretical, 
discursive, or rational discipline.’ Fogelin believes that both ‘the sceptic’s 
self-defeating claims’ and Wittgenstein’s ‘misfiring attempts to say things that can 
only be shown’ attest to the futility of philosophical reflection in the sense that ‘The 
truth of philosophical reflection, when carried to its limit, leads to paradox and 
self-refutation.’ 
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 Fogelin further believes that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein was half a sceptic and in his late 
writing he completed the journey of becoming a sceptic. 
Sluga believes that from the time of the Tractatus (§4.0031) Wittgenstein is familiar with the works 
of Mauthner. According to Sluga, because of Mauthner’s work Wittgenstein acquaints himself with 
Pyrrhonism and he borrows the ladder motif from Mauthner who, in turn, has taken it from Sextus. 
(See Sluga 1996. Sluga sketches his speculation in greater detail in Sluga 2004.) 
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Bob Plant also wants to highlight the ‘common spirit’ motivating and guiding Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and Pyrrhonism. His view is that ‘the primary concern of both Wittgenstein and the 
Pyrrhonist is not philosophical truth, but the relief of conceptual suffering.’ (See Plant 2004.)  
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Other than the common goal, Fogelin suggests that a fundamental difference 
between Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonist lies in their methods. 333 On his view, the 
Pyrrhonist’s method is external and incomplete as it does not deal with the source of 
our deep anxieties which is also the source of our drive to do philosophy.334 
However, by contrast Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophical problems is more 
internal and complete as ‘Wittgenstein’s techniques proceed from a profound 
understanding of the sources and character of philosophical perplexity’. Fogelin 
notes that Wittgenstein’s techniques can produce a more radical result.  
 
By seeing that a philosophical problem is meaningless we reach what might be called a 
suspension of concern, surely a more radical purge of our philosophical anxieties than the 
suspension of belief. 
 
Finally Fogelin concludes that regardless of how much Wittgenstein actually 
knew about Pyrrhonian scepticism and whether he revived it or rediscovered it on 
his own, his chief contribution to philosophy ‘is to free us to respond to the sceptical 
challenge by endowing it with seriousness and insight.’ 
I think Fogelin’s comparison of Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonist merits attention 
because it brings to light their common therapeutic goal of eliminating philosophy as 
traditionally practiced and the anxieties it generated. However his claim that 
Wittgenstein’s Tractarian ladder at §6.54 is an allusion to both Sextus and his 
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 Plant also suggests that we should not oversimplify the methodological particularities of both 
Wittgenstein and Pyrrhonism. (See Plant 2004.) 
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 Fogelin 1987, 234: ‘The methods of the ancient sceptics tended to be stereotyped, wooden, and 
external. Even if the various modes designed to induce the suspension of belief had this effect, they 
gave no indication of the sources of our drive to do philosophy nor did they give any explanation of 
why this drive should lead to deep anxieties.’ 
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response to peritropic refutation of scepticism lacks substance though it may sound 
fascinating.335 If Fogelin is right to suggest that both Wittgenstein and Sextus accept 
the charge that their works are self-destroying, I think it is more instructive to see 
why they do so. On my view, the problem of self-destruction causes no 
embarrassment to Wittgenstein and Sextus because their works are non-assertoric, 
that is, they do not articulate their positive theoretical positions or advance theories 
or doctrines of any sort at all. The problem of self-destruction of their works only 
attests to the futility of the kinds of theorizing and system-building found in 
metaphysical or traditional philosophy. Their non-assertoric discourses are 
anti-doctrinal as they are opposed to the kinds of assertoric theorizing and 
system-building found in metaphysical or traditional philosophy. Therefore the 
charge that their works are self-destroying are misplaced. 
Regardless of how much Wittgenstein actually knows about Pyrrhonism, it is 
obvious that the Tractatus’s self-proclaimed nonsensicality is comparable to 
Sextus’s Chronicler Disclaimer (PH 1 4) and also his allegories of ladder, fire and 
cathartic drugs (M 8 480-1) which I discussed in Chapter Three. In declaring his aim 
of elucidation Wittgenstein uses the Tractarian ladder passage to renounce having 
constructed any theory in the Tractatus; the reader should discard the Tractatus after 
using it as a ladder to ascend to the position in which he can see the world rightly. 
Sextus uses the Chronicler Disclaimer passage and the allegories of ladder, fire and 
cathartic drugs to indicate that his arguments cancel themselves and his entire work, 
including his account of Pyrrhonism are nothing more than a non-assertoric report of 
what appears to him to be the case; the reader should not take it as conveying some 
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stated principles or beliefs about Pyrrhonism or anything whatsoever. So instead of 
making speculation on the actual influence of Pyrrhonism on Wittgenstein, I want to 
make a more modest claim. I think the passage of the Tractarian ladder and the 
Chronicler Disclaimer passage embody the spirit of non-assertion in each work, that 
is, the authorial intention of not advancing theories or doctrines of any sort at all in 
their writings. In addition, the Tractarian ladder and the Chronicler Disclaimer 
passages are also illustrative of the textual strategy of the works as they provide the 
reader with some kind of reminder about their non-assertoric mode of expression. 
I agree with Fogelin’s suggestion that Wittgenstein and Sextus have a common 
therapeutic goal, and also his view that Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophical 
problems is more internal and complete than the Pyrrhonist’s as far as the source of 
our deep anxieties and our drive to do philosophy are concerned.336 However, I 
think the implication of this common therapeutic goal is somehow misrepresented. 
Following Fogelin, Stern discusses the Pyrrhonism in the Tractatus and he suggests 
that in eliminating philosophy as traditionally practised, and the anxieties that it 
generated, the critique of traditional philosophy by Wittgenstein and Sextus leads us 
not to a better philosophy but to stop philosophizing at all.337  
Stern suggests that on the non-Pyrrhonian reading of Wittgenstein, the Tractatus 
offers ‘a logico-linguistic critique of past philosophy that makes a new philosophy 
within the limits of language possible.’ 338  Accordingly the non-Pyrrhonist 
interpreters all agree that Wittgenstein aims to replace mistaken views with a quite 
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specific positive philosophical position of his own but the interpreters just do not 
agree on the details of Wittgenstein’s positive position.  
I think Stern’s characterisation of non-Pyrrhonian interpretations of Wittgenstein 
is right in principle. However, his account of the implications of the Pyrrhonism in 
the Tractatus is mistaken. Stern explains the Pyrrhonism in the Tractatus in the 
following way. 
 
Pyrrhonian Wittgensteinians (e.g. Diamond, Conant, later Baker) see Wittgenstein’s 
contribution as therapeutic, a critique of all philosophy, including his own. According to 
these interpreters, Wittgenstein aims to get us to give up all philosophical views, not to 
provide a better philosophy. On this reading, Wittgenstein offers us a form of scepticism 
that is aimed not at our everyday life, but at philosophy itself, with the aim of putting an 
end to philosophy and teaching us to get by without a replacement.339 
 
No doubt in the Tractatus Wittgenstein suggests that we should give up all the 
propositions and questions of traditional philosophy because they are senseless. 
 
Most propositions and questions, that have been written about philosophical matters, are 
not false, but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but 
only state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result 
from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. (T §4.003) 
 
Obviously in giving up all the propositions and questions of traditional 
philosophy we put an end to traditional philosophy. But this could never mean we 
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The contrast becomes less clear because, as Stern suggests on the next page: ‘most Wittgensteinians 
oscillate, or vacillate, between these views. Although they would never admit it, they want both to be 
uncompromisingly opposed to philosophical doctrine, and still to make some sense of the 
non-Pyrrhonian view that giving up traditional philosophical theories can lead us to something 
better.’ 
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end up with an impoverished philosophy or even with no philosophy unless the 
notion of philosophy and how different philosophies are evaluated must be 
conceived in terms of philosophical theorizing and system-building. Surely this can 
never be the case. 
I think both Wittgenstein and Sextus objected to dogmatic or metaphysical 
philosophy (and the kinds of assertoric theorising and system-building found in it). 
But this does not mean that they are anti-philosophy. It follows from Wittgenstein’s 
anti-doctrinal conception of philosophy (T §4.111 and §4.112) that philosophy is an 
activity of elucidation which does not result in philosophical propositions and 
philosophy as the logical clarification of thoughts makes propositions clear. 
Therefore, if we give up all the propositions and questions of traditional philosophy, 
because they are senseless, it can never mean that we are doing away with 
philosophy per se, unless we assume that dogmatic or metaphysical philosophy is 
the only legitimate form of philosophy. But surely this can never be the case. What 
we have given up is only traditional philosophy. 
On my view Wittgenstein does not provide any positive theoretical position of 
his own to replace the senseless propositions of traditional philosophy because at T 
§6.54 he renounces having constructed any theory in the Tractatus. But on the other 
hand, he does provide a replacement for traditional philosophy, that is, the new 
philosophy that he introduces and practises in the Tractatus. This new Tractarian 
philosophy takes the form of an activity of elucidation and logical clarification of 
thoughts. It is essentially anti-doctrinal and devoid of theories or doctrines of any 
sort as it repudiates the kinds of theorizing and system-building found in the 
philosophical tradition.  
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I think the new Tractarian philosophy can constitute a better philosophy in 
different ways. Firstly it can demonstrate the senselessness of the propositions and 
questions of traditional philosophy. We no longer want to say something 
metaphysical after coming to see for ourselves that these utterances are actually 
plain nonsense despite their deceptive appearance of profundity. Secondly the 
superiority of the new Tractarian philosophy can also be seen in its philosophical 
promise which Wittgenstein suggests T at §4.111 and §4.112: that is, after logical 
clarification our propositions are clear and our thoughts no longer opaque and 
blurred.  
I think, therefore, contrary to the view of Fogelin and Stern, that Wittgenstein’s 
criticism of traditional philosophy does not lead us to stop philosophizing. The result 
of his criticism of traditional philosophy should rather be this: we stop doing the 
kinds of theorizing and system-building usually found in the philosophical tradition; 
we start doing philosophy as the logical clarification of thoughts which makes 
propositions and thoughts clear without generating new philosophical propositions.  
The goal of eliminating philosophy as traditionally practised and the anxieties it 
generated is clearly represented in the works of Sextus. The Pyrrhonist does not aim 
at bringing philosophy to an end; he is still investigating (PH 1 4, 7). He only aims 
at containing and, ideally, stopping dogmatizing in philosophy (PH 1 12).  
On my view, we need to give up not just the propositions and questions of 
traditional philosophy in order to give up the theoretical conception of philosophy. 
We also need to abandon the problematic assumption that theoretical philosophy is 
the only legitimate form of philosophy. As I have argued in my discussion of 
Russell’s reading of the Tractatus, unless we can abandon or at least detach 
ourselves temporarily from the traditional conception of philosophy as 
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system-building and assertoric theorizing, we can never appreciate or identify with 
Wittgenstein’s novel conception of philosophy: a philosophy that does not result in 
doctrines.  
 
1.2. The Spirit of Non-Assertion and the Textual Strategy of the Tractatus  
 
Although the passage of the Tractarian ladder at T §6.54 provides a helpful 
reminder of the elucidatory aim of the Tractatus its importance has been played 
down by many theoretical readings. However things started to change when some 
interpreters, most notably Cora Diamond and James Conant, proposed that we 
should take the elucidatory calling of T §6.54 at face value. This particular line of 
anti-doctrinal interpretation is marked by an unprecedented emphasis on 
Wittgenstein’s therapeutic aim in the Tractatus. A resolute way of reading the 
Tractatus would require the reader to throw away its propositions as nonsense 
because it follows from T §6.54 that none of its propositions are meant to present or 
argue for any philosophical doctrines or theories.340 Before I discuss the resolute 
readings of Diamond and Conant as a possible way to understand the textual 
strategy of the Tractatus in section 1.2.2, I want to visit Frege’s reading of the 
Tractatus in order to illustrate how the spirit of non-assertion is embodied in the 
Tractatus.  
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are nonsense because T §6.54 does not say all the propositions in the Tractatus bear the elucidatory 
burden and T 4.112 does not say a philosophical work consists entirely of elucidation. 
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1.2.1 Frege’s reading of the Tractatus: Form over Content? 
 
I think in contrast with Russell Frege arguably has at least some faint awareness 
of Wittgenstein’s spirit of non-assertion in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein holds Frege 
in high regard and he earnestly sends his manuscript to Frege for his opinion. 
However, Frege finds Wittgenstein’s work unclear to him and he makes the 
following remark to Wittgenstein.  
 
The pleasure of reading your book can therefore no longer be aroused by the content 
which is already known, but only by the peculiar form given to it by the author. The book 
thereby becomes an artistic rather than a scientific achievement; what is said in it takes 
second place to the way in which it is said.341 
 
In the foreword to the Tractatus Wittgenstein declares that the object of his book 
‘would be attained if it afforded pleasure to one who read it with understanding’. 
Before this he also announces that his work ‘will perhaps only be understood by 
those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it-
—or similar thoughts’ and so he announces that his work ‘is therefore not a 
text-book’. I think the object of the Tractatus as declared in the foreword is 
unequivocally descriptive of its spirit of non-assertion.  
I think with this objective the Tractatus clearly distinguishes itself as completely 
different from the assertoric kinds of theorising and system-building usually found 
in traditional philosophical discourse and I think this is how Wittgenstein conceives 
of his own work. For the Tractatus to be a non-assertoric discourse the pleasure of 
reading it cannot be brought by the content (because the reader has already thought 
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the thoughts which are expressed in it). Instead the pleasure of reading the Tractatus 
as a non-assertoric discourse is brought by the appreciation of ‘the peculiar form 
given to it by the author’.  
Frege’s remark is obviously referring to the object of the Tractatus, namely to 
afford pleasure to someone who reads it with understanding. He draws the 
conclusion that the Tractatus becomes an artistic achievement and what is said in it 
takes second place to the way in which it is said.342 I think Frege’s conclusion 
touches on an important upshot of the Tractatus’s spirit of non-assertion, namely the 
important characteristic that its form precedes its content. Frege has a glimpse of the 
significance of ‘the peculiar form’ of presentation in the Tractatus but he finds it 
rather unsatisfactory because after all, he is more concerned with content of 
philosophical work. But at any rate, I think Frege stands closer to understanding 
Wittgenstein than he may himself be aware. But unfortunately, he could not align 
his reading of the Tractatus with his recognition that the Tractatus’s form precedes 
its content. Therefore, like Russell, he fails to understand Wittgenstein and his work. 
In an important sense, the foreword and the conclusion of the Tractatus not only 
describe but actually contain its spirit of non-assertion. We should recall the last 
statement of the Tractatus: ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.’ 
(T §7) Other than the conclusion, this statement also appears in the foreword. 
Wittgenstein explains to Ficker, his prospective publisher, that he may not be able to 
understand his work because the content will be strange to him. However, 
Wittgenstein assures Ficker that the foreword and the conclusion of the Tractatus 
are illuminative of the nature of his work and above all, the criterion for what it 
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would be for the general readers to understand his work. 343  The key that 
Wittgenstein releases in his letter is the suggestion that the manuscript forms only 
the written part of his work and there is a second part which puts everything firmly 
in place by being silent whilst many others ‘are just babbling’. 
 On my view, the Tractatus’s spirit of non-assertion is also embodied in its 
‘peculiar form’ of presentation and its intended shortness. The Tractatus gives the 
appearance of a set of remarks organized by a rigid numbering system.344 Ogden 
calls this ‘the peculiar literary character’ in his Translator’s Note. However, for 
Wittgenstein the function of the numbering system is very crucial as he explains 
earlier to Ficker, ‘they alone give the book lucidity and clarity and it would be an 
incomprehensible jumble without them’.345  
In his preparation for a bilingual publication of the Tractatus, Ogden is hindered 
by its obscurity despite Wittgenstein’s collaboration. Knowing that Wittgenstein has 
withheld some supplementary passages that would make the book more accessible, 
he proposes to Wittgenstein that the supplementary passages should be published for 
the convenience of the reader. But Wittgenstein rejects this proposal. In his reply to 
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 In his letter to Ficker, Wittgenstein writes ‘The book’s point is an ethical one. I once meant to 
include in the foreword a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you 
here, because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My 
work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely 
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inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing these limits. In 
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that it is said in the book. For now, I would recommend to you to read the foreword and the 
conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the book.’ 
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 On the significance of the numbering system in the Tractatus see Mayer 1990. 
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 Letter to Ludwig von Ficker 97. 
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Ogden, Wittgenstein explains that he does not want to make up for the book’s 
shortness as he thinks adding those supplements would disrupt the spirit of the book. 
In another letter to Ficker Wittgenstein explains the reason for the shortness of his 
work. 
 
 ‘this presentation is extremely compressed since I have only retained in it that which 
really occurred to me – and how it occurred to me.’346  
 
So the shortness of the Tractatus is indeed an intended merit for Wittgenstein 
because it helps preserve the spirit in its purest form. And this is crucial to the 
elucidatory aim of the Tractatus. According to his reply to Ogden’s request for the 
supplements, adding those supplements would disrupt the spirit of the work because 
 
‘The supplements are exactly what must not be printed… THEY REALLY CONTAIN NO 
ELUCIDATION AT ALL…’ 
 
Unfortunately whist for Wittgenstein the intended shortness of the Tractatus is a 
merit, those who prefer to read the Tractatus by theoretical lights see the shortness 
as a weakness if not a vice of the work. In response to the shortness those who prefer 
to read the Tractatus by theoretical lights usually attempt to reconstruct the text into 
various arguments for ‘the picture theory of the propositions’, or ‘the doctrine of 
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 Monk 1991, 177. 
We should recall here that when he introduces his work to Russell, Wittgenstein announces that, ‘it’s 
written in quite short remarks’ and that unless ‘a previous explanation’ is given Russell would not be 
able to understand his work. Nonetheless Wittgenstein believes that his short remarks are ‘as clear as 
crystal’. 
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showing’ which are ascribed to Wittgenstein. 347  But I have argued that this 
approach overlooks (a) Wittgenstein’s aim of elucidation in the Tractatus, (b) his 
innovative conception of philosophy as the logical clarification of thoughts, and (c) 
his novel conception of philosophy as an activity of elucidation, which are all 
corollaries to Wittgenstein’s spirit of non-assertion in the Tractatus. 
To sum up, the urge to get rid of doctrines is a fundamental cause that shapes the 
works of Wittgenstein and his conceptions of methodology in philosophy. This 
anti-doctrinal character while being an essential feature of his conception of 
philosophy in the Tractatus also prevails in the Philosophical Investigations. My 
discussion of this aspect of the Philosophical Investigations is offered in section 2.   
 
1.2.2 Resolute Readings of the Tractatus  
 
My non-assertoric reading has much in common with Diamond’s proposal of a 
resolute way of reading the Tractatus as it holds on to Wittgenstein’s ‘insistence that 
he is not putting forward philosophical doctrines or theses’ and also ‘his suggestion 
that it cannot be done’.348 According to Diamond, 
 
there is almost nothing in Wittgenstein which is of value and which can be grasped if it is 
pulled away from that view of philosophy. But that view of philosophy is itself 
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 This approach of reconstruction can easily lead to the fallacy of straw man in the interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s works. In this regard, Fogelin has a good point to make. As he notes, ‘Wittgenstein’s 
writing is often obscure and the text is surprisingly lacking in explicit arguments for one to evaluate.’ 
Therefore on his part, he has ‘resisted the temptation of reconstructing the text into an 
argument—especially when this is done as a prelude to showing that the argument is no good.’ See 
Fogelin 1987, xi. 
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 Diamond 1995, 179. 
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something that has to be seen first in the Tractatus if it is to be understood in its later 
forms.  
  
Following this conception, abandoning the Tractarian system is the only 
legitimate response for anyone who understands the author of the Tractatus.349 On 
Diamond’s view, to read the Tractatus as conveying the ineffable truth that there are 
indeed some features of reality, like the logical form of reality, the ethical, religious 
or mystical, that cannot be expressed in words but can be shown is ‘chickening out’ 
because in holding on to this doctrinal reading the reader has failed to follow the 
instruction at T §6.54 and also failed ‘to take seriously what Wittgenstein says about 
philosophy itself’.350 
Instead, the reader should throw away the notion that there are features of reality 
that cannot be put into words but show themselves because according to Diamond, it 
is not Wittgenstein’s view.351 His view is rather that the notion of something true of 
reality but not sayably true may be useful as ‘a very odd kind of figurative language’ 
employed during the activity of elucidation but it is to be used only with the 
awareness that at the end of elucidation it itself belongs to plain nonsense and should 
thus be thrown away. 
In addition, Conant also believes that the aim of the Tractatus ‘is to show us that 
beyond “the limits of language” lies, not ineffable truth, but rather (as the preface 
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 Diamond stresses on the point that at §6.54 Wittgenstein asks his reader to understand him as 
opposed to understanding his propositions in the Tractatus. See Diamond 1995 and also 
Diamond1991. 
350
 Diamond 1995, 181-182. 
351
 Diamond believes that Wittgenstein himself does not chicken out in the Tractatus. In other words 
he does not advance the view that there are features of reality that cannot be put into words but show 
themselves.  
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cautions) einfach Unsinn.’352 According to Conant, a resolute way of reading the 
Tractatus does not give a unitary reading of the work because a resolute reading is 
better thought of as a program for reading and it does not comprise a reading.353 
Following this conception, a resolute reading, as a program, leaves out the question 
about how the Tractatus ought to be read in detail unanswered. Instead it only gives 
‘a certain programmatic conception of the lines along which those details are to be 
worked out’. 
Moreover according to Conant the elucidatory activity of the Tractatus can take 
off because of its elucidatory strategy. For the reader to begin ascending the 
Tractarian ladder he must yield to some of the temptations of its propositions in the 
first place.  Therefore many of its sentences are intended to tempt the reader to 
accept them as ‘philosophical illuminating nonsense’, that is, a special kind of 
nonsense which can somehow convey insight by showing what cannot be said.354 
But eventually at the end of elucidation the reader must throw away what once 
appears to be illuminating nonsense as plain nonsense. On Conant’s view, if the 
Tractatus succeeds in its aim of elucidation, what is to happen in the reader’s 
subjective experience is that: 
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 Conant 2002, 424. 
In other words, no one, not even the author of the Tractatus can use language to get outside language.  
353
 See Conant 2006 and also Conant and Diamond 2004. 
354
 Conant 2002, 420-424. 
According to Conant, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein is opposed to the distinction between 
philosophically illuminating nonsense and misleading nonsense (or substantial nonsense and mere 
nonsense) because for him there is only one kind of nonsense which does not mean or show anything. 
Given the Tractatus’s ‘austere conception of conception’, it can never be right for the standard 
reading or the ineffability reading to support their doctrinal reading of the Tractatus with this 
distinction. 
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First I grasp that there is something that must be; then I see that it cannot be said; then I 
grasp that if it cannot be said it cannot be thought (that the limits of language are the 
limits of thought); and then, finally, when I reach the top of the ladder, I grasp that there 
has been no “it” in my grasp all along (that that which I cannot think I cannot “grasp” 
either).355  
 
But unfortunately, by contrast, the reader of standard or ineffability interpretation 
holds on the distinction between illuminating nonsense and misleading nonsense and 
goes on to communicate what cannot be said under the guise of only showing it.  
Finally I want to discuss Wittgenstein’s elucidatory use of language as an 
instance of non-assertoric mode of expression and how this non-assertoric use of 
language can serve the aim of elucidation in the Tractatus.  
According to Conant the early Wittgenstein already recognizes that language can 
be put to different kinds of use: constative and non-constative.356 The first category 
is also the assertoric employment of language in which language is used to state 
what is the case. The second category is non-assertoric and it consists of elucidatory 
and ethical employments of language.357 Strictly speaking, elucidatory uses of 
language are not employments of language per se but rather employments of 
language-like structures. In elucidatory uses of language, an apparently assertoric 
use of language is revealed as illusory. Conant suggests that  
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 Conant 2002, 422. 
356
 Conant suggests that to understand the Tractatus we need to ‘distinguish the different sorts of 
things one can do with language over and above putting it to the use of saying something.’ (Conant 
2002, 382 and 429 footnote 24.) 
357
 Conant believes that a proper understanding of what comprises an ethical use of language for 
Wittgenstein is indispensable for understanding his claim that ‘the point of the Tractatus is ethical’. 
(Conant 2002, 429 footnote 26) 
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In order for a reader to pass through the first four stages of ascent up this Tractarian 
ladder, he must take himself to be participating in the traditional philosophical activity of 
argument, to be inferring conclusions from premises… 
 
A reader of the Tractatus only ascends to the final rung of the ladder when he is able to 
look back upon his progress upward and “recognize” that he has only been going through 
the motions of “inferring” (apparent) “conclusions” from (apparent) “premises”. Thus the 
elucidatory strategy of the Tractatus depends on the reader’s provisionally taking himself 
to be participating in the traditional philosophical activity of establishing theses through a 
procedure of reasoned argument; but it only succeeds if the reader fully comes to 
understand what the work means to say about itself when it says that philosophy, as this 
work seeks to practice it, results not in doctrine but in elucidations.358   
 
Conant also suggests that not all propositions in the Tractatus are to be 
recognized as nonsensical because the Tractatus, being a philosophical work, does 
not have to consist entirely of elucidations and above all, the activity of elucidation 
needs a certain framework to take place.359 Therefore some sentences serve as 
elucidations and they should be recognized as unsinn at the end of elucidation. The 
second category being ‘the frame of the work’ ‘offering instructions for how the 
work is to be read’ should be recognized as sinnvoll. Conant identifies the foreword, 
§4.112, §6.54 and a few others as belonging to the second category. Moreover, it is a 
function of how a sentence occurs in the work that determines whether it belongs to 
the first category or the second category. 
On my view, Wittgenstein’s propositions in the Tractatus convey an illusion of 
sense as they appear to be seemingly assertoric employment of language pertaining 
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 According to Conant, ‘The aim of the passage [i.e. §6.54] is (not to propose a single 
all-encompassing category into which the diverse sorts of propositions that comprise the work are all 
to be shoehorned, but rather) to explicate how those passages of the work that succeed in bearing its 
elucidatory burden are meant to work their medicine on the reader.’ (Conant 2002, 457-458 footnote 
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to philosophical theories on the essence of language. The form and even the tone of 
his propositions are reminiscent of assertoric pronouncement on the essence of 
language. But near the end of the Tractatus §6.54 reveals to the reader its aim of 
elucidation and that the mode of expression is actually non-assertoric. This 
non-assertoric use of language is very important in serving the elucidatory strategy 
and the aim of elucidation so that Wittgenstein can renounce having advanced theses 
or doctrines of any sort at all in the Tractatus.  
I think Sextus’s writing is a parallel case to the Tractatus in that both comprise 
the non-assertoric mode of expression. In Sextus’s case, he employs an apparently 
descriptive use of language to say a lot of things in his writing but all his sentences 
give only the illusory appearance of representing certain state of affairs. Conant 
suggests that the Tractatus consists of two categories of sentences; some serve as 
elucidations and some don’t. I think Sextus’s sentences, including the Chronicler 
disclaimer passage, falls to one category only. They are all arguments that he can 
use to bring about equipollence of arguments in the topics they concerned.   
Finally I want to discuss some methodological particularities of Wittgenstein and 
Sextus. As we have seen, Fogelin suggests that insofar as the source of our deep 
anxieties and our drive to do philosophy are concerned the Pyrrhonist’s method is 
external and incomplete whereas Wittgenstein’s critique is more internal and 
complete. 
On my view, Sextus’s therapeutic use of argument can also be characterised as 
internal in the sense that he must attend to the patient’s antecedent beliefs and make 
sure that his remedy can target these antecedent beliefs so that his treatment of belief 
can produce the ultimate effect of belief cancellation. Sextus’s use of ad hominem 
argumentation is ideal in this regard because in turning dogmatic positions or 
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premises against themselves he can show that these positions or premises are not 
trustworthy or even fallacious by their own standards. Sextus does not have to 
advance his own premises and positions to argue against the dogmatists and this can 
save him from the rebuttal of self-refutation or inconsistency.360  
If Sextus’s ad hominem argumentation should succeed, the patients would no 
longer want to hold on to their dogmatic beliefs. Therefore, Sextus’s treatment of 
belief is a process of belief cancellation from the inside. However, there is the 
danger of relapse into dogmatic beliefs. In view of this danger, Sextus repeatedly 
stresses the feature of self-cancellation in the allegories of ladder, fire and cathartic 
drugs. The basic idea is that his arguments do to themselves what they do to others, 
that is, they expel themselves after taking out the dogmatic arguments. This is a 
good strategy because his therapeutic treatment of belief only aims at the 
cancellation of belief. So in undoing or deconstructing dogmatic beliefs, Sextus’s 
treatment of beliefs does not intend to provide the patients with a set of better 
beliefs.  
 To conclude my discussion of the Tractatus, I have argued that because of his 
own theoretical yearning and preoccupations Russell cannot identify with 
Wittgenstein’s aim of elucidation in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein’s anti-doctrinal 
conceptions of philosophy and philosophical work are also too remote to Russell. I 
have argued that in ascribing theories on the essence of language to Wittgenstein 
Kenny’s interpretation suffers from critical problems and what must go is his 
problematic assumption that Wittgenstein attempts to use language to communicate 
what can only be shown. I have argued that Wittgenstein’s critique of theoretical 
                                                 
360
 Of course Sextus’s may misrepresent his dogmatic premises and positions in his ad hominem 
argumentation. But in principal the style of ad hominem argumentation is internal.  
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philosophy does not lead us to stop philosophizing because we are introduced to an 
alternative, that is, the new Tractarian philosophy that does not result in 
philosophical assertions and system-building.  
My non-assertoric reading can be regarded as a resolute way of reading the 
Tractatus as it accords mostly with other resolute readings. For instance, my 
non-assertoric reading places much emphasis on §6.54, §4.112, and the foreword in 
discerning the spirit of non-assertion and the non-assertoric mode of expression in 
the Tractatus. In Conant’s resolute reading, these passages are the frame of the 
Tractatus, making the elucidation possible.  
Secondly like other resolute readings, my non-assertoric reading also leaves the 
question about how the Tractatus ought to be read in detail unanswered; hence it 
does not comprise a reading of the Tractatus. Instead of promising a coherent 
overall reading my non-assertoric reading proposes an interpretation of the Tractatus 
in which the status of its statements is revealed as non-assertoric though some of the 
statements may appear to be philosophical pronouncements on the essence of 
language. In Conant’s resolute reading, Wittgenstein’ use of language is elucidatory, 
a non-constative kind of use of language that employs language-like structures to 
create an illusion of sense.  
Thirdly, like other resolute readings, my non-assertoric reading looks into how 
the form is important to its aim, and also how its employment of language can serve 
the aim of elucidation. The merit of my approach lies in holding on to 
Wittgenstein’s anti-doctrinal conception of philosophy as a proper point of departure 
in understanding the Tractatus. As one way of approaching the ambiguous status of 
its statements and the tension brought by its self-proclaimed nonsensicality my 
non-assertoric reading of the Tractatus fares better than the theoretical readings that 
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I have discussed. Finally I have argued that Sextus’s non-assertoric discourse is a 
parallel case to the Tractatus as they have much in common in the elimination of 
philosophical theories and doctrines, and also in their distinctive non-assertoric 
employment of language to serve their therapeutic aims. 
 
2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
 
Wittgenstein indicated his dislike for the Socratic type of dialogue in Culture and 
Value.361 However it is a very widespread impression among commentators that 
arguably many parts of the Philosophical Investigations are written as dialogue 
between unnamed interlocutors. For instance Jane Heal notes that the writing of 
dialogues becomes a prominent feature of Wittgenstein’s writing especially in the 
Philosophical Investigations, while occasional passage of dialogue can be found in 
his other later writings.362 Secondly referring to the Philosophical Investigations, 
David G. Stern writes that ‘there certainly is good reason to read the book as 
belonging to the familiar philosophical genre of the dialogue.’363 Stern notes that 
the Philosophical Investigations is ‘in large part made up of Socratic dialogues’ as 
Wittgenstein ‘makes liberal use of both the basic devices of Socratic dialogue: 
syncrisis – a debate between opposed viewpoints on a given topic – and anacrisis – 
forcing an interlocutor to express his opinion thoroughly and subjecting it to critical 
                                                 
361
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362
 Heal 1995. 
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 Stern 2004 (See especially 21-28). 
As my discussion will show, Stern and Heal have very different views on the nature of the dialogue 
found in the Philosophical Investigations. 
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appraisal.’364 Finally in his discussion of ‘the difficulty of writing about philosophy 
as practised by someone who uses the Socratic method’ Mark W. Rowe argues that 
‘Wittgenstein was directly influenced by the literary solution Plato adopted’.365 
Rowe’s conclusion is that ‘Plato decided that the written dialogue was the best way 
to convey Socrates’ philosophical spirit. And Wittgenstein, under Plato’s influence, 
decided it was the best way to convey his own.’366 My following discussion will 
first look at some difficulties and complexities concerning the extent and nature of 
the dialogue form in the Philosophical Investigations. My discussion will show that 
because of ambiguity of voices some stretches of text in the work can be read 
simultaneously as external dialogue between different voices as well as a 
representation of Wittgenstein’s interior flow of thinking. 
 
2.1.1 Dialogue in the Philosophical Investigations 
 
On Heal’s reading the Philosophical Investigations is a special kind of dialogue 
although its dialogue element is characterised by obliqueness and ambiguity.367 
These features reflect the fact that, unlike Plato’s philosophical dialogues, which are 
like philosophical play scripts, Wittgenstein’s script does not feature named 
characters. Secondly, there is no uniform syntactic device (such as dashes or 
inverted commas) that signals the beginning and end of parts in the dialogue. Like 
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of philosophical method between Wittgenstein and Socrates. 
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 Heal 1995. 
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many readers, Heal has the strong impression that in the Philosophical 
Investigations ‘from time to time, a voice other than Wittgenstein speaks, i.e. that 
some thought other than one endorsed by Wittgenstein himself is being 
expressed’. 368  Since the Philosophical Investigations is a dialogue between 
Wittgenstein and his interlocutor, we need to distinguish the voice of Wittgenstein 
from the voice of his interlocutor by attending to the content and context of every 
remark.  
To validate her ideas Heal undertakes a textual analysis of three familiar passages 
from the Philosophical Investigations.369 She first deals with the absence of named 
characters. 
 
146. a Suppose I ask: ‘Has he understood the system when he continues the series to the 
hundredth place?’ Or – if I should not speak of ‘understanding’ in connection with our 
primitive language game: Has he got the system, if he continues the series correctly so 
far? – b Perhaps you will say here: to have got the system (or, again, to understand it) 
can’t consist in continuing the series up to this or that number: that is only applying one’s 
understanding. The understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use. 
c What is one really thinking of here? Isn’t one thinking of the derivation of a series from 
its algebraic formula? Or at least of something analogous? – d But this is where we were 
before. The point is we can think of more than one application of an algebraic formula; 
and every type of application can in turn be formulated algebraically; but naturally this 
does not get us any further. – The application is still a criterion of understanding.  
147. e ‘But how can it be? When I say I understand the rule of a series, I am surely not 
saying so because I have found out that up to now I have applied the algebraic formula in 
such-and-such a way! In my own case at all events I sure know that I mean 
such-and-such a series; it doesn’t matter how far I have actually developed it.’ –  
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 Heal 1995, 68. 
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 As we shall see, Heal analyses a very small number of specimens (PI §§146-147, 208-211, and 
258; altogether 7 specimens). She anticipates that those who widely read in the corpus of 
Wittgenstein will agree with her view despite the limited specimens and lack of statistics. 
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f Your idea, then, is that you know the application of the rule of the series quite apart 
from remembering actual applications to particular numbers. g And you will perhaps say: 
‘Of course! For the series is infinite and the bit of it that I can have developed finite.’ 
(Heal 1995, 64-65. Heal inserted the letters for ease of reference.) 
 
Heals finds a central clue to help resolve the absence of named characters in this 
first specimen. She notes that in §146-7 Wittgenstein explicitly assigns two remarks, 
namely b and g, to his interlocutor who is addressed as ‘you’; and this interlocutor 
speaks again in the protest put in quotation marks at e. On Heal’s view, the question 
at a and the interrogative sentence at c are both overtly flagged as being uttered in 
Wittgenstein’s own voice, and Wittgenstein himself makes some move of his own, 
at d, in response to his own question.370 Finally at f Wittgenstein comments on his 
interlocutor’s protest given at e.  
Heal suggests that it would be a mistake to take the use of interrogatives as 
evidence of dialogue throughout the writing.371 The use of interrogatives can be part 
of a dialogue (in which case the question is directed at the interlocutor). But it could 
also represent the flow of Wittgenstein’s own ideas (as a self-addressed question). 
Hence Heal believes that the use of interrogatives is not in itself any indication of 
the presence of a real and independent interlocutor.  
In addition, Heal warns of the danger of taking every stretch of text to be either (a) 
interior debate or (b) real external dialogue, because some stretches can be read in 
either way.372 Moreover the thoughts that Wittgenstein puts in the voice of his 
interlocutor could equally have figured in an interior debate in Wittgenstein’s own 
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current thinking or a debate with his own thoughts at some earlier stage. As shown 
in §146-7 even when Wittgenstein no longer found a certain thought compelling, he 
still often recognizes and is tempted by the impulse that finds expression in such 
thoughts. Therefore Heal concludes that we need to look in every case and judge by 
the context and the general feeling of the passage to see whether it is the other or 
Wittgenstein himself who poses the question or offers a certain answer, and in doing 
so we can distinguish the voice of the interlocutor from the present or earlier voice 
of Wittgenstein, despite the absence of named characters. 
In her second set of specimens, Heal considers some difficulties caused by 
Wittgenstein’s inconsistent use of punctuation marks.  
 
208… 
h We should distinguish between the ‘and so on’ which is, and the ‘and so on’ which is 
not, an abbreviated notation. ‘And so on ad inf.’ is not such an abbreviation. The fact that 
we cannot write down all the digits of pi is not a human shortcoming, as mathematicians 
sometimes think.  
Teaching which is not meant to apply to anything but the examples given is different 
from that which ‘points beyond’ them. 
209. i ‘But then doesn’t our understanding reach beyond all the examples?’ – j A very 
queer expression, and a quite natural one! –  
k But is that all? Isn’t there a deeper explanation: or mustn’t at least the understanding of 
the explanation be deeper? – l Well, have I myself a deeper understanding? Have I got 
more than I give in the explanation? – But then, whence the feeling that I have got more? 
Is it like the case where I interpret what is not limited as a length that reaches beyond 
every length? 
210. m ‘But do you really explain to the other person what you yourself understand? 
Don’t you get him to guess the essential thing? You give him examples, – but he has to 
guess their drift, to guess your intention.’ – n Every explanation which I can give myself 
I give to him too. – ‘He guesses what I intend’ would mean: various interpretations of my 
explanation come to his mind, and he lights on one of them. So in this case he could ask; 
and I could and should answer him.  
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211. o How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by himself – whatever 
instruction you give him? – p Well, how do I know? – If that means ‘Have I reasons?’ the 
answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons.  
(Heal 1995, 65-66. Heal inserted the letters for ease of reference.) 
 
Heal thinks that Wittgenstein speaks directly at h, the interlocutor raises a 
question at i and Wittgenstein makes a brief comment at j in response to the 
interlocutor’s question.373 But then the passages at k and o pose some difficulties. 
To judge by content, since l is a counter question to k it seems plausible to assign 
both k and o to the interlocutor. But on the other hand, the use of quotation marks 
seems to suggest otherwise. It is obvious that the interlocutor speaks at i and m and 
they are both explicitly set off with quotation marks. There are no quotation marks 
in k and o.  
Heal believes that this difficulty can be resolved easily. She notes that at §146a 
Wittgenstein poses his own questions first using quotation marks and then simply a 
colon. Therefore, Heal concludes that Wittgenstein’s use of punctuation is not 
entirely consistent and thus it is plausible to assign both k and o to the interlocutor. 
Heal’s textual analysis seems to show that once again, we can judge by the context 
and general feeling of the passage to see whether it is the interlocutor or 
Wittgenstein himself who speaks. 
Heal’s final specimen illustrates some further intriguing possibilities.  
 
258. q Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a 
certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign ‘S’ and write this sign in a 
calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. – I will remark first of all that a 
definition cannot be formulated. – r But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive 
definition. – s How? Can I point to the sensation? t Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, 
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or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation – 
and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. – u But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it 
seems to be. A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. – v Well, that is 
done precisely by the concentration of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself 
the connexion between the sign and the sensation. – w But ‘I impress it on myself’ can 
only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. 
But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever 
is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about 
‘right’. 
(Heal 1995, 66. Heal inserted the letters for ease of reference.) 
 
Heal notes that the natural impulse to assign r, t and v to the interlocutor does not 
square with ‘the fact that ‘I’ occurs throughout where ‘you’ would seem to be 
required’ by such construal.374 Another option is to construe §258 as an instance of 
internal dialogue so that it is Wittgenstein himself who speaks at r, t and v. But Heal 
believes that this is equally unconvincing. This is because such construal is at odds 
with the denouement of §258. Secondly throughout the Philosophical Investigations 
Wittgenstein presents himself as having succeeded in abandoning the false pictures 
which motivate the views expressed in r, t and v.  
Therefore Heal suggests that another possible way of seeing the relation of the 
remarks is to construe §258 as initiating a particular enterprise in which the reader 
becomes the interlocutor, who expresses at r, t and v her views of how the project of 
diary keeping would go in her own case, supposing she were to undertake the 
project. Heal believes that in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein’s 
interlocutor ‘is whoever is addressed as ‘you’ and is the other part of the ‘we’’, and 
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this interlocutor is to be played the reader who is reading the book and is willing to 
enter the exchange with Wittgenstein.375  
Heal’s discussion helpfully draws out some difficulties and complexities 
concerning the extent and nature of the dialogue form in the Philosophical 
Investigations. I completely agree with her analysis that although the dialogue 
element in the Philosophical Investigations is characterised by features that she 
notes,  of obliqueness and ambiguity, it is entirely apt to consider the Philosophical 
Investigations as a dialogue, albeit a very special kind of dialogue. In general I also 
agree with her views that Wittgenstein’s particular way of writing in the 
Philosophical Investigations is not ‘an unnecessary and regrettable obfuscation’ and 
that the dialogue form is wholly appropriate for Wittgenstein.  
But the agreement only makes it more urgent to clarify what purpose 
Wittgenstein’s particular way of using the dialogue form is intended to serve. Heal 
believes that the dialogue form is appropriate for Wittgenstein as ‘his procedure is 
designed to provide and does provide the reader, precisely through the dialogue 
form, with a rational route to an end point which is properly thought of as a better 
understanding or insight into how things are’.376 I do not share Heal’s view. My 
concern is that Heal’s approach seems to encourage a doctrinal reading of 
Wittgenstein’s reminders in the Philosophical Investigations. My thesis is that 
Wittgenstein’s reminders are non-assertoric; he does not offer them as theoretical 
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 Heal 1995, 72-3. 
376
 Heal 1995, 63. 
In the next section, 2.1.2, I present Heal’s account and I will follow up Heal’s vague talk of ‘an end 
point which is properly thought of as a better understanding or insight into how things are’. Heal’s 
discussion is full of such vague notions and phrases. I will try to work out what they could have 
meant. 
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assertions on the essences of language and meaning. Therefore it can never be right 
to turn his remarks into doctrines or theories of language and meaning. In the 
preface to the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein explains that his work is 
‘just an album’ of his ‘loosely connected remarks’, which are only ‘half-way decent’ 
and being ‘sketches of landscapes’ the reminders ‘give the viewer an idea of the 
landscape’. He does not say that his reminders are perfect and give a definitive 
overview of the landscape. He makes it clear that he wants his work ‘to bring light 
into one brain or another’. But he does not mean that we should take his ‘half-way 
decent’ reminders as providing the ultimate truth, the right stance to language or a 
definitive picture of meaning like a philosophical thesis. He announces that he does 
not want his writing ‘to spare other people the trouble of thinking’; instead he hopes 
that it should ‘stimulate someone to thoughts of his own’. 
On Heal’s view the dialogue form ‘is particularly appropriate as a vehicle for the 
intended content’, and we can ‘re-express ‘Wittgenstein’s arguments’ or 
‘Wittgenstein’s views’ in a more standard academic manner’.377 Heal’s inkling of a 
reconstruction of the Philosophical Investigations in terms of conventionally 
organized argumentative solutions and conclusions to philosophical problems raises 
another issue. Such reconstruction seems to depend on the problematic assumption 
that since the exchanges in the Philosophical Investigations take the form of a 
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 Heal further believes that ‘we need not be locked into an outlook which thinks that use of 
conventional expository forms is betrayal of Wittgenstein, or a betrayal of lack of understanding of 
him’ (Heal 1995, 63-64). 
Reconstructing W’s views and arguments in a more standard academic manner would require one to 
represent Wittgenstein’s views ‘via a straight-forward exposition, stating his premises, trying to make 
explicit the false presuppositions of those he disagrees with, proceeding through matters in an orderly 
way and generally making everything as clear and as easy to follow as the difficulty of the subject 
matter admits’ (Heal 1995, 74). 
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debate between two voices which speak of opposing views, once we can distinguish 
the voice of the interlocutor we can simply extract from the other voice (that is the 
narrator’s voice) Wittgenstein’s arguments and his positive solutions to the 
philosophical problems discussed in the Philosophical Investigations.  
Naturally I do not agree with Heal’s exegetical assumption that the dialogue 
found in the Philosophical Investigations is simply a representation of 
conversational exchanges between Wittgenstein and his interlocutor.378 My view is 
that even if we can identify the interlocutor’s voice in the way Heal suggests, we 
still cannot assume that everything that is said in the narrator’s voice is a 
straightforward statement of Wittgenstein’s philosophical convictions. On my view, 
to make such assumption is to take for granted that Wittgenstein’s statements in the 
Philosophical Investigations should be read implicitly or explicitly as propounding 
philosophical theses. I will argue that this assumption misconstrues the status of 
Wittgenstein’s non-assertoric statements in the Philosophical Investigations as 
providing discursive arguments for philosophical theses and theories that serve as 
argumentative solutions or conclusions to philosophical problems.  
In opposition to the orthodox interpretation that ascribes to Wittgenstein the 
thesis that language is a rule-governed practice or the theory that meaning is 
rule-governed use, I argue that Wittgenstein’s statements are non-assertoric 
reminders that serve to release us from the grip of certain compelling but ultimately 
incoherent philosophical conceptions. In other words, Wittgenstein’s non-assertoric 
reminders do not deliver any thesis or theory. On this view, therefore, even if we 
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 I argue in 2.2.1 that this assumption is made up of two supplementary assumptions and I shall call 
them ‘the two-voice assumption’ and ‘the mouthpiece assumption’. I will argue that these 
assumptions are not mandatory as some prominent polyphonic interpretations resist them. 
221 
 
find the narrator of the Philosophical Investigations arguing for seemingly positive 
philosophical theses or simply asserting theoretical claims, it does not mean that 
Wittgenstein himself is advancing philosophical theses or theories as his definite 
answers to philosophical problems. I spell out my view in section 2.2 against the 
backdrop of the shortcomings in Heal’s approach. I will show that her approach 
plays down the significance of Wittgenstein’s insistence that he was not formulating 
philosophical theses and the therapeutic nature of the Philosophical Investigations. I 
will also draw on the work of Kuusela to show that despite widespread doubt among 
interpreters, we have some good reasons to believe that Wittgenstein’s disavowal of 
having formulated philosophical theses and his actual philosophical practice in the 
Philosophical Investigations can be interpreted as constituting a coherent whole.  
 
2.1.2 Dialogue as a Vehicle and the ‘Intended Upshot’ of Reading the Philosophical 
Investigations’ 
 
On Heal’s view, while all philosophical expositions demand active participation 
by the reader, Wittgenstein’s particular use of the dialogue form can promote active 
involvement by the reader in a very special way.379 Secondly, dialogue produces a 
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 Heal 1995, 76-80.  
In Heal’s own words, ‘Indeed, active engagement is required for any understanding at all; one cannot 
understand without at least alert and attentive; no grasp of any new idea is entirely passive and 
effortless. And this is even more markedly true of Philosophy than of other subjects, since in 
Philosophy beliefs are not conveyed via some classic Gricean process (of taking someone else’s 
intention that one should believe as a reason for believing) but are presented as needing to be adopted, 
if they are, not on authority but on the basis of the reader’s own appreciation of their force’ (Heal 
1995, 77). 
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particular kind of engagement which can produce more than just understanding (in 
the sense of ‘mere acceptance of a description’) because, in Heal’s view too, the 
‘intended upshot’ of reading the Philosophical Investigations is to get the right 
stance toward the philosophical understanding of meaning, and coming to have such 
stance has theoretical as well as practical aspects.380 Heal uses the following 
example to illustrate her point.   
 
Suppose that I have made offensive and hurtful remarks to you, my friend. Reasoning 
may show me that any apology is called for. Unless I acknowledge the meanness and 
repulsiveness of what I did, show that I care about the damage to our friendship, show 
that I am willing to make myself vulnerable to the pain of having an attempt at 
reconciliation rejected – in short unless I apologise and thus throw myself on your 
mercy – our friendship is doomed and we shall both be worse off. But to realize all this, 
even to say it to you, is not to apologise. Unless the theoretical realization has its rational 
and proper outcome in remorse and attempted action I do not have a right stance to the 
world.381  
 
Heal believes that the dialogue is a particularly appropriate form for Wittgenstein 
not only because it is lively and thus can get the reader engaged. A more important 
reason, in Heal’s view, has to do with ‘something about the content of ‘the message’ 
he is trying to get across, or, better something about the nature of the state which is 
the hoped-for upshot of an attentive and sympathetic reading’.382 According to Heal, 
the dialogue form can enable the reader qua being an active participant of the 
                                                 
380
 Heal repudiates the philosophical thesis that some clear line exists between the theoretical and 
practical aspects. On her view, ‘rational enquiry is a route to both practical and theoretical positions’ 
and ‘coming to have the right stance, even on such an issue as the philosophical understanding of 
‘meaning’, is something which has a practical side and which can be intelligibly actualized only in 
the context of a dialogue’ (Heal 1995, 77). 
381
 Heal 1995, 77-78. 
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 Heal 1995, 78. 
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conversational exchanges in the Philosophical Investigations to have an appropriate 
setting for taking up the right stance on the philosophical understanding of meaning 
after some attentive and sympathetic reading. Heal admits that it is not possible to 
canvass properly in her discussion the issue of what the content of the Philosophical 
Investigations is. At any rate, she proposes ‘a brief and unsubstantiated account’ of 
the Philosophical Investigations as one reading at least of part of ‘the message’ 
Wittgenstein is trying to get across.383 On Heal’s account, sections 1-242 of the 
Philosophical Investigations have to do with the dismantling of a tempting but 
ultimately incoherent picture of meaning. Heal sums up this incoherent picture of 
meaning as follows. 384   
 
The picture to be dismantled is one on which for someone to understand a word one way 
rather than another is for him or her to have before the mind some item, for example an 
image or formula. This item is to guide the application of the world and set the standard 
for its correct use. 
 
Heal believes that along with this original picture of meaning, sections 1-242 of 
the Philosophical Investigations also sketch and offer a different picture of meaning 
as the right stance on the philosophical understanding of meaning.  
 
The picture offered instead is one on which for someone to grasp the meaning of a word 
is for him or her (as the result of training) to apply the word with confidence but without 
appealing to any further guidance. That we can talk of meaning and find that we share 
understanding are, on this view, rooted in the fact of shared spontaneous responses.  
                                                 
383
 I follow up Heal’s elusive talks of the ‘intended upshot’ of reading the Philosophical 
Investigation’, ‘getting a right stance to the world’ and ‘the message’ Wittgenstein is trying to get 
across in this section. I complete my discussion of these elusive terms in section 2.2.2. 
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 Heal 1995, 79. 
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As we have seen Heal believes that the ‘intended upshot’ of reading the 
Philosophical Investigations is to get the reader to adopt the right stance on the 
philosophical understanding of meaning. Accordingly, the reader is supposed to give 
up on the original picture of meaning and take up the second picture of meaning as 
the right stance after her reading of the Philosophical Investigations. At this point, I 
think Heal’s unspoken hypothesis appears more explicit than ever. In Heal’s 
discussion the ‘intended upshot’ of reading the Philosophical Investigations is to get 
the right stance on the philosophical understanding of meaning. For her 
interpretation, the second picture of meaning sketched and offered in sections 1-242 
of the Philosophical Investigations provides just this right stance. We should recall 
Heal’s suggestion that with the aid of the dialogue, the reader will come to ‘an end 
point which is properly thought of as a better understanding or insight into how 
things are’. It follows that according to Heal’s unspoken hypothesis the second 
picture of meaning, while being the right stance toward the philosophical 
understanding of meaning, represents ‘a better understanding’ of meaning and it 
propounds Wittgenstein’s insight into how things are with respect to the 
philosophical understanding of meaning. Obviously Heal’s underlying assumption is 
that the second picture of meaning constitutes Wittgenstein’s positive solution to the 
philosophical problems of meaning and understanding. In the end, although Heal 
refrains from attributing a theory of meaning to Wittgenstein, she actually ascribes a 
substantive view of meaning to the Philosophical Investigations and she disguises 
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this philosophical understanding of meaning as ‘the message’ Wittgenstein tries to 
get across.385  
Heal believes that coming to have the right stance on the philosophical 
understanding of meaning produces understanding not in the sense of ‘mere 
acceptance of a description’; it has practical as well as theoretical aspects. Heals 
suggests that the practical aspect of getting a right stance ‘can be intelligibly 
actualized only in the context of a dialogue’. On this view, the appropriateness of 
dialogue form can be seen as follows 
 
The difference between one who has read a theoretical non-dialogue version of the 
thoughts and one who has pursued them via the dialogue route is closely analogous to the 
difference between ‘one who realises ‘All humans are mortal’ and one who realises ‘I, 
like everyone else, am mortal’.386 
 
According to Heal, through the dialogue form, the question ‘What is involved in 
meaning?’ is presented as ‘What is it for me and for you to mean?’ Therefore if a 
reader of the Philosophical Investigations is drawn along to see that the original 
picture of meaning is ultimately incoherent, she will come to acknowledge the 
fantasy nature of this picture of meaning, with vivid self-application built in her 
acknowledgement. In other words, she will realise the tensions or preconceptions in 
her own conceptual scheme and then she will give up the incoherent picture. By 
contrast if someone has read a theoretical non-dialogue version of the thoughts of 
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 I continue with the implications of Heal’s unspoken hypothesis in section 2.2.2. 
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 Heal 1995, 80. 
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the Philosophical Investigations, she may end up with a ‘mere acceptance of a 
description’.387  
In section 2.2.2 I will argue that to ascribe the above positive account (that is the 
second picture of meaning) to Wittgenstein as his theory of “meaning as use” runs 
the risk of discounting, if not totally silencing, a very prominent voice in the 
Philosophical Investigations, the voice that thoroughly renounces the use of 
philosophical theses in understanding the actual workings of our language. I think 
this voice speaks aloud of the anti-doctrinal character and therapeutic nature of the 
Philosophical Investigations on several occasions. Some of the foremost examples 
are as follows.  
 
§109 …And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and 
description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its 
purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; 
they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a 
way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. 
The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have 
always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by 
means of language. 
                                                 
387
 In addition, Heal suggests that approaching the issues of meaning, truth and fact in the 
third-personal theoretical way can lead to various errors. According to Heal these errors may lead to 
another unsatisfactory and paradoxical picture of meaning. ‘For example, we may overrate the 
individual’s power to strike out with his or her own judgement or we may stress too much the grip on 
us of intellectual tradition or we may underrate the actual seriousness and commitment with which 
we make at least some of our judgements. The upshot may be that we get swept away from the 
original picture but end up with something just as unsatisfactory and paradoxical’ (Heal 1995, 81). 
Heal believes that on the other hand, Wittgenstein’s way of proceeding has its own pitfalls and it may 
encourage some bad developments. For instance, it can lead to the adoption of a kind of bullying tone 
and unnecessary vigilant attitude to frivolity, idle chat and the ordinary superficial but friendly 
exercises of social life. (See Heal 1995, 82-83)  
227 
 
 
§116 When philosophers use a word—‘knowledge’, ‘being’, ‘object’, ‘I’, ‘proposition’, 
‘name’—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the 
word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?— 
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. 
 
§118 Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy 
everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, 
leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but 
houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand. 
 
§119 The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain 
nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the 
limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery. 
 
§127 The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular 
purpose. 
 
§133 There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different 
therapies. 
 
§255 The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.388 
        
                                                                                                      
2.2 The Anti-Doctrinal Character and Therapeutic Nature of the 
Philosophical Investigations 
 
For a number of reasons I dispute Heal’s suggestion that the dialogue in the 
Philosophical Investigations is a vehicle for the ‘intended content’ (as 
Wittgenstein’s theoretical assertions) and that one could reconstruct this content ‘in 
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 I discuss these remarks in reference to the anti-doctrinal character and therapeutic methods of the 
Philosophical Investigations in section 2.2.2. 
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a more standard academic manner’. Firstly, as I have said, such reconstruction seems 
to proceed on the problematic assumption that the narrator expresses Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical convictions and hence that once the voices in the Philosophical 
Investigations are distinguished, the reader can simply take the narrator’s points as 
Wittgenstein’s own solutions to the problems discussed. In the following discussion, 
I will show that this assumption is problematic because of the ambiguity of the 
voices in the Philosophical Investigations. Heal’s approach conceives of the 
exchanges in the Philosophical Investigations as a debate between two distinct 
voices (that is the voices of the narrator/Wittgenstein and his interlocutor) which 
express opposing views. I will argue that a two-voice reading is not mandatory, 
because polyphonic readings of the Philosophical Investigations are legitimate 
alternatives. Secondly, I am opposed to Heal’s idea of reconstructing ‘the intended 
content’ of the Philosophical Investigations, if that leads to ‘Wittgenstein’s theory of 
meaning’ or ‘Wittgenstein’s thesis that meaning-is-use’. On my reading, 
Wittgenstein’s statements in the Philosophical Investigations are non-assertoric and 
they do not utter philosophical assertions. In section 2.2.2, I will argue that 
approaching any train of thought in the Philosophical Investigations as if it 
represents Wittgenstein’s attempt at philosophical theorising and system-building is 
hard to reconcile with the voice that speaks of the anti-doctrinal character and 
therapeutic nature of the Philosophical Investigations.  
                                                                                                                 
2.2.1 The Two-Voice Assumption and the Mouthpiece Assumption  
 
Despite the ambiguity of voices in some sections, there can be no denying that 
some passages in the Philosophical Investigations do give the strong impression that 
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Wittgenstein’s own voice is somehow present in the exchange. For instance, at §46 
the narratorial voice announces that ‘Both Russell’s ‘individuals’ and my ‘objects’ 
(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) were such primary elements.’ Since the narratorial 
voice speaks in the first person and Wittgenstein is the author of the Tractatus we 
seem to have strong reasons to believe that the narratorial voice here is 
Wittgenstein’s own voice. 
In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein said that he 
wanted to publish his new work along with his first book, the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus; because he believed that his new thoughts could be seen in 
the right light only by contrast with and against the background of his old way of 
thinking. At §23 the narratorial voice supplies a case of such comparison. 
 
It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they 
are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said 
about the structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus.) 
 
This passage reveals Wittgenstein’s dissatisfaction of his old way of thinking 
concerning the structure of language. Given the hints here in §23 and in the preface 
it seems that the reader is supposed to compare Wittgenstein’s new thought about 
the multiplicity of language-games, with his old way of thinking, namely the 
Tratatus’s ‘picture theory of language’, according to which every proposition is a 
picture of a state of affairs with a definite truth-value.  
But notice that the narratorial voice at §23 simply says ‘Including the author of 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’. Unlike §46 it does not speak in the first person. 
It merely identifies the author of the Tractatus as one of those logicians who have 
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misunderstood the structure of language. By speaking of himself in the third person, 
Wittgenstein seems to open the way for doubting that the narrator’s voice is his own 
voice. 
Alternatively, can the reader infer that the narratorial voice here is Wittgenstein’s 
own voice? Perhaps, we could justify such an inference on the grounds that 
Wittgenstein wants to contrast his new thoughts with his old way of thinking, or that 
he wants to emphasize the ‘grave mistakes’ in the Tractatus? On this view, what 
happens here could be a matter of taking distance from oneself in order to examine 
one’s old way of thinking more objectively. This self-examination may resemble an 
external dialogue between interlocutors but in fact it is an interior flow of one’s own 
thinking.  
So this speaking of himself in the third person at §23 raises two possibilities. As 
we have seen in Heal’s discussion, the use of interrogatives by itself cannot be taken 
as evidence of dialogue throughout the writing because interrogatives can be part of 
a dialogue but it can also represent a flow of Wittgenstein’s own ideas. In my 
opinion, this speaking of himself in the third person at §23 gives similar effect. It 
can open the way for doubting that the narrator’s voice is Wittgenstein’s own voice. 
But it can also open the way for a representation of Wittgenstein’s interior flow of 
thinking.  
I do not want to claim that Wittgenstein’s own voice is never present in the 
Philosophical Investigations. I think §46 is among the very few passages where the 
ambiguity of voices is less acute and hence we can find a plausible and more or less 
straightforward connection between the narratorial voice and Wittgenstein’s own 
voice. My real concern has to do with what I call ‘a two-level inference’, that is, the 
first inference from the narratorial voice to Wittgenstein’s own voice and then the 
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second inference from Wittgenstein’s voice to Wittgenstein’s doctrines. On my view, 
even if we can grant the first level inference from the narratorial voice to 
Wittgenstein’s own voice in passages like §46, it still requires much speculative 
reconstruction to make that connection support the second level inference from 
Wittgenstein’s own voice to ‘Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning’ in the Philosophical 
Investigations.389  
Heal believes that it is possible to ‘re-express ‘Wittgenstein’s arguments’ or 
‘Wittgenstein’s views’ in a more standard academic manner’. Her textual analysis 
finds several places where Wittgenstein supposedly speaks, comments and asks 
questions in his own voice. I would dispute Heal’s claims that (i) the dialogue in the 
Philosophical Investigations is an exchange between two identifiable voices and (ii) 
the narratorial voice (which is also the leading voice) represents Wittgenstein’s own 
voice, hence expressing his philosophical stances. Heal’s textual analysis depends 
on (i) and (ii), but she never gives any reason to support them. She only claims that 
it is her ‘strong impression’ that ‘from time to time, a voice other than 
Wittgenstein’s speaks i.e. that some thought other than one endorsed by 
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 In the Tractatus, the concept of an ‘object’ refers to a possible constituent of a state of affairs (T §
2.011). Among its other attributes, an object is said to be ‘simple’ in that it cannot be compound (T §
2.02 – 2.021). The passages §§46-48 in the Philosophical Investigations argues, in opposition to the 
Tractatus, that the talk of such simple constitutes parts of reality makes no sense.  
No doubt the idea that the talk of something absolutely and contextlessly simple makes no sense 
constitutes part of the Philosophical Investigations’ critique of a mistaken picture of language 
(according to this mistaken view, ‘individual words in language name objects – sentences are 
combinations of such names’ (PI §1). Ultimately this critique will contribute to the dismantling of 
the referentialist theory of meaning (that is, ‘Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated 
with the object for which the word stands.). However, the attempt to reconstruct ‘Wittgenstein’s 
theory of meaning as use’ in the Philosophical Investigations still has a long way to go. 
Another formidable obstacle to such reconstruction stems from the non-assertoric status of 
Wittgenstein’s reminders on language. 
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Wittgenstein himself is being expressed’. On my view, both (i) and (ii) are 
questionable assumptions and neither of them is mandatory. I call assumption (i) the 
two-voice assumption. I call assumption (ii) the mouthpiece assumption because it 
suggests that one of the two opposing voice in the Philosophical Investigations is 
Wittgenstein’s mouthpiece and that it spells out his discursive arguments for 
philosophical theses and theories. Not all interpretations of the Philosophical 
Investigations take these two assumptions for granted. I will now sketch two 
prominent interpretations that eschew the assumptions. 
Cavell’s reading of the Philosophical Investigations denies the mouthpiece 
assumption. In The Claim of Reason, Cavell describes the two opposing voices in 
the Philosophical Investigations as the ‘voice of temptation’ and the ‘voice of 
correctness’ with neither voice being straightforwardly Wittgenstein’s. 390  On 
Cavell’s reading, the voice of temptation attempts to formulate philosophical 
theories on language, meaning, understanding, etc. whereas the voice of correctness, 
resisting the philosophical theories set out by the voice of temptation, tries to remind 
the reader what we ordinarily say and do in every day. Cavell believes that 
Wittgenstein is not advocating any systematic account of language, meaning, 
understanding, etc. through the voice of correctness, and that we should approach 
the Philosophical Investigations as a conflicted dialogue which shows the deep 
difficulties in philosophizing.  
Stern’s interpretation rejects both the two-voice assumption and the mouth-piece 
assumption.391 Stern believes that while there is good reason to approach the 
Philosophical Investigations as belonging to the genre of philosophical dialogue, 
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Heal’s reading is not the right way to approach the dialogues in the Philosophical 
Investigations. However, he notes that many interpreters unfortunately share Heal’s 
assumptions.392  
Stern rejects the mouthpiece assumption for two reasons. Stern grants that ‘a 
clear-cut set of answers to the paradoxes of ostension, explanation, and 
rule-following’ is present in the Philosophical Investigations. However, he believes 
that the connection between this train of thought and Wittgenstein’s intentions is far 
from clear. Stern notes that unfortunately many interpretations make the common 
mistake of identifying the viewpoint defended in a particular strand of argument in 
the Philosophical Investigations as the view advocated by Wittgenstein. In these 
mistaken interpretations, 
 
The narrator is usually taken to be arguing for Wittgenstein’s own philosophical position, 
‘ordinary language philosophy’, while the interlocutor attacks our ordinary way of 
speaking, arguing that it does not do justice to his intuitions and his arguments.393  
 
Stern sketches a general view of these interpretations in terms of Kripke’s 
influential and widely discussed reading of the Philosophical Investigations.394  
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 Stern 2004, 24-25. 
On Stern’s view the dialogues in the Blue Book and the Brown Book do set out views endorsed by 
Wittgenstein, interspersed with occasional objections whereas for the Philosophical Investigations 
matters are not that simply any more. 
Stern believes that accepting the two assumptions would prevent the reader from ‘seeing how 
Wittgenstein’s second masterpiece is not simply the result of simply putting together what he had 
already written’. 
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 Stern 2004, 24. 
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 See Kriple, 1982. 
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If we take Wittgenstein’s narrator to be a behaviourist, or an ordinary language 
philosopher who maintains that the rules of our language guarantee that we are mostly 
right, then the sceptical paradox – namely, that ostension, explanation, and rule-following 
can always be undermined by sceptical possibilities – receive what Kripke calls a 
‘straight’ solution: we really can provide a positive answer to the paradox, because the 
expressions in question can be defined in terms of public behaviour, or the rules of 
grammar that govern our use of language.   
 
If, on the other hand, we follow Kripke in taking Wittgenstein to be a sceptic who 
endorses the paradoxes he has formulated, then the appeal to what the community 
ordinarily does in its use of these terms is only a negative answer to the sceptical problem 
(Kripke calls this a ‘sceptical’ solution): recognizing that we cannot solve the problem, 
we instead appeal to what we ordinarily do as a way of indicating the best reply available, 
albeit one that does not really solve the paradoxes.395  
 
However, Stern believes that the ‘straight’ and the ‘sceptical’ solutions are all 
misguided as they both identify the outlook of the author with the strand of 
argument associated with the leading narrator, which is a mistake.396 According to 
Stern, Wittgenstein actually provided neither a straight solution nor a sceptical 
solution to the philosophical problems discussed in the Philosophical Investigations 
because he aimed to dissolve the philosophical problems by means of a dialogue 
between opposing voices. In other words, the interpretations that depend on the 
mouthpiece assumption misunderstand the character and methods of the 
                                                 
395
 Stern 2004, 21-22. 
Apparently Heal’s reading of the Philosophical Investigations opts for the first case.  
396
 Stern 2004, 23.  
In the ‘straight’ case the reasons given by Wittgenstein’s narrator for solving the problem of 
rule-following are mistakenly identified as Wittgenstein’s own solution to the problem. In the 
‘sceptical’ case, the narrator’s claims that the interlocutor faces the problem of rule-following are 
mistakenly identified as Wittgenstein’s own conviction in the problem. 
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Philosophical Investigations. This is the second reason why Stern rejects the 
mouthpiece assumption.  
Stern suggests that the reader should not assume that everything that is said in 
opposition to the voice of temptation in the Philosophical Investigations must be 
taken as a straightforward statement of Wittgenstein’s philosophical stances. He 
warns that ‘all this talk of Wittgenstein’s arguments and of the positions he opposes, 
while unavoidable, is potentially deeply misleading’ because such talk 
 
makes it tempting to suppose that Wittgenstein’s distinctive contribution to philosophy 
turns on a clear distinction between unproblematic, ‘everyday’ uses of language, and their 
mirror image, the ‘metaphysical’ uses of language that are characteristic of traditional of 
philosophy.   
 
However, if Wittgenstein is correct, the accounts offered by all the participants in his 
dialogues are nonsense, and so cannot, in the end, be true or false. 
 
Ultimately, Wittgenstein’s view is that the proto-philosophical accounts of meaning and 
mind that his interlocutor proposes and his narrator opposes cannot be understood’397 
 
On Stern’s view, Wittgenstein’s idea is that when one says that a solution to the 
sceptical paradoxes of ostension, explanation, and rule-following or of ‘private 
language’ is possible, or when one says that such things are impossible, one’s words 
do no useful work at all. 398  Therefore Stern believes that if we follow 
Wittgenstein’s advice, we should not endorse any of the views that Wittgenstein 
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 Stern 2004, 25. 
398
 Stern 2004, 26.  
Stern refers to PI §254 ‘What we ‘are tempted to say’ in such a case is, of course, not philosophy; but 
it is its raw material. Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about the objectivity 
and reality of mathematical facts is not a philosophy of mathematics, but something for philosophical 
treatment.’ And §255 ‘The philosopher treats a question; like an illness.’ 
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discusses in the Philosophical Investigations. And we should give up both 
behaviourism and anti-behaviourism. According to Stern, Wittgenstein’s discussion 
of philosophical problems in the Philosophical Investigations should produce this 
result: ‘a combination of words is being excluded from the language, withdrawn 
from circulation’ (PI §500).  
Stern notes that the two-voice assumption is usually taken for granted. As an 
alternative to the two-voice reading, Stern proposes a three-voice reading that can do 
justice to ‘the variety, diversity, and ambiguity of the voices in the Philosophical 
Investigations’. Stern’s suggestion is that instead of seeing the arguments in the 
Philosophical Investigations as exchanges between Wittgenstein and his interlocutor, 
the reader should approach them as ‘an exchange between a number of different 
voices, none of which can be unproblematically identified with the author’s.’ 399 In 
addition to the two opposing voices, Stern finds a third voice, the voice of a 
commentator.400  
According to Stern, the commentator’s voice is not always clearly marked off 
from the narratorial voice, and therefore most readers treat them both as expressions 
of Wittgenstein’s views. As a result, the readers become ‘unable to reconcile the 
trenchant and provocative theses advocated by the narrator and the commentator’s 
                                                 
399
 Stern 2004, 22-23.  
Therefore Stern prefers to speak of the dialogues in the Philosophical Investigations as dialogues 
between Wittgenstein’s narrator and an interlocutory voice rather than between Wittgenstein and the 
interlocutor. 
400
 Stern notes that in PI §§39-142 while there are voices that express the positions set out in the 
Tractatus, the narratorial voice sets out the case against these Tractarian convictions. In PI §§
140-693 while there is an anti-behaviourist voice that expresses mentalist, verification-transcendent, 
and essentialist intuitions and convictions, on the other hand, the narratorial voice sets out 
behaviourist, verificationist, and anti-essentialist objections to traditional philosophical views. 
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rejection of all philosophical theses’.401 On Stern’s view, the commentator’s voice 
provides ironic commentary on the exchange between the two opposing voices, by 
raising objections to the assumptions of the two opposing voices. The 
commentator’s voice also points out some platitudes about language and everyday 
life that the two opposing voice have overlooked.402 
 
2.2.2 The Character and Methods of the Philosophical Investigations 
 
Heal’s interpretation merits attention for its judicious recognition that the 
Philosophical Investigations is written as a dialogue, and that the dialogue form is 
particularly appropriate for Wittgenstein. Heal refrains from saying that 
Wittgenstein advances a thesis or offers a theory of meaning in the Philosophical 
Investigations. She appears cautious, uses only some elusive notions such as ‘the 
intended content’, ‘Wittgenstein’s arguments’, ‘Wittgenstein’s views’, ‘the content 
of the Investigations’, ‘the content of “the message”’.403 She seems to substitute 
                                                 
401
 I discuss these conflicting strands in the Philosophical Investigations in 2.3.2. 
402
 Stern believes that these three voices in the Philosophical Investigations play roles quite similar 
to Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. (See Stern 2004, 
22-23). According to Stern, the commentator comes closer to expressing W’s viewpoint than either of 
his leading protagonists do. 
Pichler 2004 also offers a polyphonic reading. He suggests that in the absence of the ultimate 
authorial voice, there is an indefinite number of voices and the Philosophical Investigations denies 
dogmatism precisely through the multiplicity of voices. 
403
 Heal uses ‘the intended content’, ‘Wittgenstein’s arguments’ and ‘Wittgenstein’s views’ on p.63. 
She uses ‘the content of the Investigations’, ‘the content of “the message”’ and ‘picture of meaning’ 
on p.78. She mentions ‘Wittgenstein’s sketch’ on p.79. I have already discussed other similar notions 
like the ‘intended upshot’ of reading the Investigations, ‘the message’ Wittgenstein is trying to get 
across, ‘the right stance’, ‘a better understanding’ and ‘insight into how things are’ in section 2.1.2. 
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‘picture’ and ‘sketch’ for ‘theory’ in her brief account of ‘the content of the 
Investigations’. Unfortunately Heal never seeks to clarify what would distinguish 
views, content, message, picture or sketch from “theses” and “theories”. As we have 
seen, on Heal’s approach, interpreting Wittgenstein need not be fundamentally 
different from interpreting other philosophers. We have also seen in section 2.1.2 
that on her reading Wittgenstein attempts two things in sections 1-242 of the 
Philosophical Investigations: to dismantle a tempting but ultimately incoherent 
picture of meaning; and secondly to sketch and offer a better picture of meaning as 
his positive views and thereby resolving the philosophical problems of meaning and 
understanding. It can be said that Heal conceives of Wittgenstein as engaging in 
both a negative task and a positive task. The negative task is the dismantling of a 
mistaken picture/theory of meaning and this negative task gives a negative result: 
the idea of a private language is shown to be incoherent. Now what is the positive 
task and what does it give?  
Accordingly, the positive task is to sketch and offer a better picture/theory of 
meaning to replace the mistaken one. But as we have seen, Heal refrains from saying 
‘Wittgenstein’s theory’ and in her discussion the ‘positive result’ (the second picture 
of meaning) is disguised as just another picture of meaning, albeit a better one that 
conveys ‘insight into how things are’. But again what would distinguish a picture 
from a theory? And when compared with the original picture, on what ground can 
                                                                                                                                         
According to Heal ‘we should note that the Investigations is full of both assertions and arguments on 
the subject matters of traditional Philosophy, meaning, truth, fact etc. and that Wittgenstein is clearly 
at times engaging directly with the thoughts of Frege, Russell, etc.’ The point she wants to make is ‘it 
is not wholly wrong to think of Wittgenstein as addressing the same puzzlements (about meaning etc.) 
as previous philosophers and to think of him as wishing to address them by discursive rational 
means’ (Heal 1995, 76). 
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the second picture of meaning be accepted as giving ‘a better understanding’ of 
meaning? 
In arguing for the appropriateness of the dialogue form, Heal imagines that after 
some attentive and sympathetic reading the reader is ultimately ‘drawn along to 
acknowledge the fantasy nature of the original picture and the truth of the reminders 
that are assembled’ for the second picture of meaning.404 So perhaps it can be said 
that Heal’s interpretation actually entails the following ideas  
 
(i) Wittgenstein’s new picture or theory of meaning is sketched in some of the
 reminders in sections 1-242 of the Philosophical Investigations. 
(ii) The reminders that Wittgenstein assembles for his picture or theory of meaning 
are true reminders in that they are insights into how things are so far as
 philosophical understanding of meaning is concerned. 
(iii) The reader will take up Wittgenstein’s picture or theory of meaning as the right
 stance after realizing the fantasy nature of the original picture and also (ii).405  
 
Insofar as Heal’s interpretation proposes to treat Wittgenstein as articulating his 
arguments in the form of philosophical reminders pertaining to a theoretical 
overview of grammatical rules or as offering a definitive picture or theory of 
                                                 
404
 Heal 1995, 80. 
 Referring to ‘the original picture of meaning’, Heal suggests that ‘the picture is part of a larger story 
which (arguably) includes elements like a correspondence theory of truth and the idea that a complete 
natural science will reveal all the facts there are’. 
405
 I suspect that Heal’s interpretation is prone to an extra idea, that is, Wittgenstein’s picture of 
meaning is part of a larger story which (arguably) includes elements like a behaviourist theory of 
language. But it is also fair to say that Heal’s interpretation has been trying to hold back from this 
extra idea. 
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meaning to replace the original one, Heal’s interpretation risks importing substantive 
views on language or a theory of meaning into the Philosophical Investigations. I 
believe such an exegetical move violates Wittgenstein’s intention announced in the 
preface and fails to do justice to the anti-doctrinal character and therapeutic nature of 
the Philosophical Investigations.  
I think that we can take Wittgenstein’s intention more seriously and recognize the 
non-assertoric status of his statements in the Philosophical Investigations. This 
recognition can helpfully inform our understanding of the anti-doctrinal character 
and therapeutic nature of the Philosophical Investigations. I expound my 
non-assertoric reading of Wittgenstein as follows.406 
 
(i) The Philosophical Investigations delivers Wittgenstein’s reminders about
 language and meaning as well as other subjects.407 
(ii) The reminders about language and meaning are true reminders in that they
 simply make things ‘open to view’ by ‘assembling what we have long been
 familiar with’ so that ‘seeing connexions’ becomes possible. In giving these
 ‘perspicuous representations’ the reminders shed light on our problem about
 language by ‘clearing misunderstanding away’ without adding new knowledge 
or information to ‘the ground of language’ though a new way to think about 
                                                 
406
 In this synopsis I provide textual support for my non-assertoric reading. For further validation of 
my non-assertoric reading, I will discuss in what sense Wittgenstein’s statements do not constitute 
philosophical theses. 
407
 I shall not consider these other subjects (for instance, the concepts of logic, ‘the foundations of 
mathematics’, and ‘states of consciousness’). But I believe that the import of my proposal of 
non-assertoric reading can be applied generally to Wittgenstein’s reminders about these other 
subjects. 
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things is given to us. Our problems are thus solved in this manner. (PI §§90, 109, 
118, 119, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129) 
 
And most importantly:  
 
(iii) The reminders about language and meaning may be used to establish ‘an order 
in our knowledge of the use of language’ but it does not give the order. Though 
the reminders ‘are meant to throw light on specific features of our language’, 
they are not intended to pave the way to ‘a future regularization of language’. (PI 
§§130, 132, 133) 
(iv) The reminders about language and meaning are not second-order theoretical 
explanations or revelations giving the essence of language and meaning. In other 
words, the reminders are not assertions of rules to which language must 
correspond. (PI §§90, 91, 92, 109, 120, 121, 124, 125, 131) 
 
It follows from my non-assertoric reading that we should be careful in ascribing a 
picture of meaning to Wittgenstein. The talk of Wittgenstein’s “picture” of meaning 
can be misleading if it implies that Wittgenstein intends to give us a replacement 
picture of meaning which is more superior in the sense that it is definitive and 
exclusive (like a philosophical thesis establishing the order in our knowledge of the 
use of language). Heal’s interpretation is misguided because it seems to assume that 
after dismantling the original picture of meaning Wittgenstein’s reminders offer a 
definitive and exclusive picture of meaning which is capable of giving the order in 
our knowledge of the use of language. 
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No doubt the original picture of meaning is dismantled. However, it is not the 
actual source of our problem but the mere symptom of it. The real source of our 
problem which is also the proper object of philosophical therapy is our urge to 
misunderstand the workings of language (PI §§109, 113, 125, 255). It is this 
underlying urge that gives rise to or finds expression in the original picture of 
meaning. We are held captive by this picture of meaning which lies in language (PI 
§115). Through his reminders Wittgenstein dismantles this problematic picture. But 
he never intends to give out an alternative picture of meaning as if it captures the 
ultimate order in our knowledge of the use of language.  
 
PI §309 What is your aim in philosophy?—To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.  
 
A fly is held captive by a fly-bottle. What would we do if we want to show the 
fly the way out of its predicament? We will not lead the fly to another fly-bottle, or 
any other fly trap device in disguise. Instead, we will set it free so that the fly will no 
longer find itself entangled in any fly-bottle.  
Wittgenstein’s reminders should produce the same result. They set us free so that 
we are no longer held captive by our problematic picture of meaning. There can be 
no denying that Wittgenstein’s reminders can be used to produce a superior picture 
of meaning, that is, the meaning-as-use picture. But what makes this replacement 
picture of meaning superior should not be its potential for building up the ultimate 
philosophical order of things; rather it should be its capacity to serve clarificatory 
purpose.408 According to my non-assertoric reading (especially (iii) and (iv)) the 
                                                 
408
 I will soon look at Kuusela’s suggestion that the meaning-as-use picture is better construed as a 
clarificatory model. 
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reminders at best can only establish ‘an order in our knowledge of the use of 
language’, not the order. This is because there are different therapies for different 
illnesses (PI §§133, 255) and the reminders are assembled for a particular purpose 
(PI § 127). In other words, the reminders assembled in the Philosophical 
Investigations are useful for some targeted illnesses, that is, some particular 
misunderstandings of the workings of language depended on referentialism. 
Wittgenstein assembled these reminders for the purpose of dismantling the 
referentialist picture of meaning. The reminders are particularly useful in clearing 
away misunderstanding caused by referentialism. However, being clarificatory 
model the reminders are also applicable to other cases of misunderstanding of the 
workings of language in other contexts.409 
On this non-assertoric reading, any interpretation that seeks to extract and 
reconstruct ‘Wittgenstein’s thesis or theory of meaning’ in the Philosophical 
Investigations or his definitive solution to the philosophical problems of meaning 
and understanding is misguided. A major problem with interpretations of this kind is 
that in trying to read Wittgenstein’s reminders as implicit or explicit theses 
propounding his final and complete solutions to the philosophical problems of 
meaning and understanding, these interpretations run the risk of turning 
Wittgenstein’s non-assertoric statements into his discursive arguments pertaining to 
a theory of meaning as his universal and conclusive solution to the philosophical 
problems of meaning and understanding. Many interpretations go astray because 
they misconstrue Wittgenstein’s non-assertoric statements. However, some 
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 In the Nachlass, Wittgenstein is more explicit about the incomplete nature of what he has said 
about meaning. ‘The meaning of a word, I said, is its use. But an important supplement must be 
added to this’ (Nachlass 180). 
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interpreters hold on to this approach even at the huge cost of attributing a 
fundamental inconsistency to Wittgenstein. 
Kripke’s controversial and widely discussed reading of the Philosophical 
Investigations is an outstanding example in this regard. On Kripke’s view, 
Wittgenstein articulates a powerful case for an unsettling sceptical paradox of 
rule-following. Kripke believes that this paradox is ‘the central problem of 
Philosophical Investigations’ and it can be regarded as ‘a new form of philosophical 
scepticism’.410 Kripke confesses that he has expressed ‘Wittgenstein’s view more 
straightforwardly than he would ordinarily allow himself to do.’ However, Kripke’s 
excuse is that, regardless of Wittgenstein’s repeated disavowals of having 
formulated philosophical theses or theories, Wittgenstein has actually formulated 
some sceptical theses. And yet because of the nature of his theses, Wittgenstein has 
to put them in disguise.411 
A Kripke-style reconstruction may not give a desirable reading of Wittgenstein. 
At any rate, the Philosophical investigations’ relation to theory and theses in 
                                                 
410
 Kripke 1982, 7. 
Commentators have widely disputed Kripke’s reading. Baker and Hacker 1984 provides a judicious 
retort.   
411
 Kripke 1982, 69: ‘Wittgenstein’s professed inability to write a work with conventionally 
organized arguments and conclusions stems at least in part, not from personal and stylistic 
proclivities, but from the nature of his work. Had Wittgenstein – contrary to his notorious and cryptic 
maxim in §128 – stated the outcomes of his conclusions in the form of definite theses, it would have 
been very difficult to avoid formulating his doctrines in a form that consists in apparent sceptical 
denials of our ordinary assertions.’ 
Referring to his reformulation of ‘Wittgenstein’s arguments’, Kripke declares that ‘Probably many of 
my formulations and recastings of the argument are done in a way Wittgenstein would not himself 
approve. So the present paper should be thought of as expounding neither ‘Wittgenstein’s’ argument 
nor ‘Kripke’s’: rather Wittgenstein’s argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him’’ 
(Kripke 1982, 5).   
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philosophy has become a watershed for the interpretations of Wittgenstein.412 
Pichler provides a survey of Wittgenstein interpretation in which the interpretations 
of the Philosophical Investigations are divided by the ‘theory vs. therapy’ debate.413  
 
Whereas one group of scholars, though on different levels and to varying degrees, sees 
the PI as a work advancing both philosophical theses and theories, another sees it as a 
work which aims to dissolve philosophical problems through a number of not necessarily 
systematically related therapies. 
 
When defending a theses or a theory understanding of the PI, one typically holds that the 
PI, in order to solve philosophical problems, itself proposes philosophical theses and 
arguments.  
In contrast to this, defenders of a therapeutic understanding of the PI typically holds that 
the PI dissolves philosophical problems by bringing to light their illusory nature (i.e. by 
showing the absence of any substantial claim and thus theory), rather than by developing 
and putting forward new theses and arguments to answer these problems.  
(Pichler’s discussion uses PI as an abbreviation for the Philosophical Investigations.) 
 
Pichlers notes that this ‘theory vs. therapy’ debate attests to ‘a striking contrast’ 
between the way Wittgenstein wanted the Philosophical Investigations and himself 
to be understood, and the way in which his interpreters want to understand and 
utilize the work itself.414  
                                                 
412
 For a detailed account of the numerous exegetical approaches to Wittgenstein see the 
‘Introduction’ in Kahane, Kanterian, and Kuusela 2007, 1-36. 
413
 Pichler 2007, 123 – 124. 
The theory vs. therapy debate is only one of the many possible ways to characterise interpretations of 
Wittgenstein. Another possible characterization is the text-immanent vs. contextual debate. With 
increasing number of Wittgenstein’s texts (especially his Nachlass) becoming available to scholars, 
the contextual standpoint has become the more prominent approach. 
414
 Pichler 2007, 125. 
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Kenny believes that a fundamental reason for this interpretative dilemma has to 
do with the fact that Wittgenstein seems to have two rather different and also 
conflicting views of philosophy: the overview theory of philosophy and the 
therapeutic theory of philosophy.415 Kenny himself is pessimistic as to whether it is 
possible to reconcile Wittgenstein’s account of philosophy with ‘the entirety of his 
philosophical activity’ in the Philosophy Investigations.416 Kenny believes that if 
the reader is to give priority to Wittgenstein’s account of philosophy, she will 
conceive of the substantive theses of the Philosophical Investigations as ‘momentary 
yieldings to a form of philosophical expression that Wittgenstein had long rejected 
in theory, and to a great extent, grown out of in practice’. Accordingly she will 
excise all these substantive theses from the text. In return she will see a substantial 
gain in consistency in the work. If on the other hand, the reader is to give priority to 
Wittgenstein’s practice, she will judge Wittgenstein’s account of the nature of 
philosophy as an inadequate account even of his own philosophy. She will discard 
this account as one of the weakest parts of his philosophising. She will treat his 
statements as perfectly genuine arguments, as bearers of truth value. Finally Kenny 
concludes that ‘We are forced in the end to make a choice between accepting his 
theory and following his practice.’ 
An important merit of my non-assertoric approach is that Wittgenstein’s remarks 
on the therapeutic conception of philosophy and ‘the entirety of his philosophical 
activity’ in the Philosophical Investigations can constitute a coherent one. My 
                                                 
415
 Kenny 1982, 1-26.  
As Kenny sums up, ‘On the one hand, he often compares philosophy to a medical technique, to a 
therapy, a method of healing. On the other hand, he seems to see philosophy as giving overall 
understanding, a clear view of the world’ (Kenny 1982, 2). 
416
 Kenny 2006, xix. 
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non-assertoric approach sheds new light on the ‘theory vs. therapy’ dilemma by 
suggesting a new option. According to my non-assertoric approach, Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical reminders are non-assertoric; they do not advance any theoretical 
assertions pertaining to the meaning as use thesis or set out rules to which our 
language-use must conform. The reminders aim rather to give a therapeutic result: 
releasing people from misunderstanding of the workings of language in a 
referentialist context by making things ‘open to view’ and ‘assembling what we 
have long been familiar with’ so that ‘seeing connexions’ become possible. Those 
who are released from such misunderstanding are given a better picture of meaning 
but this better picture does not constitute a philosophical thesis or theory of meaning. 
This is a positive result in the sense that some concealed nonsense is now exposed 
and dispelled from our conceptual scheme. I will now draw on the work of Kuusela 
to show that Wittgenstein’s reminders not only provide us with philosophical 
therapy in this sense but at the same time they also deliver ‘a more nuanced 
understanding of the concepts of language and meaning’ — something that even a 
theory would not be able to give.417  
On Heal’s reading, Wittgenstein pursues the philosophical problems of meaning 
and understanding in sections 1-242 of the Philosophical Investigations and like 
other philosophers who would have conducted a similar endeavour in the 
conventional way, Wittgenstein proceeds by first criticizing the original picture of 
                                                 
417
 Kuusela 2008 (See especially chapter three and four). 
To those interpretations that ascribe theories to Wittgenstein, Kuusela raises an important question. 
‘Now it might be, of course, that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is inconsistent. But this cannot be 
accepted without further argument. That it is tempting to read Wittgenstein’s statements as theses, 
and that it may be hard to see how else to construe them, does not mean that they should be read as 
theses – especially if this makes his philosophy contradictory’ (Kuusela 2008, 6). 
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meaning and then advancing his own picture of meaning as a better solution. It 
seems that a foremost direct expression of this better alternative can be found in §43 
 
PI §43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word 
“meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. 
And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. 
 
My previous discussion has suggested some strong reasons to repudiate the 
connection between the train of thoughts expressed by the reminders and 
Wittgenstein’s authorial intention. Now I will give more support to my discussion 
by showing in what sense Wittgenstein’s statements do not constitute philosophical 
theses. 
Some interpretations assign an almost boundless generality to the conception of 
meaning as “rule-governed use” despite the explicit reservations stated in §43 (that 
is, ‘For a large class of cases—though not for all’). Baker and Hacker’s 
interpretation is one of these interpretations.418 Accordingly, Baker and Hacker 
suggest that the conception of meaning as rule-governed use holds necessarily for all 
cases of word-meaning.419 In this way, Baker and Hacker take §43 as conveying the 
definition of the concept of word-meaning, which establishes a necessary condition 
of word-meaning.  
                                                 
418
 Baker and Hacker 1983, 250-251.  
419
 See Kuusela 2008, 153: ‘According to the interpretation put forward by Baker and Hacker, 
examples of the use of “meaning” that are excluded are cases such as “those clouds mean rain” and 
“you mean so much to me,” but all cases of word-meaning are included in Wittgenstein’s statement 
about meaning.’ 
249 
 
Kuusela believes that in turning the conception of meaning as rule-governed use 
into a philosophical thesis about the concept of meaning Baker and Hacker’s 
interpretation has induced the problem of dogmatism. Kuusela asks: 
 
How can the philosopher be sure that in stating her rule she is not overlooking cases that 
do fall under our concept of word-meaning but do not fit the criterion of 
rule-governedness as a necessary condition of word-meaning? 
 
And what guarantees that her statement about what meaning must be is not yet another 
example of a philosopher projecting a mode of presentation (her definition of the concept 
of meaning) onto reality?420 
 
Instead of reading §43 as putting forward a philosophical thesis of meaning, 
Kuusela proposes to approach the conception of meaning as rule-governed use as a 
clarificatory model, that is, ‘a model to be used as an object of comparison’ (PI §
131).421 Kuusela believes that this clarificatory model is particularly helpful in the 
light of the manifoldness of the concept of meaning and the blurriness of language 
use.422 
                                                 
420
 Kuusela 2008, 154.  
A fundamental problem with Baker and Hacker’s interpretation is that since they make 
Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning as constituted by rules hold necessarily for all cases of 
word-meaning they need to uphold its universality by arguing those who disagree with the conception 
are either speaking nonsense or deviating from normal language use.  
421
 Kuusela believes that ‘To attribute to Wittgenstein a thesis about what word-meaning must be on 
the basis of §43 reads more into the text than it can support. Such a reading fails to take seriously the 
possibility that the statement is only meant to dissolve certain particular philosophical problems’ 
(Kuusela 2008, 157). 
422
 Kuusela 2008, 155: ‘According to this interpretation, rather than stating that the use of “meaning” 
must accord with the model of meaning as rule-governed use, he is saying that one should compare 
the actual concept (or the actual use of the world “meaning”) with this model, noting both the 
similarities and the dissimilarities between the model and actual use.’ 
250 
 
 
Abiding by the method of comparison, however, one refrains from claiming that actual 
language use must fit the models one puts forward. In this sense no theses are advanced 
about how things—including language use or concepts—must be.  
 
Thus when used as an object of comparison, the conception of meaning as constituted by 
rules does not amount to a thesis about the essence or the possibility of word-meaning.  
 
Rather, it articulates a particular way of conceiving word-meaning, while leaving open 
the possibility that there might be cases that do not fit this model.423 
 
A significant advantage of Kuusela’s proposal is that when the conception of 
meaning as constituted by rules is made an object of comparison it becomes a great 
deal less controversial. For instance even those who do not accept the view that 
word-meaning depends on rules can now grant some role to rules in the constitution 
of word-meaning on the premise that the conception captures at least a particular 
aspect of the concept of word-meaning. The second advantage is that ‘the necessity 
expressed by the rule is now treated as characteristic of the model and not projected 
onto the objects of description as a thesis about their essence’. Kuusela believes that 
in this way, Wittgenstein is in principle safeguarded against dogmatism.424  
Finally Kuusela believes that treating Wittgenstein’s conception as a clarificatory 
model can lead to an increase in the flexibility of philosophical thought. For instance, 
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 Kuusela 2008, 156. 
424
 Drawing on Wittgenstein’s lectures of 1933-34, Kuusela provides more textual support for his 
interpretation and he concludes that ‘it would be erroneous to maintain that Wittgenstein takes the 
rule-governedness of words to be a necessary condition of their meaningfulness.’ (See Kuusela 2008, 
158-163) 
Kuusela also argues that Wittgenstein’s conceptions of language as a rule-governed practice and 
language as a family-resemblance concept do not constitute philosophical theses about the essence of 
language because they are to be taken as centres of variation. (See Kuusela 2008, chapter 4) 
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because now we see that the conception of meaning as constituted by rules is not put 
forward as a philosophical thesis, we will be more receptive to cases of 
word-meaning in which the sound of words is relevant.425 And in fact in the 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein himself too discusses such cases in which 
the sounds used as expressions are not governed by any rules at all (PI §§527-534). 
Such ‘speaking with tongues’ cases would include expressing feelings and 
sensations with sounds or conveying emotion with tone. Kuusela believes that 
Wittgenstein’s purpose of including a discussion of ‘speaking with tongues’ cases in 
the Philosophical Investigations is ‘to foreground this “non-rule-governed” 
dimension of meaning, in contrast to the conception of meaning as constituted by 
rules.’426  
                                                 
425
 Kuusela 2008, 176-180. 
426
 Other than ‘speaking with tongues’ cases, Kuusela finds two more examples: ‘the soulless 
language’ in §530and the onomatopoeic words in Nachlass.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
My discussion has proved that applying the idea of non-assertoric discourse to 
the writings of Plato, Sextus and Wittgenstein can produce some fruitful results. 
Unlike dogmatic readings my proposal of non-assertoric reading can facilitate a 
better position for us to deal with the philosophical and interpretive challenges posed 
by the distinctive language-uses, as well as the unique styles and methods employed 
in their writings. For instance, unlike the futile attempts of the readers of assertoric 
reading to discern Plato’s metaphysical doctrines, on the basis of the Sun, Line and 
Cave, or to harmonize the images into one holistic philosophical interpretation, my 
proposal of non-assertoric reading opens up a more rewarding way of engaging with 
the images and other aspects (like the use of a fictional Socrates and other dramatis 
personae, and the elenctic mode of argumentation) of the dialogues. On my 
non-assertoric reading, Plato uses the images of the Sun, Line and Cave to 
recommend that, certain comparisons between the Form of the Good and the images 
be followed up. But my non-assertoric reading does not assume that Plato uses the 
images as a means of ascent to his metaphysical doctrines. My proposal casts a new 
light on the role the images serve in Plato’s philosophical method and exposition. 
Instead of being propaedeutic to Platonic doctrines, they are maieutic: they are 
invitations and provocations to explore likenesses and comparisons in the search of 
knowledge about the Good; and in considering the likeness and comparisons 
between the images and the Form of the Good the reader has accepted the invitation 
(or the challenge) to do philosophy along with his reading of the images and the 
argumentative exchanges in the dialogues. My proposal has yielded similar 
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successful results in the writings of Wittgenstein as opposed to doctrinal readings. 
Finally a major breakthrough of my proposal is that in recognizing Sextus’s speech 
is consistently non-assertoric, I have shown that the charge of self-contradiction 
against his writing is misplaced because it arises from misunderstanding the 
non-assertoric nature of the Pyrrhonian discourse which comprises of avowal of 
appearance, the interrogative, the imperative, and the argumentative mode of 
non-assertion. 
In so far as the case studies that I have examined in this thesis avoid making 
assertoric presentation of the authors’ own views as theoretical doctrines, they can 
be put together as presenting a special mode of doing philosophy that does not result 
in theory or doctrine. Since each of my chosen philosophers works deals with 
different philosophical problems, in different times and within different traditions 
their methods are not all the same. In my discussion, I have highlighted the ways in 
which the different kinds of non-assertoric mode of philosophy differ from each 
other. Unlike Plato’s dramatised dialogues, Wittgenstein’s use of the dialogue form 
in the Philosophical Investigations is extremely austere (or minimalist): he has 
stripped his dialogue of essential dramatic elements like stage settings and even 
named characters as he allows only different voices to feature in his dialogue. 
Secondly, whilst Plato’s dialogues give out many vivid images which may serve 
theoretical ends as they recommend certain likenesses and comparisons be followed 
up in the search for knowledge, Wittgenstein’s dialogue in the Philosophical 
Investigations provides us with images (like the fly in the fly-bottle) and several 
thought experiments (e.g. the famous beetle-in-a-box (PI §293)) for therapeutic 
purpose. On the other hand, insofar as the Tractatus’s self-proclaimed nonsensicality 
is suggestive of its aim of elucidation, its textual strategy and non-assertoric mode of 
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expression; it resembles Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism and its Chronicler 
Disclaimer. In bringing to light their common therapeutic goal of eliminating 
philosophy as traditionally practiced and the anxieties it generated, Fogelin takes the 
lead in comparing Wittgenstein with the Pyrrhonist. However, I have disputed his 
view that both Wittgenstein and Sextus accept the charge that their works are 
self-destroying. On my non-assertoric reading, their works do not articulate their 
positive theoretical positions or advance theories or doctrines of any sort at all. As a 
result, the problem of self-destruction causes no embarrassment to them. Instead, the 
charge of self-destroying only attests to the futility of the kinds of dogmatic 
theorising and system-building found in metaphysical or traditional philosophy. 
Sextus and Wittgenstein do not participate in dogmatic theorising and 
system-building and they are fiercely opposed to such endeavours in their works. In 
addition, I have also disputed Stern’s view that the critique of traditional philosophy 
by Wittgenstein and Sextus leads us not to a better philosophy but to stop 
philosophizing at all. The Pyrrhonists spent all their time on contradictory arguments 
but unlike the premature dialecticians or the misologists who stopped investigation 
thinking there was nothing sound or secure whatever in arguments, the Pyrrhonists 
did not fell under the spell of contradictory arguments. Their confrontational 
dialectic can serve the pursuit of truth as it can check against dogmatizing and rash 
assent with its arguing to equipollence. 
To conclude, in distinguishing different modes of non-assertoric discourse in my 
three case studies, the proposal of this thesis has dissolved some prevailing 
exegetical problems that confronted the readers who practise doctrinal readings. My 
proposal has also resolved the philosophical and interpretive challenges posed by the 
distinctive language-uses, unique styles and methods of the great philosophers. This 
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thesis can contribute to the on-going interest and investigations on philosophical 
writing, methods and styles by asserting itself on the proposal and discussion it 
offers. Hopefully it would be the greater success of this thesis if it does not come as 
an end but rather as the beginning in reinstating the non-assertoric modes of 
discourse in Plato, Sextus, Wittgenstein, and other great past or present 
philosophers. 
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